Define.

Cough cough.

That's a good point. As I often say, there is an important difference between determinism and pre-determinism. I am a determinist, but not a pre-determinist. I believe that knowledge of the future (or possible future) can be used as an input to *determine* a different outcome. If I see a ball coming at me, I can predict that it will hit me, and then use this knowledge to duck out of the way. In a pre-determined universe, the ball is either going to hit me or it isn't, and there isn't anything I can possibly do to change anything. So, 'why bother even trying to duck out of the way?', as the implication goes.

Pre-determinism is a straw man of determinism, used by magical-free-will believers who have no imagination.

Prisons can be used to deterministically deter people from committing crimes. No magical free will is required.

I take the position of hard determinism. I consider the idea of free-will, or contra-causal freedom, absurd to the highest degree. I think of compatibilism as offering, as Kant put it, the freedom of clockwork, which I also regard as absurd. I content myself with the clockwork, because that view accords with what I have learned about the nature of conscious entities and I have noticed nothing absurd about that which it posits.

As for punishment from a deterministic perspective, and with regard to what I said above, I offer this (translated) quotation from "The System of Nature" (published in 1820) by Baron d'Holbach:

Woah there, tiger.

'Deterministic' does not mean all actions are 'pre-determined'. You're projecting a theistic outlook (fate) onto a concept that you don't appear to understand.

Do we make choices? Yes.

Are these choices determined (or 'driven') by both our environment & genetic heritage? Yes.

Take a look at that. Our actions are, in part, derived from our surroundings. When our surroundings include abstractions like laws, we are helping to determine the actions of our fellow persons. When you say, 'Free Will', what does that even mean? Without any benchmarks ('determiners') to wiegh decisions against, how can a decision-making paradigm even exist? How can one perform an action that has no 'reason' behind it (even a random outburst cannot escape intention; the intent, in that case, is to appear to be random)?

Free Will is gibberish, and insisting on it's veracity betrays a fear that you might not be the special little snowflake you've been promised that you are.

Don't worry about it, Mike, we all start somewhere.

There is a subtle, but important, distinction between determinism and predeterminism. Determinism says that all events follow a certain pattern of behavior. It may include probabilistic behavior, like you find in quantum mechanics. (The particles may not follow an absolutely rigid pattern of behavior, but the larger objects they comprise—stones, houses, humans, and planets—essentially do, hence the reason that stones do not teleport to various mountain tops.) Predeterminism adds what we may call fate or predestination. The outcome is determined beforehand; the universe or a god may have set things up so that you would die of sickness, regardless of whether you went to a doctor, or go into war, regardless of whether you wanted to. The outcome is certain, but not necessarily the events that lead to the outcome. Perhaps a metaphor would make the distinction clearer. Think of the universe as a poker game. Determinism and predeterminism both hand you a rule book and deck of cards, but predeterminism stacks the deck.
 

Ok, ignoring for a minute that this is contradictory, there's something else you've totally missed.  Fish, like every other creature, are a product of genes, which exist as a result of various atoms forming absolutely predictable bonds.  Where this becomes important is that absolutely nothing done by any organism -- ever -- would be possible if it were not facilitated by the genes.

Think about that statement in reverse:  Absolutely everything a fish can do is a result of it being built by genes in such a way that it can be done.  Imagine that we do an experiment with fish and rocks.  We put a hundred fish in a tank and throw a rock into the tank a thousand times in exactly the same place, noting the exact location of each individual fish at the time of entry.  We could then track each fish to see if it did exactly the same thing every time, or whether it sometimes did something different.  If it did something different, we'd simply say, "Approximately 5% of the time, fish go this way as opposed to that way."

While it's certainly possible to assert that this is the manifestation of free will, the assertion answers no questions, nor does it have any basis in fact, since free will (as I have explained in great detail in the essay you have not read) is a nonsense term.  The accurate explanation is that fish have been genetically programmed to be able to take different options.

Consider the evolutionary advantage of having multiple options.  Suppose a fish has to run away from a certain predator fish quite often.  Now imagine that there are two varieties of this fish -- one that always makes a left turn after five swishes of the tail, and another that sometimes makes a left and sometimes makes a right.  If the fish only made a left turn, eventually, by sheer force of numbers, there would be a variant predator that always anticipated that left turn.  This would give the predator an advantage, and soon the population would become unstable.  However, if the fish moved unpredictably, this adaptation would have no advantage.

It should be obvious that having the ability to act unpredictably is evolutionarily selectable.  Now all we need to do is realize that humans do exactly the same thing.  We are very complicated creatures, to be sure, but our genes have changed as we have become smarter and smarter -- they are the reason for it.

Now, finally, I want you to think about this -- if unpredictable behavior is a selectable trait, so too is motivated unpredictable behavior.  That is, if a creature that mindlessly acts unpredictable has an advantage, a creature that can predict the outcome of its actions and can act unpredictably has an even greater advantage.  Enter sentience.

Free will (as it is conventionally understood) is the belief that, given the same situation or circumstances, "I could have acted otherwise." That everyone presupposes this explains why the terms "guilt," "regret," and "remorse" have currency in our vocabularly. Compatibilism simply redefines "free will" to be "compatible" with determinism (hence the term).

Yes and no. Yes, "free will" entails self-determinism. No, your "will" is not free. Why? Because what you call your "will" must ultimately be determined by influences external to yourself. (Your "will" is simply one link in a causal chain that extends backwards to the beginning of time or the indefinite past).

As I see it, the only being who can have compatibilist free will is God. Why? Because only God can be free from external influences.

I guess logic dictates this conclusion. If you believe in theory that you do not really have free will, then you're not really able "to direct your body." Evidently, you're just a passive spectator in the game of life, not an active participant.

I believe that the concomitant, contiguous universe is perfectly pre-deterministic.  Equally I believe that the phenomenon to which we, principally, refer as a continuous human experience is utterly free under that law, however, it can naturally operate in a frame of reference which exhibits deterministic patterns.

To start with essential quantum theory elements we say that at the smallest scales probabilities having equal weight become numerous - graduating up to our local scale we find the sum of probabilities approximate relatively straight lines. I would add that beyond the local scale (towards massive gravitational objects and ultimately the universe) probability amplitudes refine down to pure unfettered determinism.

So in short I believe in, somewhat, a continuum of determinism. Within it there exists absolute freedom and absolute constraint, both of which, and all the in betweens, I believe are accessible reality - access albeit depends on your concept of identity and is essentially a digression, so suffice it to say, I believe in both - free will and determinism.

And what is your "concept of identity" and how does that mesh with your concept of God?

I was able to surmise that by your response in my "consciousness and evolutionary theory" thread. Of course, you don't have to explain how consciousness was naturally-selected if you eliminate it as a problem (or unwittingly assume it as a brute fact of all living organisms).

Incidentally, contrary to your belief, there are many who believe that a goldfish has an inner life. The notion that it is simply an organic "robot without consciousness" is patently absurd.

I'm not particularly interested in defining something out of existence simply because I don't want to deal with it.  I have neither eliminated the problem of explaining consciousness or assumed it as a brute fact.

Interestingly, it turns out that someone else has already dealt with the problem of consciousness:

Consciousness Explained

Rather than give a book report, I'll let you read this and get back to me.  Once you're done with that, you can try for a different perspective:

How the Mind Works 

When you get done with that, You'll be relatively well versed in the philosophy of mind in the 21st century.  Then we can talk.

Why should I care what some people believe?  Do they have evidence?  Furthermore, did you miss the part where I described consciousness as a continuum, not an on-off switch?  Is it beyond your understanding that my model is compatible with goldfish having an inner life?

 Paisley, have you read Dennett or Nagel?

 I wanted to verify that you have no idea what you're talking about.  Thanks.

That you're citing arguments you are not familiar with.  You're just name dropping, not arguing.  I have read both Dennett and Nagel, and I do understand both Nagel's objection to Dennett and Dennett's answer to the objection.  But you see, we can't talk about it because you don't know either.

I'm not here to be your surrogate for actual study.  Do your homework before you try to play with the big boys, you poser.

 Paisley, you haven't critiqued my argument.  You've just tossed out some terms and expected me to jump through your hoops.  Stop dropping names and start making your own arguments.  Am I parroting Dennett?  Quote Dennett and quote me and demonstrate your claim.  Does Dennett's argument fail?  Demonstrate why.  Don't just cite somebody who claims it does.  I've written about the concept of mind.  If I decided to say that Nagel's got it wrong, somebody could go on another forum and say, "Hambydammit argues that Nagel's got it wrong and Dennett has it right."  Would that mean anything?  Would it constitute an argument?

OF COURSE NOT!

Philosophers are not arguments.  Arguments are arguments, and you haven't made any.  You've made assertions.  Does my position lead to an impossible conclusion?  Walk me through it.  Make the argument yourself.  I have no time for or interest in comparing the size of our literary dicks.