Theism and Epistemic Scepticism
Offline The creationist employment of epistemic scepticism is a marvellous example of the mind numbing stupidity of this doctrine. In brief, the argument goes (and it has many variants) that the reason that we observe evidence for such-and-such a phenomenon that appears to support a paradigm that would contradict their interpretation of Scripture (chronology, etc) is because they were deliberately placed there by God, that is, that the universe has been set up to appear as if to be much older than it actually is. Of course fossils were designed to "test our faith". (Rolls eyes)
One can only marvel at the sheer lack of gumption of someone bravely idiotic enough to venture this idea. A common response is the “Last Thursdayism” notion, that is, that it would be equally valid to assert that everything was actually created Last Thursday, including all our memories, to make it appear as what we think the history of the universe and ourselves has been.
At any rate, what the “last Thursdayism” argument demonstrates about what I call the Argument From Trickery, hereafter referred to as AT, is that it is essentially a variant of epistemic scepticism. Epistemic scepticism constitutes arguing that reliable knowledge is not possible because it is not possible to know that our faculties for gaining knowledge are reliable in and of themselves. The most familiar example is Descartes Demon, or his question on the distinguishing between dreaming and wake-ness. Yet Descartes was not the first to come up with the notion. A more modern conceptualization is the solipsistic brain in the vat hypothesis.
None of the EP arguments actually affirm anything, rather that because we cannot establish that it isn’t the case that our epistemological faculties are being manipulated, hereafter referred to as SP (Sceptical possibility) such as that my experiences are being generated by neural input/output simulations such as in the Matrix, that I can actually have knowledge about the world which I inhabit. In brief:
1. To know Q, S must know ¬SP
2. S does not know ¬Sp
3. S does not know Q
Again, we can marvel at the theist who fails to see the internal contradiction in using an EP argument to support a proposition:
1. If SP, ¬Q
2. S knows SP
3. S knows ¬Q
Naturally, they cannot articulate how on Earth S is supposed to know SP hence ¬Q. The claim of SP is an ad hoc justification for something that has been refuted. The utterance “S knows SP” leads to an internal contradiction, rather akin to me asserting “I am actually a brain in a vat”. The obvious point to take away is something that is so simple to grasp it is simply a marvellous demonstration of stupidity that anyone could fail to grasp it: If SP, then S cannot know Q! If it is true that such-and-such epistemological faculty is actually being manipulated in some way, then
a) It is impossible to know this (S cannot know SP)
b) Knowledge claims, any knowledge claims, cannot be affirmed (S cannot know Q)
The claim that an agent is manipulating our world (God, in this case, plays the role of Descartes demon) is not verifiable, but a true EP is not meant to be verifiable, and cannot be verified. Rather, by virtue of that it cannot be falsified, S cannot know Q! Bizarrely, these people act in a manner as if the assertion “SP” somehow supports their ability to make knowledge claims, rather than completely eliminating the concept of reliable knowledge altogether! The utterance “God is manipulating the world to make it appear as if Q is true” where Q are all the concomitant claims made by empirical science which contradict the beliefs of those making the claim, is an absurd utterance. As we have seen, it is impossible to sensibly utter “SP is true” without leading to internal contradiction (undermining your ability to make the knowledge claim K that SP is true). In addition, in this case, it is merely an ad hoc which is used to avoid the knowledge claim at hand being falsified. We’ll call this knowledge claim (Genesis account, etc.) B. As before, Q refers to our empirical findings:
1. If Q, ¬B and if B, ¬Q
2. Q appears true
3. B
4. Therefore SP
5. Therefore ¬Q
6. Therefore B
One doesn’t need a vast intellect to spot the unsubtle error in the argument. I won’t spell it out.
"Physical reality” isn’t some arbitrary demarcation. It is defined in terms of what we can systematically investigate, directly or not, by means of our senses. It is preposterous to assert that the process of systematic scientific reasoning arbitrarily excludes “non-physical explanations” because the very notion of “non-physical explanation” is contradictory.
-Me
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bump. I'd like to include a Predicate QL symbolization key for this, to demonstrate the invalidity directly. However, I can't force the forum post to accept Quantifiable logic connectives and quantifiers.
"Physical reality” isn’t some arbitrary demarcation. It is defined in terms of what we can systematically investigate, directly or not, by means of our senses. It is preposterous to assert that the process of systematic scientific reasoning arbitrarily excludes “non-physical explanations” because the very notion of “non-physical explanation” is contradictory.
-Me
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You just scared the crap out of me, I was actually able to follow your logic. I feel smart.
BRAVO....
Man is the only animal in all of nature that cannot accept its own mortality.
I think you mis-characterize two things. First you mis-characterize skeptical theism. Second you presented epistemic skepticism too weak. Skeptical theism is the view that denies the following inference:
Where S is an epistemic agent, if S can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some apparent horrific evil, then it is likely that there is no such reason.
Usually skeptical theist point to the large gap between "God knowledge" and "Human Knowledge", capitalizing on the fact that we are fallible knowers, if we are knowers at all. Most skeptical theists are local skeptics, meaning they are only skeptics about particular premises or propositions. This means they are not global skeptics, they do not argue that most people don't know anything (the brain in the vat arguments are arguments for global skepticism, so it's kind of odd that you would present these arguments in conjunction with skeptical theism). Presumably your critique is that theists pick and choose which premises to be skeptical about, but they certainly are not using any argument like "proposition p contradicts theism, therefore i should be skeptical about p", nor does your critique mean that skeptical theism is false. At least most skeptical theists i've read don't present any argument like you mentioned; they just don't find the above inference very plausible, perhaps for the same reason atheists don't find the following premise very plausible:
Where S is an epistemic agent, if S can't think of any atheist explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe, then it is likely that there is no such explanation.
Last, epistemic skepticism I think is much stronger than you had presented. Epistemic skeptics often use the following argument:
(1) If S knows that S has hands, S knows that S is not a brain in a vat.
(2) S doesn't know that S is not a brain in a vat.
(3) Thus S doesn't know that S has hands.
(4) If S doesn't know that S has hands, then S doesn't know a lot.
(5) Thus, S doesn't know a lot. (3, 4)
(2) in the first argument usually has a defence along the lines that there is nothing in S's experience that could suggest that S is not a brain in a vat. In short they agree with you that S can't even in principle know that S is not a brain in a vat.
In defence of the very first proposition, it's quite simple: If S has hands, then S is not a brain in a vat.
Surely you would not deny this. But if S knows p and S understands that q follows from p then S knows that q (this is a closure principle, that is widely accepted today).
Now we argue as follows:
(6) Assume S knows that S has hands.
(7) But if S has hands, it logically follows that S is not a brain in a vat.
(Eight) Thus, S knows that S is not a brain in a vat. (from closure, 6 and 7)
(9) Thus, If S knows that S has hands, then S knows that S is not a brain in a vat. (6 - 8)
So either you deny closure, and thus (1) or you deny (2). Presumably you accept (2), since you argue that there is no way you can even in principle verify that you are not a BIV, that's fine. So some how you deny (1). Now i'm interested, do you deny closure? Doesn't it seem odd to argue that if I know something, say F, and I understand the logical entailment from F, I don't know what logically follows from F?
Also the great lottery problems are usually used in defence of Epistemic skepticism, for a good overview of the arguments see John Hawthorne's book on the subject.
Finally with respect to why some people are epistemic skeptics, a lot of epistemologists suggest that knowledge requires what is known to be true. So, if S knows that p, p must be true.
Now listen to this statement: "I know that p, but i might be wrong". Doesn't this sound just awful? Some epistemologist think that it does sound awful so they suggest that knowledge cannot fallible (ie we can't have knowledge of p, where p might be wrong, or that the knowledge of p might be wrong), they say that in order to have knowledge we must have certainty. But if knowledge is not fallible, then we don't know a whole lot of anything. Thus we don't know a whole lot of anything.
The title may have been a misnomer. I was addressing the creationist ad hoc as to why we find evidence contradicting their assertions.
This article does not address the problem of evil.
Again, you misconstrue the argument. This argument is only with respect to the creationist argument which states as an ad hoc that God is manipulating the world in order to "test our faith" (or words to that effect". This is similar to the Cartesian Demon thought experiment. This post only addressed this particular creationist argument, which is more or less a form of global skepticism as well as an ad hoc and a total abdication of intellectual responsibility. The only difference between said creationist argument and a normal global skeptic argument is that a skeptic is arguing against the possibility of knowledge based on the possibility that our epistemological faculties our faulty. Creationists who try to use the ad hoc justification of why their propositions have been proven false from an empirical standpoint are trying to argue that said faculties are faulty by employing said faculties, hence shooting themselves in the foot. That was my argument. Perhaps I should change the title.
This is exactly the same as what I wrote. It's just the reverse of Moore's argument. One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.
I'm not denying the principle or Moore's modus tollens. I accept that if S knew q, then S knows ¬SP. That's fine. My argument was that these creationists are asserting that they know that SP is true. But that is logically impossible. If SP is true, then S does not know q, and surely if S did not know q, S could not know SP. It's fine to say that if S knew q, S would know ¬SP, but what I was pointing out was that the ad hoc argument I called the Argument from Trickery suggests that S knows SP. But like I said, that's impossible. It's very well and good to say that if BIV (Brain-in-a-vat) or something to that effect is possible then S knowing q is not. Creationists who appeal to SP are using a meaningless ad hoc justification for their beliefs.
You'll have to refresh me. When I think of the lottier problem I think of the Gettier Counterexample problem (or are you and I referring to the same thing?)
This is now off-topic, but I'll go with it. I'd find it worse to concede that one cannot have contingent/uncertain knowledge. It would present a severe problem for epistemology. Obviously:
For S to know q, S must know q with certainty
S does not know a lot of things certainly
S does not know a lot of things
Under this, only a few statements would be considered knowledge, like Descartes statement. But, I prefer to say that most knowledge claims are contingent, and that the epistemic justificatory force, whatever it might be, can be fallible. A priori reasoning, it is well known, can be both defeasible and fallible (BonJour wrote a lot on this subject) even though many consider it superior to a posteriori reasoning. Presumably, to know something, it must be true, and you must justify its truth, but even that is not necessarily enough, since you might be lucky to have knowledge that is unrelated to your JTB (justified true belief). So, if I was driving, saw some poodles in a field cut to look like sheep, inferred there were sheep, and happened to be right since there were some sheep hiding out of sight behind some boulders, I would have a JTB, but no knowledge. When we say that most knowledge claims are contingent, it makes life a lot easier since it allows for things like induction and so forth. That's why we have degrees of certainty, like:
I am fairly certain that p
I think that p
Probably p
Maybe p
p could be right
definitely p
p is more likely than not p
etc.
"Physical reality” isn’t some arbitrary demarcation. It is defined in terms of what we can systematically investigate, directly or not, by means of our senses. It is preposterous to assert that the process of systematic scientific reasoning arbitrarily excludes “non-physical explanations” because the very notion of “non-physical explanation” is contradictory.
-Me
Books about atheism
I see what you mean now, i suppose the title threw me off. Since skeptical theism is a defended view in contemporary metaphysics specifically dealing with the problem of evil. You're addressing a different philosophical debate than I had first suspected. I'm no creationist, so I'm probably not going to defend them. But the epistemology interests me so I'll address a few of the concerns you raised with the epistemic picture.
I think I follow you here, if you're a creationist you're going to have to be an infallibalist, and a lot of them are. So I think you're on the right track. But I wonder if they would just say that they don't know that SP is true, they just know that SP is a possibility. And because SP is a possibility, then they don't know that q. There's no way that S can know that ~SP (ie whether SP or ~SP is true), thus you can't know that q. And i'm not sure if ad hoc-ness is the best critique that you can give. That is to say, I'm not sure that ad hoc-ness can really get rid of the epistemelogical challenge that the creationist presents. I think most atheists are content with just saying things like, "look I know that q, thus I know that ~SP". And leave it at that. If the creationist wants to say "that's ad hoc" you can just nail them with the same critique. But their argument makes sense, it's not really that meaningless.
The lottery problems are basically this. Suppose I have a lottery ticket. if fallibalism is true, then I should be able to know that my lottery ticket is a loser. But I can't know that my lottery ticket is a loser, after all it's possible that it could win. Thus fallibalism is false. That's it in a nutshell, and I've greatly simplified it but there is a lot of literature in epistemology about it. In particular by Hawthorne and Dreske.
Well skepticism is a major problem in epistemology. Irregardless of whether we think our knowledge attributions are contingent, and whether this makes life easier, this does not make fallibalism true. If knowledge attributions are contingent then there is some amount of luck involved in being right, and if we're just lucky that we're right, then we don't have knowledge. It seems extremely odd to say that "S knows that p, with x amount of certainty, but S could be wrong". And the argument above seems incredibly plausible, you can't verify that you are not a brain in a vat. Even looking at your hand and saying "I know I have a hand" is no verification for that. Thus you don't know that you have hands. This seems to be very relevant to you're whole argument against skeptical creationists, they argue that the mere possibilty that you could be wrong, makes you not have knowledge and sufficient justification. They can be fine with the idea that their views are not sufficiently justified, but their point seems to be neither are the atheists.
Anyways I'm no skeptic, but my point was that the argument for skepticism could have been presented stronger.
Yes, you and I were talking about the same thing.
It does mean that Justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge, by the problem already mentioned. We might be lucky to believe things that are true, but for false reasons (like in the case with the lottery ticket).
Of course. That's why Moore's refutation is not very good. It is perfectly possible that you think you have a hand, but that really you are a brain in a vat which is being simulated to have the experience whereby you believe you have this hand.
I don't think that is what they are saying. And this is merely my experience, that they are saying that what they believe must be infallible as such evidence to the contrary must be indicative of some form of SP. This is a problem because there is no reason to suppose what they believe must be infallible, and furthermore, even though it can be said that it is possible that some SP is true, therefore undermining our ability to gain knowledge, it would be internally contradictory to say that SP must be true. When you think about it, it's really a bizarre statement. How on Earth could I possibly claim I must be a brain in a vat. Similarily, how could I possibly claim that the world must be being manipulated to decieve us?
"Physical reality” isn’t some arbitrary demarcation. It is defined in terms of what we can systematically investigate, directly or not, by means of our senses. It is preposterous to assert that the process of systematic scientific reasoning arbitrarily excludes “non-physical explanations” because the very notion of “non-physical explanation” is contradictory.
-Me
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