Understanding Moderate Religion
Introduction
As some of you will know, although I am an atheist I don't think that theism is necessarily irrational.
I also think that religion is misunderstood in 'militant' atheist circles. (I used 'militant' for want of a better word - you guys know what I mean...)
The common view is that fundamentalism is real religion and that moderatism is simply those who can't bring themselves to fully accept or reject fundamentalist religion so cherry pick as what suits them. I think that this is a narrow view that misunderstands religion.
So now I've made a claim on what religion isn't, I need to now offer a positive account of what religion is and then provide evidence that my account accurately responds to the real life practices of religious people.
Btw, this isn't accusatory in anyway.
I know that people here like and respect moderates in a lot of ways.
As far as I know I see two main reasons why people here feel the need to target moderates too:
1) Intelectual honesty and consistency - even if a moderate's belief is benign, if it's just as unscientifically supported as the fundamentalist then is it right for us to hold double standards for the ones we like over the ones we dislike? If we genuinely think a moderate's belief to be wrong then should we just pat them on the head and let them believe a falsehood? Do we not respect them enough to be capable of critical thinking and wanting to see the truth?
2) Moderatism feeds fundamentalism - even if moderates themselves are benign, their being there feeds fundamentalism. Fundamentalists get away with a lot because their antics are closely related to practices that are more respected. It takes a lot to distance yourself from mainstream beliefs so the survival of a belief system often requires it to share as much as with mainstream as possible. That the mainstream is 'half way' to fundamentalism gives them much more than they want.
I think that my arguments in this topic will provide a genuine answer to the first one and will possibly offer some ideas in the way of the second.
Preliminaries
Before we go on, I just want to make some clarifications on what it is for a belief to be irrational.
A belief irrational if there is some flaw in the reasoning.
Perhaps a subtle fallacy in conclusions drawn or maybe false premise behind it.
This doesn't mean that the person is irrational in believing it - the RRS accept that the theist themselves might be being rational, i.e. reasoning with the best knowledge they have at that time, but the belief itself isn't rational as their reason would reject it if they knew better.
Another point I think needs acknowledging is the 'context' of calling a belief irrational - why we see it as a bad thing.
If you think about the part that beliefs play in our lives, how we will sit down because we believe a chair is below us - an incorrect belief would lead to us falling.
We need beliefs to be accurate for them to have practical purpose in our lives. Reason is our way of making beliefs as accurate as possible, so to have a belief that is irrational is of little use to us and will affect our decision making for the worse.
So because we need a 'belief' to be accurate and reason is the best way to ensure this accuracy, we want our beliefs to be as rational as possible.
In a similar way, an action is rational if it reason declares it the best way to achieve the aim that it was supposed to.
The last point I want to make is one about language.
Language is a very diverse thing and this can lead to all sorts of philosophical confusions.
I'm sure you're all familiar with the fallacy of equivocation - it's when we confuse that the same word can mean two different things.
e.g. A bank is a good place to put money and a bank is on the edge of a river so I should throw my money into the river.
That one was pretty obvious - it's the more subtle ones that cause the real confusion.
Wittgenstein liked to use the word 'game' as an example.
He claimed that the various uses of the word game were related in various ways but were also subtly different.
He claimed that whatever 'essence' of 'definition' you tried to tie down to the word 'game' you could find a game out there that was counter example.
In a similar way, I think that our real world usage of the word 'belief' doesn't quite reduce to the way we were using it above.
Although belief as something that needs to be accurate for practical purposes is a common way we use 'belief', it is not the only way we use that word.
I think that 'religious belief' is subtly different to 'practical belief'.
Not completely different - they will be closely related and the differences will be subtle.
However, the differences will be enough to make a difference on how they ought to be evaluated and thereby leave them different on how they should be judged to be 'rational' or not. With that, I am ready to finally put forward my hypothesis on what religious belief is.
The Hypothesis - Religious belief is subtly different to practical belief and these differences warrant a difference in evaluation.
If I am saying that religious belief is to be evaluated differently to practical belief then I need to claim that they have different purposes.
Practical belief has the obvious practical usage - if we want to eat an Orange then we need to know where to find an orange and that our beliefs on where to find an orange will determine our success or failure in this.
My claim is that religious belief has a different purpose. Rather than instant practical use, the value of religious belief is the way it affects our outlook on the world.
That is, the psychological effect that these 'articles of faith' have on our life in general.
So for a religious belief to be valuable/commendable it would have to:
a) Have a positive effect on our life - particularly in our morality and personal meaning and happiness.
b) NOT interfere with our practical rationality - i.e. not contradict our scientific knowledge.
Bear in mind that other than this difference in justification/application, this belief would be pretty much the same.
It would be psychologically similar, 'feel' similar, so if you'd ask someone if <insert religious claim> really happened then they'd say yes.
The only difference would be that they wouldn't "feel right" about applying religious doctrine practically in the same way we do with other beliefs and justify these beliefs by the effect that it has on their life.
My belief that this is the natural state of religion and that literalists on both sides have misunderstood it, both by assuming that religious belief and practical belief are the same thing.
One dismisses religious belief for not holding to the standards of practical belief, the other bastardizes their practical belief in an attempt to unify both together.
(While I both think they've misunderstood religion to the same degree, I think that the dismissal of religion is much less severe than trying to unify them.)
Having said that, while I think that there is argument for moderate religion being natural religion and fundamentalism being the perversion, I'll leave that for another topic as I think there's enough to debate here as it is. For now I'll just settle for the fact that religion/theism can be 'not irrational'.
Notice that I've said 'not irrational' rather than 'rational'.
If religious practice is a different practice to normal belief to be valued in a different way then it's quite likely that the evaluation would be different too.
Rather than rational or irrational, I think that religion is a-rational and would be valued as more 'good/bad' or 'humanitarian/inhuman' rather than 'correct/incorrect' or 'rational/irrational'.
The consequence of this hypothesis would be that there's such thing as 'religious belief' where:
a) The 'beliefs' are like normal belief except do not have direct practical application.
(Any good religion should have clauses like "Thou shalt not put the lord to the test" or "The lord works in mysterious ways" or "God is ultimately beyond man's expectations/understanding"
b) The religious belief is to be justified by the positive effect on the person and people.
("Before I accepted Jesus into my life... blah blah blah..." - well, you might not find this convincing but atleast they're arguing for the right thing! )
c) Although they often take care to make sure that there is no direct contradiction between their religious beliefs and practical ones, they don't feel the need to scientifically justify their religious beliefs.
(Hence the employment of 'faith' and the 'God of Gaps')
My argument is simply that moderate religion be judged by it's effect on the person.
There could easily be a counter argument in the form of "But religion is bad for the person psychologically/spiritually/socially too because..." which is fair enough - the only conclusion I am trying to settle here is that moderate religion is to be judged by its effect on the person rather than how well it matches scientific fact. I consider it still possible that even moderate religion might fall flat in the face of this kind of judgement too, but I'd be surprised.
Evidence that moderate religion really is like this and that I'm not merely projecting how I'd like it to be.
So how would I go about providing evidence that religion is 'this way' rather than 'that way'?
I've made two claims about moderates regarding their religious belief, that they don't treat it like practical knowledge and that they justify it by the effect that it has on their lives.
I can justify this by picking out typical behaviours and phrases that we expect from them and show that they fit my theory.
Evidence that moderates don't treat articles of faith like practical knowledge
First see if you can even get out of them a belief that has practical application.
I mean, they do base practices on their religion but not with direct consequences.
The religious practice is justified as a whole for other reasons.
In the meantime, individual beliefs do not have individual applications.
My belief in gravity means that I would happily bet my entire life savings that if I was to hold a plastic ball (you're not going to hustle me with magnets here! ) in the air and let go then it would drop to the ground. Do the moderates have any religious beliefs that they could base bets on in the same way?
A lot of Catholics believe that the bread and wine is transformed into the body and blood of Christ - see what response you get if you ask them what affect eating human flesh and blood has on their diet, and if they happen to be vegetarian then do they pass by the Eucharist?
If you were to ever make the claim "If Christianity was true then God would X and Y - after all, that's the character of the God described!" then they are likely to say that "Religion doesn't work like that", or "You're missing the point" or "The lord works in mysterious ways" or "It's not your place to understand God's plan, just trust."
Are these actions and phrases common to the moderates you're familiar with?
Do you disagree that they are characteristics of moderates or do you disagree that they fit my theory?
Evidence that moderates justify their beliefs on their effect rather than their scientific accuracy/certainty
It's often been said that the rationality that they apply to the other areas of their life seem to bypass the moderate's treatment of religion.
What's more, they vigourously argue that it's just not appropiate, often trying to point out other areas in our life where we don't feel the need to be scientific.
They are fond of the 'God of Gaps' (both unsupported and uncontradicted by science)
Even where contradictions appear between their scientific and religious beliefs, they try to brush them aside as if they didn't matter.
They clearly see their religiousness as a-scientific, living out the NOMA split as described by Gould.
So what happens when you ask them why they believe?
They will talk about morality and meaning.
They will talk about what religion does for them on a daily basis - they clearly draw strength from it.
They often have anecdotes and stories about themselves or friends or even people they've read about.
The stories will often involve a rebellious character who didn't think much to religion, had some problems, accepted religion and that solved them.
They often consider their religion to be an integral part of their moral practice too.
Whether religion really is a help in these things is up for debate - my point is that it's these things that justify or discredit religion.
Another evidence is how they judge differing beliefs.
Moderates tend to be happy that other faiths can lead to God while others who claim to be of the same faith are 'false'.
How do they judge who is close to God and who it not?
Once again it's the character of the believers.
Those religious sects that do bad (e.g. the inquisition, the terrorists, extortionists) etc are those who have lost their way.
(The cheeky bastards even call them atheists!!)
Those of other religions who do good (e.g. peaceful Buddhists) are often seen as being close to God in the eyes of the moderate.
Again, you will have to decide yourselves whether my charitarizing of the moderate fits with your own experience.
I think it's characteristics we're all familiar with, it's just that I'm offering a new interpretation to the data, one that wasn't considered before and one that I personally think fits better.
These examples were the best I could come up with from the top of my head.
The verification/falsification will be a more gradual process.
Now the theory is in your mind, it will subconsciously test it everytime you meet a moderate.
Over time you will gradually get the feeling that the theory fits moderate behaviour or you will find yourself feeling that it doesn't.
(That'll be your subconscious brain functions giving the results of their analysing your experiences)
I'd like to think that means you'll start to agree with me within the year but it's perhaps more likely you'll finally start presenting all those counter examples that your brain has been picking up!!
I guess time will tell!
What does this mean for fundamentalism.
There's always been this misconception towards fundamentalists, that they are the ones who follow the Bible properly rather than cherry pick.
Truth is, they cherry pick just as much as moderates do, if not more so.
Or where they don't they're willing to completely contradict themselves.
You see, religious belief can often mean what you want it to mean at that moment in time.
The religious believer's interpretation of their Holy Book will depend on the Zeitegeist of their time and place.
Fundamentalists do this to a higher degree than anyone.
God is the most loving, caring and understanding when they're trying sell him to people and then turns into a wrathful monster who dishes out eternal damnation when they want to scare you into obedience.
They know the absolute truth about things when they're feeling assertive and want to tell you that X is sinful and that Y actually happened but will declare God beyond all understanding when pressed to give a rational justification for their beliefs.
In the same way, they will play the "This is the hard truth - not what you want God to be..." when arguing with moderates and then pull out the "You rationalists want to take all the mystery of life and turn love and feeling into some mathematical equation" when the sceptics start challenging them on the facts.
They are happy to flip from one to another depending on who they are debating.
I don't think that many people change their mind on a major issue from a single argument.
A single argument might be the final straw the triggers the change in mind but more often than not it takes a several points to be on the back of the mind before the person is open to change. After all, if our idea only has a couple of slight problems we see them as something we can work around, that answers will come to.
Some changes will come around through attacking the purely unscientifficness of religious belief, but I don't think that it will get very far on its own.
After all, when you consider the reasons why people have faith, scientific fact is irrelevent.
Apologetics has never converted anyone, merely helped people who were attracted to the lifestyle of religion and were hoping for a way to find a loophole in their scientific knowledge.
(Is it a coincidence that Strobel found the Christian arguments more convincing after he admired the personality changes in his wife?)
If we want to attack fundamentalism then we want to attack it from all sides at once.
"My beliefs are on faith, on hope and love" is presented as an excuse to dismiss sceptical criticism, perhaps just the day after they used "You can't just believe what you want" to dismiss the humanitarian appeals of moderates.
That's why I see moderates as an ally against fundamentalism rather than a cover for it.
Fundies can only use moderates as cover where the sceptic's remarks affect moderates.
If we were to work with moderates to bring forward the ideal anti-fundy arguments, ones that targeted objective claims while accepting the validity of personal faith, fundamentalism would have no cover at all.
Not that we wouldn't have disagreement and debate with moderates too, just that would be a leisurely topic to debate for fun, rather than one that our politics and future critically hangs on.
Anysway, here's my theory of moderate religion.
Thoughts?
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Hamby, Tilberian,
I have a question...
What do you think comes first. The function of the belief (i.e. what the belief is used for), or how the belief is believed (i.e. metaphorical, or factual/literal)?
Example proposition: Jesus rose from the dead.
Surely it is the implications of how the belief is believed which determine function, behaviour, etc.
In other words: before someone can think the function of the above belief is to save people (from damnation), they must first believe the proposition is historically/factually/literally true (in addition to the notion of damnation).
Strafio is arguing that they first determine the function, and that determines how they believe it.
Interested on your view on this.
So do you hold that the beliefs of moderates do not contain any scientific/historical/factual import?
I think they do.
Even if they themselves hold their believes to be outside reason (although I'm not sure I think moderates necessarily will think this) and even if they believe that their belief do not have anything to do with science, they will still often indirectly trespass into science (i.e. by wanting their belief to represent reality; by holding a belief to be factual/historical, etc.) If this happens then do you not think the belief should be evaluated according to the standards of the domain that it has trespassed into?
I don't think we can say a belief or endevour only has one purpose or means of evaluation. We can say there is a primary purpose, but not that any other purpose is irrelevant, which is what Strafio's argument with religious belief.
Here's my argument/proof...
Lets use science as an example:
Scientific issues are generally not assessed according to their moral status, rather they are assessed by their accuracy; their correspondence to reality; whether they are true. Yet there clearly are times in which an additional purpose (such as ethics) must be introduced into the evaluation process of certain scientific endeavours. Stem cells research for example.
How this relates to religion:
Even if the purpose of religion is not, for example, their correspondence to reality, there will inevitably be times when their correspondence to reality is of significance, and as such, we must evaluate the belief on that purpose.
Example:
The belief that Jesus was born of a virgin is inescapably a belief about biology. Even if science/accuracy is not the purpose of the belief, if the belief is held to be factual/historical, if the theist is in any way interested in whether their belief represents reality, it will necessarily be infringing on science, thus scientists (and rationalists) have every right to comment and assess the plausibility of the belief.
The only way this can be denied is to demonstrate that theists are not concerned with whether their beliefs represent reality, and I think you'd be hard pressed to find a significant group within the mainstream who would not be concerned.
Agreed. You can hold a irrational belief for rational reasons.
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
My point, strafio, was that your thesis isn't coherent enough to be an argument, but it one were to try to use any of these points, they would be fallacious.
It is not shallow to simply acknowledge the lack of anything to discuss. You must make a case first, and you have not. I hold that belief is as well defined as need be and that there is no such thing as a second kind of belief. If you're not making an argument... well... my work is done. Burden of proof and all...
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Um... I'm still really uncomfortable with all this talk of the function of beliefs. I honestly can't think of a way that it's pertinent to the question of whether or not theism is a-rational.
I guess the best way I can answer this is that belief must come before action. This could get really stupid really fast, though. If I go to church, that doesn't mean I first believed that Jesus rose from the dead. It means that I believed I should go to church, for whatever reason. This is why attaching actions to beliefs is a wild goose chase. Speaking of theists as if every action is directly tied to a religious doctrine is disingenuous at best. People's motivations and beliefs are not nearly so straightforward.
I don't want to accept this without Strafio saying it, because I've already gotten in trouble for making the mistake of assuming that their was an argument in the OP.
If this is the argument, then I think it's pretty silly.
That pretty much sums it up.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Post 9 in this thread is still waiting for you.
It's not the complete argument, just a bitesized portion.
Ought to be the right size for plenty of disagreement but not so broad that we get unfocused.
btw, if you still don't believe that function is a necessary part of the definition of belief, I'd like to see what your definition is without it.
The thing is, you can't come back to 1 later because we need to know what 1 is before predicting any consequences following from its existence. So, anything you say from here on is going to be naked speculation.
Odd that the distinction you want to make is specifically between fundamentalists and moderates, and yet their existence clouds the issue... smells funny to me.
For any argument, the groundwork is definitions and givens. Your two categories of belief haven't been defined and are certainly not axiomatic or in any other way given.
This is meaningless. Beliefs either are or are not rational, and our evaluation of beliefs doesn't alter their nature. Checking a belief for validity and truth is something that can be done, but the appropriateness of such an act is entirely dependent on the normative qualities of the circumstances surrounding it.
Curiously, you're equivocating equivocation.
Belief, in either a neurological or philosophical context, means something precise. It is the mental state of awareness of something and accepting it as part of the set of things that are real and true.
During day to day speech, we use "believe" to mean lots of things. However, to say that popular equivocations are the same as a philosophically precise definition is... well... equivocating terms.
In looking through the rest of this post, I find myself saying exactly the same things, and wondering why you were so interested in my responses, since I've given them repeatedly. You've put all kinds of normative statements in this argument without justifying them or putting them within the context of defined terms. In other words, you're not making an argument. You're just saying the way you think things ought to be, and speculating about some mysterious "practice belief."
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
I think beliefs can happen both ways. It is certainly true that when evidence convinces us of the correctness of a certain proposition, we form a belief. It is also true that people can, through an act of will, bring themselves to believe anything. That means that if a person apprehended a compelling reason to hold a certain belief (ie salvation of his soul) he could literally talk himself into holding the requisite beliefs (Jesus rose from the dead).
I feel that beliefs formed the first way happen spontaneously and unconsciously, and beliefs formed the second way require a great effort of consciousness to manipulate the normal workings of the cognitive process. This effort is ongoing, but it becomes easier as the brain assimilates the belief into more and more of the person's personality. Outside reinforcement helps a lot with retaining Type 2 beliefs, which is why going to church is viewed as important. The way faith-based Type 2 beliefs are formed, with one part of the personality working against other parts, suggests to me that faith-based belief formation is not a natural or health process but rather a sort of immune response to other negative stimulus.
I agree fully with you that when faith-based beliefs are imported into any area of public discourse (science, politics) they must meet the test of reason or be discarded as invalid. Reason is the only commonly accepted tool we have for determining truth; other, more esoteric methods cannot be accepted without inciting chaos in society.
I disagree with you that moderates would insist that their religious beliefs reflect reality. As Strafio said, I think many moderates would tell you that such questions are beside the point. If you went up to many moderates and asked them if they really believed in the virgin birth, they would say that they don't know that it didn't happen and that the question is not very important to them in any case because the story works for them whether it is factual truth or a metaphorical fairy tale. They may be entirely aware of the scientific impossibility of the scenario, but their focus is the message contained in the story, not the story's connection to reality.
The very valid problem that I think you are pointing to is one of intellectual discipline. Can the moderate, having decided to accept certain beliefs on faith, keep the faith-based beliefs in their corner and prevent "contamination" of his rational processes by his faithful presumptions? Lets say a moderate theist scientist discovered evidence that showed that abortions prevent breast cancer. Would he be able to report these findings, or would his faith presumptions force him to decide that his research is flawed?
Lazy is a word we use when someone isn't doing what we want them to do.
- Dr. Joy Brown
I'd really like to see the proof of this statement. Yes, a person can talk themselves into believing a great many things, but I dare you to spend a week convincing yourself that you are a set of stereo headphones. Let me know how it works out.
This is an important distinction because of where the limits to belief fall and why. I cannot convince myself that I don't exist precisely because my existence is axiomatic. Axioms are the foundations of logic, which is the codification of reason. In other words, I cannot help but think rationally on a base level. Though there are extreme cases of people who are so insane that they cannot think logically past the basics, the overwhelming majority of humans on the planet cannot help but use reason.
The real question has more elements. Supposing that this person sees a compelling reason to believe in Jesus, does he really have the choice to believe or does he believe and have only to admit it publicly? Similarly, if someone is not convinced, but admits publicly that he does, we cannot speak of his belief in Jesus because it doesn't exist. We can only speak of his belief that it is in his best interest to act as if he believes.
This is the crux of the matter. Many who profess belief in something really believe in belief in something. That distinction should not be lost, or one falls prey to the notion that there might actually be two kinds of belief, when in reality, belief is belief.
Having determined the answer to this question, would his decision be based on his belief or his predictions regarding the consequences of publishing the research?
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Perhaps I was overreaching by saying "anything." However, if we are to put any credibility to the billions of theistic testimonials, it seems we have to accept that people can believe a huge variety of things that are blatantly irrational, illogical and out of synch with direct observation.
The question arises as to whether they "really" believe these things. Lacking a mind-reading device, we can't know. Certainly many, many people act as though they believe irrational things.
I always think about Winston being tortured by O'Brien in 1984 and the ring of truth in O'Brien's assertion that if he chose, he could float off the floor like a soap bubble. I understand that this is not evidence of anything, but my guess is that, under duress, the brain will create a belief rather than suffer unacceptable levels of damage or pain.
It is as Dennet says: more research needs to be done. I would like to see a study that puts theists under a PET scan and monitors their brain activity as they profess their belief in impossible things like Jesus rising from the dead, then compares those results to the activity when they profess belief in commonplace things like the existence of a chair in the room.
Well, again, it depends on whether you think that someone can retroactively edit their beliefs. If yes, then the scientist could make the discovery, realize the consequences, then force himself to form the belief that his results are wrong. If no, then all he is doing is pretending to think that his results are wrong. I actually think that people are a little better at self-deception than that.
You know who would be good to ask is some of the former hardcore theists here. I bet some of them believed some stuff that they had to work hard at believing.
Lazy is a word we use when someone isn't doing what we want them to do.
- Dr. Joy Brown
Also, even if we could establish a different kind of belief, it doesn't logically follow that it has anything to do with religion.
In any case, I don't see any difference in kind. The only different between belief and faith, is that faith is belief + no evidence (and necessarily so, by definition).
Belief is a mental state in which a proposition is held to be true - and is held with some evidence/justification.
Unjustified belief is a mental state in which a proposition is held to be true - and is held without any evidence, although evidence may be possible.
Faith is a mental state in which a proposition is held to be true - and is held necessarily without evidence; there can't be evidence by definition.
The nature of the belief is the same (although there can be different degree of certainty for each of the above), the difference is the basis on which the belief is held.
And Strafio seems to be arguing (in the discussion between me and him) that because religious belief/faith is not about making predictions or about accuracy in the way science or politics is, that it is wrong to apply such methods (reason, etc) of evaluation.
Well, I contend that:
a) Most theists will to some degree be concerned with whether their beliefs accurately represent reality. The best methods to assess this is reason, science, critical thinking, etc. I accept there many be a tiny minority who may not be concerned at all, but this isn't the mainstream.
b) Even if the their beliefs accurately representing reality is of little concern--or no concern--to them, the beliefs themselves may unintentionally trespass into other domains by virtue of their content.
c) Thus in (a) we must assess beliefs according to reason, and in (b) I think we should (or we should at least have the right to), although since there is no intention on the part of the theist to invade that domain, it wouldn't be as much of an issue.
However, in either case, I think you're be hard pressed to find a theist, a religious belief, or combination of the two that does not warrant assessment via reason, science.
And thus the problem with Strafio's argument, which is that there is a type of belief/theist that does not warrant such assessment.
I'm willing to allow for the possibility of a rare extreme liberal theist to fit this assessment of Strafio's, although he is arguing that his assessment fits the mainstream.
This problems stems from his view that there are two distinct types of theism, whereas would you not agree that a spectrum of belief is a better description for theism, starting from the extreme liberal theist, to liberal, then moderate theism, and then into fundamentalist and extremist theism. Obviously these will overlap rather than be distinct.
I think this is referring to belief in belief. I think someone can talk themselves into belief in belief, but I'd question that someone can genuinely force themselves to believe a proposition. The difference can be subtle in that it can be hard to tell the difference, maybe even for the individual themselves, although I think it can become clearer if the belief is scrutinised.
Part of the difficulty in distinqishing between the two is due to behaviour. I think believing in belief can in fact influence behaviour (such as via social conformity) which can bring false conclusions about an individuals belief. I don't think behaviour can necessarily tell us about the beliefs themselves (i.e. that they actually believe it), which I think is the root of Strafio's error: many liberal/moderates theists might not actually believe in the claims, but believe in belief in them due to some kind of positive aspect they bring to their lives. Strafio seems to conclude this belief in belief is another kind of belief.
This would be interesting. I'd also like to see what happens when an atheist profess belief in Jesus rising from the dead under the PET scan as a comparison.
On a relates issue: here a brain scan of a preacher speaking in tongue (i.e. nonsense). It's from a BBC show Am I Normal: Spirituality
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVUFfEu2YHg (about 3 mins in)
The results were interesting.
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
Wow you folks are smart. Thanks for sharing yourselves ....
I've always thought the religious are lying to them selves, for various, mostly obvious reasons. I think because reality can't be fully known, theist's then justify their wishful ideas as being "godly" intuition. We all "believe" we are in AWE ... just don't make shit up and call it truth, is all I beg .... please, please ....
Yeah, ME too Tilberian , who wrote,
"It is as Dennet says: more research needs to be done. I would like to see a study that puts theists under a PET scan and monitors their brain activity as they profess their belief in impossible things like Jesus rising from the dead, then compares those results to the activity when they profess belief in commonplace things like the existence of a chair in the room." ////
Ummm , why has this has not been done, or has it? YEAH, Lie detector tests for everyone ! Hook up the Pope on world wide live TV .....
Atheism Books.
I agree with this, although I would say that a belief is not rational/irrational because an individual wants the belief to be accurate. A belief can intend to be accurate (i.e. to correspond with reality) regardless of what we think of it. It doesn't require us to want it to be accurate.
In any case, you've not shown that this applies to theism.
First, you've not demonstrated that there are two kinds of theistic belief rather than degrees of theistic belief. You've also not demonstrated that any theism is not interested in its representation of reality.
Second, I think theism inherently and necessarily makes truth claims about the universe. To be a theist is to believe in a god that intervenes and is interested in human affairs. Thus, Theism is inherently and necessarily based on a truth claim about the universe. Even if the theist is metaphorical about everything else, they must believe in this base proposition otherwise they're not a theist.
Moderates may interpret some or even most aspects of theism in a metaphorical manner, however the beliefs themselves can and should still to be evaluated according to reason.
Furthermore, there is no reason why we cannot separately evaluate the belief itself AND the effect it has on the believer. As Tilberian said, an irrational belief can be held for rational reasons. I think the best you can get is to say the theist is not being irrational for holding an irrational belief.
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
Not 'naked speculation' - it would be explaining a hypothesis that is yet to be confirmed/falsified.
This explanation is necessary because you still don't fully understand the hypothesis I'm putting forward.
How am I supposed to put forward evidence for a position you don't even understand?
Whatever evidence I put forward wouldn't mean anything unless you understood what I was trying to prove.
When your only problem with my position is the lack evidence, then will be the right time to talk about evidence.
In the meantime, let's determine whether my position is even a valid hypothesis first. That's surely the correct order, right?
I know I'd need a coherent position from a theist before I could even listen to whatever evidence they claimed they had.
I tried giving the entire argument at once but you had a lot of issues with it.
I knew straight away that each one needed proper addressing and I would not be able to do them all in one go.
So what I've done is decided to break them down and address them one at a time - make sure that each one is settled before moving on.
Obviously my argument isn't proved until I've addressed every issue and I'm very forward about that.
If I was to say something daft like "My argument is proved" with a part of my argument missing, then comments like this would be appropiate.
Instead I say "There's a lot to take in at once so let's start with this step" - surely a sensible measure to keep our debate focused?
For you to then criticise me for not taking to account something to be covered in one of the many other steps is not only unfair but it diverts the issue from the part that we are trying to discuss.
When I first wrote this argument I thought that the moderate/fundamentalist distinction would be helpful.
However, I had a particular definition of 'fundamentalist' in mind, one that doesn't quite fit the popular usage of the word.
According to my 'theory of religion', faith and fact are two different things.
Fact were accurate propositions about the world that could be taken authoritatively but needed justification.
Faith was part of a human practice, based on transforming their first person view of the world and inspiring virtue.
I called 'fundamentalism' the conflation of these two.
It was treating faith with the certainty and authority of fact while still leaving out the justification.
I accused fundamentalists of cherry picking which characteristics of fact/faith suited their agenda at that moment in time.
E.g. Treat it like fact when they wanted other people to accept their authority but call it faith when they didn't want to have to defend their own views from criticism.
However, the word fundamentalist means something else, and moderates can do their fair share of conflating too.
So I now ammend my position by coining the new term "Religion Conflationism"
It's a fallacy of conflating faith with fact.
So I claim that faith, when treated as faith, isn't irrational.
It's when faith is conflated with fact that religion becomes irrational.
If from there we took the conversation to the topic of moderates vs fundamentalists, (a different topic now) I'd say that moderates would be likely to have less religious conflations and more like to be open to reason on the conflations that they did have.
Then again, maybe not. It's a different topic now anyhow.
All I want to show in this topic that faith/religion would be 'not irrational' if it was free from conflation.
Well guess what was coming at the end of the post...
I was a bit put out by how you gave the introduction to the argument the usual line for line treatment, and then completely passed over the argument itself having decided you'd seen enough from the intro.
Nonetheless, you did raise an important point:
I took it for granted that people would find talking of belief and evaluation in terms of practice acceptable.
So what will follow is some arguments to address this.
Once we have settled this I'll try reposting the argument and see what happens from there.
(If you respond to just one part of this post, make it this part: )
Why I consider evaluating beliefs to be a practice:
Evaluating a belief as true/false or rational/irrational is something we do.
Therefore it is a practice.
It can therefore be evaluated through practical reason like other practices.
I don't think you'll find this one so controversial.
Why I called belief a 'practice':
This one is a bit more difficult.
I think my best approach here is to criticise your own definition attempts to define belief to try and show you that any meaningful definition must involve atleast some reference to human action, even if it's just a disposition to act in a certain way in a certain situation.
I have two problems with this definition:
1) I would define mental state in terms of belief, i.e. use belief as an example, rather than the other way around.
If you are defining belief in terms of mental state then what is your definition of mental state?
What relevence does this 'mental state' have to our everyday lives? Or do you consider it irrelevent altogether?
2) If belief means for a proposition to be considered true then what significance to our everyday lives does it mean that we think a proposition is true?
(Unless you are happy to consider it irrelevent ofcourse...)
btw, I know you didn't use the word proposition in your definition but I figured that's what you meant by 'thing' - feel free to correct me on that.
I think that you've defined it in terms whose meaning also will eventually need to involve human practice to have meaning.
Nonetheless, I'll let you answer my objections and see where we end up.
Once we've settled this side debate on how 'belief' relates to 'practice', I'll repeat those first premises again.
Curiously enough, Topher has accepted those first premises.
Maybe he wasn't as opposed to acknowledging the functional/behavioural side to belief as I first thought.
Fair enough... it's probably a better wording of what I meant.
Points to be addressed later on in the argument.
We'll get there in good time.
There's no reason why we can't look at it like that, but there's no reason why we have to either.
This topic is looking into a different alternative.
"This topic is looking into a different alternative."
yeah ....
Atheism Books.
I'm pretty sure it hasn't been done. And you can imagine the theist talking heads lining up to denounce the findings in advance if anyone ever actually conducted a study like this. They would claim, with some justification, that we don't know enough about interpreting the activity we see on brain scans to use them as lie detectors...yet. But I think the difference in a comparative study would be a nice little PR coup for our side.
Lazy is a word we use when someone isn't doing what we want them to do.
- Dr. Joy Brown