DISCLAIMER:  I think deconstructionist arguments are usually very stupid, so I gave up reading them many years ago, and am not qualified to discuss any recent breakthroughs that make the arguments less stupid.

Personally, I don't see how, if true, this argument helps the bible in any way.  One would assume that an all powerful deity could suspend the rules of logic to make a non-contradictory text if he wanted.

Furthermore, this argument would not absolve god of not knowing that his own text was inevitably flawed if he decided to play by the rules of logic and not do anything supernatural.  The bible does claim that it's perfect, so god's either a liar or ignorant.

I dare say that on the contradiction scale, the bible ranks pretty damn high.  I don't think even Atlas Shrugged has as many internal contradictions.

I've never devoted much time to biblical flaws.  I've always been of the opinion that if a person can't see that it's inherently contradictory, the big words I use in my everyday speech are just going to confuse them and make them wander away aimlessly.

Would a perfect 'word of god' be able to be imperfectly understood???

The direct quotations from 'god' in the bible are just as damnable as the actions taken by the followers. So I won't delve into the bible god's aberrant behavior if you promise to stay away from the allegedly good things allegedly quoted by followers in the bible.

If by 'word of god' you are referring to what voice you have heard then I must ask you if you understood it. How 'perfectly' did you understand it? And most importantly: Were you capable of implementing this 'perfect' word into your life?

          So contradictions in the Bible are not your biggest gripe? I did not know that. I read through your article and now I see where more of gripe rests. Thanks for the reply Rook and Hamby. I posted this question to see if there was any possible fruits that may come from it. However, I see now that what I was questioning isn't really at issue in terms of the Bible as literature. If I think of anything else to ask, I'll let you guys know.

Actually, several theologians I know point to the fact that the bible does not assert itself to be "inerrant", etc.--including 2 Tim 3:16:

"All scripture is inspired by God and is useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, so that everyone who belongs to God may be proficient, equipped for every good work" (16-17)

What is says scripture is:

-Inspired by God

-Useful for: teaching, reproof/rebuke, training in righteousness, helping people to do good

...nothing about "infallible".  You might presuppose that these things entail the Bible to be "inerrant, infallible, etc."; however that also presupposes that 'correct propositions' are the essence of Christianity.  But what if the essence of Christianity is something experiential, relational, and dynamic rather than woodenly propositional? 

Christian scholars of the Hebrew Bible such as Walter Brueggemann openly point to the contradictions of the Bible as being evidence of a religion whose essence consists of relationship and dialogue between people who are trying to figure this God thing out.  I think we see some evidence of this being the case in the early Christian church as well through theological disagreements of the apostles, and the continuing dialogue and debate among the early church fathers. 

So to go back to the the 2 Timothy verse, it's interesting, I think, that the heart of the Bible's "usefulness" is not for the end of correct indoctrination; rather, it is helpful in order to push a person toward the ideal of "righteousness" (i.e. right-living).  The essence, then, is something quite experiential, rather than propositional.  And if part of that experience or right-living entails debate and trying to "figure this God thing out" then seeing things like contradictions, as well as the ambiguous and enigmatic teachings of Jesus, would be "useful" toward that end.

At least that's what I think.  I've got a lot to learn still.

I think you're going in the right direction in that there should not be a one-to-one connection between the two.  I would not say that "Word of God" and "the Bible" are one and the same.  Karl Barth is an example of one who would say the same.   I don't think you can reduce "the Word of God" to "the Bible", although the Bible can function as "the Word of God."  More precisely, I think, the Bible is the written record of "the word of God" coming to the community of faith. 

There is, then, a step of separation--if you will--from "God's word" proper, and "God's word" as it is recorded by humans in the Bible, and canonized as authoritative by that community.  As such, I don't think that alleged errors in the scriptures have anything to do with God's "omniscience," but rather our lack of it as humans.

This might sound strange at first, but what if a lack of "unifying design" is itself part of the unifying design?  Indeed, a lack of propositional unity would cause a problem if the essence of the faith required unified propositions.  But, as I mentioned above, what if the essence of the faith was in the dialectic itself, a dialectic that manifests itself within the walls of scripture as apparent "contradictions": such as Job contradicting the message of Proverbs, etc.

scientific process dude.  If your hypothesis proves insufficient, you adjust it a bit, and then try it again, and again, and again until you find something that works.  You don't give up until you find the project to be hopeless, and I'm far from that point. 

I see your point GOD, for once.    

Hehe, thanks Hamby.

I could be wrong, but the Christian post-modernists seem to be relatively fresh meat for refutation.  Most anti-Christian arguments I've seen (especially from atheists) seem to be aimed at a modernist conception of Christianity.

Good.  That's the best thing to focus on when refuting any position: refuting it internally (e.g. through intrinsic contradictions). 

The post-modern-ish Christian positions I'm talking about involve a bit of what I'm sort of playing with here in my posts: a faith that is less proposition, and more experientially-based.  Walter Brueggemann is a good example of a postmodern Old Testament theologian (check out his Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy).  He openly points to contradictions of the Hebrew Bible, but suggests that these "contradictions" are evidence of the dialectical nature of the faith community.  He also frequently points to the poetry and art in the scripture, speaking of "Truth" that transcends mere proposition.  

N.T. Wright would probably be considered a postmodern New Testament theologian.  I'm reading his tome New Testament and the People of God  (in bits and pieces...) right now.  In it he seeks to develop a sort of fresh perspective of the New Testament from the ground up, starting with a "Critical Realist" philosophy of epistemology, as well as a philosophy of history, and literary genre, and so on.  It's a massive effort he put forth, and a very interesting read so far. 

I honestly don't know of any postmodern systematic theologians.  The bent postmodern Christianity seems to be taking would almost make such a "systematic" attempt a contradiction, but I could be wrong. 

As far as writings on a postmodern approach to church goes, the authors affiliated with the "emerging church" are interesting to read: Brian McLaren and Rob Bell to name a couple. 

Ha ha... I haven't heard of the 'Chewbacca defense" before, but I'm a fan of Star Wars! 

Wright and Brueggemann are both incredibly interesting, and eloquent writers--if you like good writing. 

"Critical Realist" epistemology is actually the preferred epistemology of most working scientists, from what I understand.  Bertrand Russell is even included among their ranks, if I'm not mistaken.  I think it can basically be summed up by saying that while absolute certainty is impossible, the pursuit of knowledge is not necessarily a fruitless enterprise.  I think Michael Polanyi is an important figure in this line of epistemology, who points out that presuppositions are the necessary tools we use to work out a picture of reality; the only way to examine anything is with the "tool" of a presupposition.  If you want to think critically about your presupposition, you can only do it by using yet another presupposition.  As such, Wright suggests that "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." 

Following this way of thinking, one does not really begin with a "blank slate" and then acquire "beliefs" as evidence for them comes in.  Rather, one must begin with beliefs, and then solidify and refine these beliefs as needed. 

That is Critical Realist epistemology--as I understand it--in a nutshell.  Interesting stuff. 

Ok.  Not what I was remembering.  It sounds as if this is going to end up at the supposed "problem of induction," which is addressed really well by probability (Bayes).  I say addressed because there's some quibbling over whether or not the problem is solved or circumvented, but for my money, if you can legitimately circumvent a problem, you have solved it....

I don't know too many scientists who would even use the phrase "the pursuit of knowledge is not necessarily a fruitless enterprise."  I think it would be more like "The pursuit of knowledge is the only way to effectively gain specific knowledge."  The descent into nihilism negates the argument that uncertainty = no knowledge.  The only question is whether or not we can come up with an intermediate definition of knowledge between deductive certainty and complete ignorance.  The traditional "justified true belief," where justification comes from empirical scientific certainty, and true comes from accurate data, seems to do just fine.

If these folks are not going to end up at the problem of induction, how are they going to get to even empirical plausibility for god?  If they're not going to get to empirical plausibility, how are they going to justify knowledge?

As for presuppositions, I think this is adequately addressed by noting the difference between individual colloquial presupposition and the existence of justification.  I do not need to presuppose my own existence, for I experience it directly. From there, if I take the time, I can deduce logic and math entirely for myself.  With these tools, I can deduce probability theory.  At this point, all I have to do is avoid nihilism by admitting that what I perceive is a mental representation of an actual reality, and I'm home free.  Plug in what, by all available standards, appears to be empirically true, and trust probability, which is deductively derived.

Where's the problem?

Maybe I'm oversimplifying this, but unless he's saying that I, specifically, presuppose lots of things, I'm not sure where he's going, at least in trying to get to god.  It's true that almost everything assumes the truth of something else, but those truths are not arbitrary.  Rather, they are either probabilistically virtually certain, or they are empirically virtually certain.  In other words, I don't get to make up my own assumptions.  They must be justified (as per our knowledge definition).

Well, biology teaches us that we are not blank slates.  We have instinctive and genetic dispositions which we cannot avoid.  We are programmed for the syntax of language, for example.  I know that if I'm in a coffee shop with a bunch of philosophy undergraduates, we'd have to go through the whole, "Yeah, but that's arbitrary" thing, but in practical reality (which is what this is all about, right?) we've got three options:

1) Reality exists, and is perceivable, in which case probability works, and all we have to do is get past the idea that the word certain has to mean mathematical certainty.  Then, science wins, and there's no epistemological basis for god-belief.

2) Reality exists, and we have no way to accurately perceive it.  Why are we having this discussion?

3) Reality does not exist, and I am a figment of my own imagination... except for that whole Descartes thing... so I gotta go back to #1.