So proper inference and comprehension consists of something other than the application of the LNC, UI, MP, MT, UG, etc.?

Okay, I misunderstood what you were saying.

But you're wrong.  It does not define it.  The only premise that is logically implied by P-->Q is ~P v Q, this is the rule of implication.  Even if you apply this in the context of an argument, you still cannot derive a contradiction when you deny the antecedent or affirm the consequent.  You just become dead in your tracks.

Watch:

(1) P-->Q

(2) ~P

(3)  ~P v Q   <1; Imp>

(1) P-->Q

(2) Q

(3) ~P v Q <1; Imp>

Thus, these aren't fallacies by virtue of non-contradiction.  They are fallacies because there are no valid rules of inference which would allow you to infer P from Q or Q from ~P, even if you use implication.  The only rule of inference which allows you to isolate atomic sentences from "or" statements is disjunctive syllogism, and in order for that to work in this instance, you would need to posit P or ~Q, which would either be affirming the antecedent or denying the consequent, both valid inferences.

What you've cited are inferences that can made once you apply modus ponens and infer Q.  Actually, only two of them are.  P & Q and ~(P v Q) are the only inferences you can make by way of conjunction (i.e. not implied by P-->Q).  There is no way you could do that with (~P & Q) or ~(P & ~Q).

Watch: 
 

(1) P-->Q

(2) P

(3) Q  <1,2; MP>

(4) P & Q <2,3; Conj>

(1) P-->Q

(2) ~Q

(3) ~P <1,2; MT>

(4) ~P & ~Q <2,3; Conj>

(5) ~(P v Q) <4; DeM>

(1) P-->Q

(2) ~P

(3) ~Q <1,2; invalid inference>

(1) P-->Q

(2) ~P

(3) Q <1,2; invalid inference>

You could infer (~P v Q) or (~P v ~Q) by way of ADD, but you did not include those as part of your terms.

What you are saying is this:

(P-->Q)-->[(P & Q) v ~(P & ~Q) v (~P & Q) v (~P & ~Q)]

I've already established earlier in the thread that the relationship between antecedents and consequents are not necessarily analytic.  They can be synthetic as well.  That is why modus ponens is not a tautology.  Hence, my point still stands that denying the antecedent or affirming the consequent do not violate the law of non-contradiction, and yet they are still errors in reasoning.  The only recourse you would have is if you derived P & Q and then by rule of ADD, inferred the other three terms, in which case they would still not be derived by implication from P-->Q.

EDIT:  Notice how ~(P v Q) can also be derived by the same rules once you deny the antecedent.  Using that same fallacy, you are able to get two premises which are derivable when you are use proper reasoning.  Once again, no contradiction at all.

There really is no basis for that and there is absolutely no reason to trust logic if it is true.  I will just say that my biology necessitated a formal system under which my logic applies and declare myself the winner of the debate.

Under your worldview, your physical body does not do what you tell it to do because you are just a wind-up toy.

I admit that there are controversies in logic.  I never stated that everyone agrees with me. 

I meant "descriptions"

If we are going to continue discussing this (and I'm actually enjoying this), then we have to come to an agreement on terms.  I think there is a disconnect on the definitions that we are using.

I'm not sure what you mean.  In order to justify empirically that we exist, we would first have to be aware of our existence.

It seems that if I am going to keep talking to you I am going to need to go into more detail about my thinking.  I will start by defining some new terms. 

Internal reality is all of a person's thoughts, feelings, and sensory experiences (basically everything they experience.   This is the same definition I gave for mind).  The difference between the two is that everything you experience is called your internal reality, and everything some one else experiences  is called their mind.  The reason for this distinction may become clear if this discussion continues long enough.  Everything a person experiences is part of their internal reality, and a person can not experience external reality directly.

External reality is that which exists outside a persons internal reality.  It can not be experience directly, but statements about it can be made with the use of various assumptions. 

Internal truth is a truth statement in someones internal reality that is not meant to represent external reality. In other words It is not making a claim about external reality. Truth of this kind would be considered subjective. 

Examples of internal truths are values, feeling, and Ideals.

A specific example of an internal truth would be the sentence 'I feel hungry'.

External truth is a truth statement about external reality. Truth of the kind would be considered objective.

Examples of external truths are laws of physics, historical events, and physical objects.

Both external and internal truths are parts of a person's internal reality which includes everything a person experiences.  

Because it is imposable to experience external reality directly to make statements about external reality it is necessary to make assumptions.

Let me give you an example.  Before me right now is a cup.  Because I can see that cup, and because I can reach out and touch it, I feel that I am justified in believing that cup exists in external reality.   

In other words I assume that sight and touch are things that can be used as evidence for making a claim about external truth.

To make any claim that something is true requires some kind of evidence.  Different claims require different kinds of evidence.  Many internal truths are self evident.  For instance feeling hunger is evidence that one feels hungry. 

All external truth claims require both assumptions and evidence.  

To make statements about external reality requires both assumptions and evidence.  I, however, am not the one trying to make a statement about external reality.  For your argument to work it is necessary to prove all possible worlds contain the laws of logic.  This is a statement about external reality, and as such it must include some kind of assumptions, and some kind of evidence.  The only evidence you gave for this statement was that the inability to imagine a world without logic means that all possible worlds have logic. 

The assumption in this case seems to be that things that can't be imagined do not exist. 

The evidence is that a world without logic can't be imagined. 

I do not accept the assumption that only things that can be imagined exist.  It is arrogant to think that the limits of our imagination determine reality.   

edit: fixed spelling error

We can experience the world outside of us insofar that its elements interact with us and through this interaction reveal things about their nature.  For that to even happen, we require a conceptual apparatus that can comprehend the things which we perceive.  Comprehension necessitates logic. 

It is not necessary to prove that the laws of logic exist in every possible world since the very notion of proof and modal logic (i.e. the logic of possibility vs. necessity) itself presupposes laws of logic.  If I was to prove that the laws of logic were necessary, I would have to use the laws of logic and assume that they were, well, necessary.  It would, by the criteria of logic itself, be circular.  I cannot offer proof, I can only offer supporting ideas which is what I did by invoking the idea of retortion.  But retortion is not proof.  It is just a justification.

Anything which is self-evident, by its very definition, must exist necessarily and not contingently.  You've hijacked the term "self-evident" and applied it to internal mental states.  Those are actually not self-evident.  The claim, "I am hungry" is equally a posteriori as a claim about the Earth's gravitational pull.  It is not an analytic claim (i.e. hungry is not contained in the concept of I) and there are possible worlds where I could have not been hungry.  The only difference would be the nature of mental states themselves, insofar that their immateriality precludes the possibility of physical evidence being presented.  You've conflated this with the idea that they are self-evident and require no evidence, thereby misapplying the notion of a priority.

To say "there is no proof that the laws of logic exist in all possible worlds" is a stalemate position.  It cannot be disproved, but it also cannot be defended.  It is much like claiming, "There exists an invisible pink unicorn in my room which we cannot experience in any way nor can we attribute anything to it.  We can explain everything without invoking but guess what?  It is there." 

EDIT:  I want to give you credit though.  I can tell that you are a deep thinker and you have great potential as a philosopher.  I just think your worldview is misguided.  I used to be an atheist agnostic.  Lose your presuppositions and you will eventually come to God using your own logic or reason.  You are on the right track, do not let the noetic effect of sin blind you.

Of course you didn't, the point of raising the issue is to question your premise that logical laws are necessary to all possible worlds.  We can conceive of paradoxes and have encountered realities that cannot depend on logic. It would seem it is to our senses that logic is necessary, not to possibility itself.

Ok, so essentially, 'conceptual containment' refers to a relationship between two abstract things, like two labels applying to divergent components of one reality, yes?  

If so, then it is a dualistic idiom which supposes it necessary to draw in "abstract space" an explicit connection, that already exists in actual space, to describe what mind is doing.  Thus conceptual-containment refers to a theory of mind which presupposes duality.

I'm happy to do that, are there any terms in particular you would ask me to clarify?

And, presuming that by 'our existence' you are referring to the ego {the object defined as "I"}, it, simply, cannot be done. "I" cannot be aware of its individual existence because nowhere does it exist without the totality of the universe, without nature. One cannot be aware of that which never occurs. 

Nice man of straw, Fortunate_Son but I'm not calling into question the modality of logic, I'm calling into question your premise of absoluteness of its modality.

Maybe, not, but a lack of controversy regarding their ontological nature would, at least, need to be assumed in order to accept such a premise, No?

As I said, a straw man. That's not my criteria.

A study of the beingness of abstractions? I thought the name for that was epistemology?

Straight up Fortunate_Son, do you have a problem separating labels from objects in your application of logic, because it really still seems you do?

K, thanks.

Well before I clarify these terms I had better correct the misunderstanding here. I never stated that our existence is empirically verified. I said our existence itself is empirical (or empiricism itself if your prefer), we are physical interaction. Saying such is not affirming an "I", as it were, it is affirming a nature from which the inquiry arises.

Woah, that's just weird. What.the?

No, I'm calling into question the 'every' of the necessity.

Que? I don't understand how you think that retort is even relevant. Your premise is basically that identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle are necessary predicates of possibility. If that were true then there would be zero reason for controversy about it, since impossibility, by definition, precludes existence.

Impossible <---> Never Existing

Then it is theory of mind presupposing dualism. There is no way that what you said here contradicts this charge.

If it is an ontology of our comprehension then surely it is an epistemology of some kind, right?

I explained what I meant. You seem to have skimmed it on several occasions now, is there a reason it is passing under your nose unnoticed every time?

Empirical - or, if you prefer, empiricism itself. -- we are physical interaction.

This debate is ridiculous.

Not only because of all the people who are humouring the perversions of this "Fortunate Son"...

But because the debate itself is perverse. Where is it going? WTF are you talking about?

Who gives a flying fuck how many obscure mathematical symbols you can come up with? Logic?

WTF does logic matter when you don't have a heart? Symbol this and symbol that. Irrelevant.

This all is quite... disgusting.

Do yourself a favor and do not try ventriloquizing your friends. 

From earlier in the thread:

"Are you claiming that logic is reducible to brain chemistry?"  -- Fortunate Son

"No, I am a neutral monist, I do not believe consciousness resides in brains, guess again."  -- Eloise

Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the very same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical nor mental. This view denies that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally different things. Rather, neutral monism claims the universe consists of only one kind of stuff, in the form of neutral elements that are in themselves neither mental nor physical. These neutral elements might have the properties of color and shape, just as we experience those properties. But these shaped and colored elements do not exist in a mind (considered as a substantial entity, whether dualistically or physicalistically); they exist on their own.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monist

Thanks for the offer VB, but Fortunate_Son is correct in pointing out that my stance in monism is neutral so when I say, "we are physical interactions" I am not advancing a biologically based theory of mind, nor any strict "physicalism" for that matter.

However, your point about air and blood interacting, that is what I am talking about when I say we are physical interaction. That particular interaction is a key part of the precise description of our being animated, the exchange between blood and air is central to the ontology of life. So, yes, I am proposing that what has become basic in biochemistry* extends directly to theory of mind, only in a slightly different way than you've suggested.

* really this is just applied physics (as my sig. suggests)

The laws of logic are either contingent or they are necessary.  This is an antonymic pair, which means that there are no other options.

If you are going to say that we are calling into question logic and therefore cannot introduce criterion like antonymic dichotomies, then we have nowhere to go in this discussion.  It is simply a stalemate as you commit yourself to a position that is neither tenable nor falsifiable.

I'm sure a great biologist could tell you what would have to had been the case in order for lizards to have evolved with wings and the ability to breath fire.

What difference does it make?  Yes, I ascribe to Christian dualism.  I believe that the mind and the body are separate entities and that people at their most fundamental level are spiritual beings.  That's irrelevant to the issue of logic, though.  The laws of logic are ontologically dependent upon a mind, whether you believe that the mind is a material or immaterial entity.

Again, I'm not sure what you mean by "nature". 

My understanding is that "nature" is the set of all physical objects.  No, I do not believe the laws of logic have any basis in physical objects.  For example, you are not Eloise by some property of Eloiseness that exists in your body. 

I do not know what that means. 

Once again, I haven't a clue what you are talking about.