I'm just going to go out on a limb and declare the following: "When you try to prove your point by citing your essay scores in philosophy class, you lose."

Want some eye opening discussion?  Ask your favorite philosophy professor to check this discussion out.

Possibly because the statement of a fallacy may indeed be an accurate characterisation of a thought-system based on fallacious ideas.

Or, putting it another way, if the idea, the 'reasoning', contained in that statement is indeed the defining idea behind "metaphysical idealism", that would make the statement that "if we only know the world as representation, then the world is only representation" as part of a definition of "metaphysical idealism", arguably quite logical.

But the basic assertion itself, is fallacious, if it really is asserting that because we can only perceive the external world via a reconstruction from sensory data, therefore what those senses are responding to does not exist.

If you, or "metaphysical idealism", actually maintain that, to our mind, that 'representation' is all we have available to deal with, since we have no 'direct' apprehension of the world, the statement may be correct, although poorly phrased, in that is easily misunderstood. IOW, those aspects of reality that we cannot perceive or interact with may be regarded as effectively non-existent to us.

I think even that is highly questionable, since science seems to show that there are many aspects of reality that we in no way can perceive either directly, or via our senses, but do affect the nature of our experience indirectly by the way they affect those aspects we can perceive.

It proves someone is a dinkus and that affects the conversation

If he would have come in and said, "Hey, some people inside certain humanities hold X opinion, care to comment?" I would not have had any problem.  But he didn't, he came in and said, "The humanities are the antithesis of naturalism because *drumroll* I said so." and then proceeds to play word games.  Granted, I shouldn't be shocked, because of his name, but still.  If his favorite professor (who grades his papers at 90%!) actually agrees with him, then I would willingly debate him too because the position that the humanities are all currently centered on anti-naturalistic ideas isn't tenable in any way I can see, and I'd love to hear from someone who can actually give a logical argument for it being so.

This thread is the worst kind of elitist, ego driven, navel gazing that philosophy often breeds.  Yuck.

I'm out of patience, but that does not give me the right to be rude, my apologies.

Are you willing to concede that you should re-phrase your argument to be less broad, or are you going to hold fast to the idea that humanities and the people who study are, by deninition, opposed to naturalism?

Oh, so you can be nice. That’s a surprise. Apology accepted.

I have narrowed my definitions to the following:

– Metaphysics conflicts with Naturalism.

– Social constructionism conflicts with naturalism.

– Rationalism conflicts with empiricism.

I have said that the difference between the humanities and the natural sciences is that the humanities allow for multiple metaphysical perspectives. The natural sciences only allow for one metaphysical perspective – naturalism. In that sense they conflict. However, the humanities allow for the perspective of naturalism in the humanities, and in that sense the humanities and natural sciences do not conflict.

Thanks for engaging with that axiom, as it is the core of this discussion.

Have you heard of the relationship between perception and substance, described by John Locke and George Berkeley? Your modification fits the definition of reality proposed by Locke. My version fits the definition of reality proposed by Berkeley.

I’ll just lay them out:

Locke: "if we only know the world as representation, then, to us, the world is only that representation."

Berkeley: "if we only know the world as representation, then the world is only that representation."

Lock maintained that we only know our perceptions. We only know the world as our perceptions. Our perceptions are in our minds. Therefore the world we perceive is in our minds, BUT it is supervened upon a substance external to our minds that we do not perceive.

Berkeley differed from Lock in that he refuted the existence of such a substance that is invisible to our perception. Berkeley said there is no way of knowing whether there is such an invisible substance, simply because we cannot perceive that substance i.e. Berkeley was saying that the claim that our perceptions are supervened upon a substance invisible to our perception cannot be empirically verified. Such a substance has to be postulated metaphysically. So strangely, from Berkley’s perspective, the rejection of the metaphysical idea of an invisible substance external to our minds renders the world as inside our minds.

I don't regard the 'supervene' idea as a useful way to describe things.

This is just one reason why I regard the philosophical/metaphysical approach as irrelevant to understanding reality.

All our 'knowledge' of other than purely deductive/definitional propositions is inevitably only an internal conceptual model of external reality.

The bulk of most people's models are based on their personal sensory perceptions, modified and added to by information conveyed to them from reading written material, listening to and watching broadcast material, internet, etc, etc.

All this data, both via our own senses, and indirectly via the senses of other people, is reasonably assumed to be ultimately dependant on, derived from, actual external objects and energy flows which exist independently of we humans. Such an assumption is by far the most parsimonious explanation of what we perceive, IMHO. This is the basic assumption of Science, of course, which employs all kinds of mathematical and logical tools to analyse and correlate all the reported perceptions of many people to construct and refine a much more detailed model of what appears to be 'out there' than we individually generate.

That is the sort of language, the conceptual dictionary, which allows me to make sense, to whatever degree I can, of the totality of my perceptions and mental experience. This has served me pretty well, when compared against the accounts of other people for over half-a-century so far. And based on the responses of many people I engage with, it works well.

I have read accounts of philosophy since before I went to University. While at Uni, I read from the library the book which, for better or worse, has been the basis of my understanding of philosophy in general, and various famous philosophers in particular, since then. It was Bertrand Russell's 'History of Western Philosophy'. I have heard criticism of it, and I would not wish to defend it to the death, but I have retained a 'soft spot' for Russell. I also like Daniel Dennett a lot, I find his expositions on consciousness and evolution and religion and belief, and his ideas on chance and determinism, (as in his book 'Freedom Evolves' ), fascinating and helpful in allowing me to get my head around some subtle concepts.

Your perspective is one of the strangest I have encountered.

The way I see it, Epistemologist, you are conflating idealism, social constructionism and the humanities with the social sciences.  This isn't necessarily unwarranted, because, as I mentioned earlier, as field of science they are still very pseudo-scientific.  Ideally, they would follow the scientific method and thus would not be lumped together with social constructionism and the humanities.  The other issue is that the social sciences address how humans interact with each other, NOT how they interact with reality.  The social sciences are NOT metaphysical positions, they are subjects that study human behavior.  You are again conflating them by incorporating metaphysics into the discussion.  Once you start analyzing something metaphysically, it moves out of that study and into the realm of philosophy.  The reason why these fields are pseudo-scientific (IMO) is partly because they are addressed metaphysically and not empirically or rationally. 

Metaphysics does not conflict with the natural sciences because the natural sciences lead to a specific metaphysical conclusion.  They are two different levels of study that are not in contradiction.   The study of nature through a specific method does not contradict the study of reality (natural science and metaphysics, respectively).

Social constructionism does conflict with naturalism in the sense that it is idealism versus physicalism.

Rationalism and empiricism are only in contradiction in certain metaphysical worldviews.  In reference to science, they are not in contradiction because the worldview used is naturalism.  When reason is natural, observation of it is not a contradiction.  In other worldviews, however, they can be contradictory.

Your argument is that there are ways to true knowledge through means other than science, right?  The issue is that you still haven't give us a coherent set of standards for what constitutes truth.  You haven't given your own worldview, so we don't know what to work with.  In the OP you claimed there are certain truths that are ineffable to science.  You then said that the humanities have certain truths to them that can't be explained scientifically.  Like I and others said in the other thread, you need to argue how we are to decide what is true and not true.  In the other thread I pointed out that this distinction necessitates logic.  From there you can argue why there can be non-scientific truths.  I may have missed it, but so far I haven't seen anything about how YOU distinguish true and false (i.e. worldview).  I think this is why this discussion has kinda gone in circles...  We hold idealism as idiotic but you hold there are some truths to it.  I need you to explain what aspects of it are true and how you can back those claims.

I am not conflating metaphysical idealism with the social sciences, and natural sciences. What I am doing is asserting that you cannot understand strong sociology unless you first understand the difference between metaphysical idealism and physicalism/materialism/naturalism.

I am not saying that the humanities give access to truth that science does not. Several humanities subjects are sciences, so there is no conflict between science and the humanities. The conflict is between natural science and the humanities. I am also highlighting the conflict between the formal sciences, natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. These four perspectives are fundamentally different worldviews, and the difference between them is metaphysical.

As Zaq mentioned earlier, science is not a perspective. It’s a method. So when strong sociology asserts that the world/universe is inside human minds, that does not make sociology any less scientific than natural science. Natural science asserts that the world/universe is external to human minds.

Yes, the social sciences do address how humans interact with reality. Social science maintains that social reality6 is the only reality there is i.e. it maintains that the world/universe actual is social reality. An example is the sociology of knowledge: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology_of_knowledge

The sociology of knowledge maintains that human knowledge (which includes the world/universe) is a social construct and inside human minds. An example of the sociology of knowledge is the concept of scientism, which criticises natural science as being the only effective way to view the world/universe: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism

To understand strong sociology, it is also necessary to know about the strong programme: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_programme

What you are not understanding is that EVERY academic subject begins from a metaphysical perspective. It is impossible to separate metaphysics from any given academic subject, whether it is physics or sociology. Every academic subject actually defines itself through metaphysics. Naturalism is metaphysics, and strong sociology is metaphysics. In addition, sociology is perfectly empirical and rational. Sociology uses mathematics and the scientific method to study social systems.

The natural sciences don’t lead to a metaphysical conclusion. They start with a metaphysical assumption, which leads to a physical conclusion.

Metaphysics certainly does conflict with the natural sciences, however it does not conflict at the level of method, so you are right on that point. Metaphysics conflicts with natural science at the level of perspective. Naturalism and physicalism are metaphysical perspectives of natural science that conflict with other metaphysical perspectives like idealism and strong sociology.

You seem to be confusing naturalism with science. Science is not a worldview. As Zaq pointed out, science is a method, but naturalism is a perspective (a worldview). Perspectives (worldviews) are metaphysical, but methods are not.

And what do you mean by observing reason? How can reason be observed?

That was what I proposed in my very first post, at the beginning of the discussion. However, butterbattle pointed out that several sciences are also humanities, which means that there is no conflict between science and the humanities. Also, as I mentioned above, Zaq pointed out that science is a method, and not a perspective, so in that sense, science does not conflict with the humanities. So what I am now asserting is this:

Academic disciplines are divided into four categories, including humanities, formal science, natural science, and social science. The differences between these four fields of academic research are metaphysical, and therefore these differences are at the level of perspective (worldview). These different metaphysical perspectives inform the methods of each of the four disciplines/fields, which leads to different types of truth and knowledge. These different types of truth and knowledge conflict in that they incorporate different worldviews (metaphysical perspectives).

That is a strangely dualistic approach. As we have not yet defined what constitutes a "human mind," nor even properly identified the properties of the "human mind," it would make sociology much less scientific than natural science.

Small but vital correction: natural science asserts that, at the moment, there is no evidence for anything other than the world/universe. The "human mind," whatever it might turn out to be, is part of the world/universe/reality/whatever you want to call it. Therefore, the "human mind" is subject to investigation by natural science.

Science is far more than a method. It is also an epistemology. Certainly, that epistemology dictates the practices of the scientific method. Additionally, in the colloquial sense, "science" also refers to the body of knowledge gathered by the application of the scientific method.

This may seem like nitpicking, but it seems as if your over-simplification of the nature of science (the epistemology, and the method) is the root of your misunderstanding.

This is a strawman representation of science. First, science is not the only effective way to view the world/universe (or as I like to call it, 'reality'). Obviously, humans have survived far longer without science than we have with it. This means whatever way of knowing our pre-science ancestors had, it was effective.

The epistemology of science claims to have the only method of gaining knowledge about reality that is verifiable  and self-correcting. As BobSpence1 said in the post above, the judicious application of empiricism goes a long, long way to correcting misunderstandings, errors, and incorrect axioms.

Finally, "scientism" is a pejorative used by people who think there are "other ways of knowing," but have no epistemology that is self-correcting and verifiable. They wish to make an ideology of the epistemology of science so they can deconstruct the strawman. In fact, most practitioners of science know that science has weaknesses. The scientific method attempts to compensate for those weaknesses, but it makes the practice of science laborious. Most scientists would welcome an epistemology that led directly to verifiable knowledge.

The problem isn't that science has become an ideology. The problem is that nobody has provided an alternative method of gaining verifiable knowledge of reality.

Perhaps. But your unstated assumption here is that all metaphysical systems are equal. They are not.

Metaphysics is the application of logic to a set of axioms. Obviously, metaphysics with poor axioms are inferior to metaphysics with quality axioms. Most metaphysical systems use logic alone to verify their axioms. Again, BobSpence1 has beaten me to it when he stated that the practice of science is designed to verify the axioms against our measurements of reality. If our axioms are found wanting, science is further designed to determine precisely how the axiom is wanting. In that way, old axioms can be either modified to better fit observed reality, or discarded entirely in favor of new axioms.

This is the kind of event Kuhn meant with the phrase, "paradigm shift."

As an aside: I would argue this makes science much more than a metaphysical system, as metaphysics is the application of logic to a set of axioms. The systematic application of empirical data as a means of verification is what defines science, both as an epistemology and as a method.

Again, your unstated assumption is that all metaphysical systems are equally valid. They simply are not.

As for the distinction between natural science and social science, the distinction is more methodological than metaphysical.

If that was your original argument you didn't do a very good job of expressing yourself.

Bob's point (I imagine he will speak for himself) is that although some people think there is a conflict, anyone still conflicted is beating a dead horse at worse and playing semi-stimulating mind games at best.  His point seems to be, "Look at everything naturalism and science has accomplished, now show me what metaphysics has accomplished since the rise of science."

It’s actually monistic. Both idealism (including strong sociology) and physicalism/naturalism are monistic perspectives of the mind.

As we have not defined what constitutes the “human mind” nor identified it’s properties, then by the standard you identify there: Doesn’t it mean that natural science is making the same mistake by asserting that the world/universe is ‘external’ to the human mind?

Don’t worry about nit-picking. We could break it down even further. Science, as you say consists of a method and an epistemology. It also includes data and theories (knowledge). There is also the ontological (metaphysical) perspective from which the epistemology emerges.

In my psychology studies, I was taught that it proceeds in the following order, with each step informing and determining the next. And it goes around in a cycle. However, please correct me if I’m wrong: 1) Ontological (metaphysical) perspective, 2) Epistemology, 3) Hypothesis, 4) Methodology (e.g. quantitative or qualitative), 5) Data, 6) Theory (knowledge).

From my understanding, different fields of science, at these different levels, are complimentary, coexistent, or conflicting.

The criticism embodied in the concept of scientism, was formulated by sociology. But this criticism by sociologists is only directed at natural science. The Wikipedia article on this quotes the physicist Ernest Rutherford as saying: "there is physics and there is stamp-collecting." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism

What gets the backs up of social scientists is the implication that all science apart from physics is just bunk. Or more specifically, that physics is the gold standard of science, and the less like physics a science is, the less scientific it is. The main problem, criticised by sociologists, is that physicalism and naturalism are not scientific. They are metaphysical, and therefore cannot be empirically verified. Physicists and other natural scientists are basically lying when they deny that.

I didn’t mean to imply that. Ultimately, I am contrasting the metaphysical perspective of strong sociology against that of natural science, particularly physics.

The metaphysical difference between strong sociology and natural science that I am highlighting is that: Strong sociology asserts that the world/universe is inside human minds. And natural science asserts that the world/universe is external to human minds. As you said above, the human mind and its properties have not yet been adequately defined, so asserting that the world/universe is internal or external is going beyond what is verifiable.

In my psychology studies, I was taught that the data and theories of a particular science are informed and determined by the ontological (metaphysical) perspective of that science i.e. the meaning of scientific data does not come from the data, but from the ontological perspective. In that sense, it is intellectually dishonest to conclude that scientific data confirms or falsifies the ontological (metaphysical) perspective of that science.

So are you saying that when strong sociology asserts that the world/universe is inside human minds, and natural science asserts it is external, that difference is more methodological than metaphysical? From what I understand, that difference is clearly metaphysical.

But that doesn’t falsify what I’ve said. You’re trying to falsify what I’ve said from the perspective of your emotions. That’s a fallacy. I think what’s happened is that my arguments are so totally excellent, that you cannot counter them with reason, so you have to resort to emotion.

Your debating method, like that of mellestad, is questionable.

All I have done is to clarify that the humanities, social sciences, formal sciences, and natural sciences, conflict.

The people arguing are the ones who have disagreed with that. They’ve disagreed simply because they’re ignorant. So I had to educate them.

This is after all the forum of the Rational Response Squad, who are famous for their ignorance.

I think we should stop the name calling now.

It’s also between strong sociology and natural science. People that call philosophy ‘fairyland’ are usually those who have not studied it much, so they know very little about it. If you don’t know what something is, you can’t know it’s fairyland.

So what does it mean when instances of reason and observation cannot be reconciled? For example, some physicists say that string theory is not physics, because it goes way beyond what is observable. If string theory can never be verified by observation, does that mean it’s not true?

I agree. However, ultimately, you have to decide whether physics is the queen and maths the king, or whether maths is the king and physics is the queen. That choice is metaphysical.

But metaphysics is the fundamental level, so it’s not resolvable. Ontological perspective is unquestionably fundamental.

Actually, different academic disciplines are conflicting, coexistent, and complimentary. If you deny the existence of the conflicts, that means you don’t understand the differences. If you don’t understand the differences, then you can’t possibly understand the similarities either.

And BTW, Epistemologist, 'beating a dead horse' is not a fallacy. You have made a category error.

It is a figurative way to refer to the process where someone continues to argue over an issue that has been pretty much resolved long ago.

You may disagree with whether the issue really has been resolved or not, but that doesn't make asserting that it has a 'fallacy'.

It really seems to be the case that you read and interpret many words and expressions very differently from the rest of us, which is a major reason for this ongoing disagreement.

 BobSpence1,

I’m sure that you and mellestad are both very nice people in your own contexts. But I’m not talking to you and mellestad any more, because neither of you understand the relationship between metaphysics, science and the humanities. You both keep going off topic. And neither of you are honest enough to admit your ignorance. However, I will continue to talk to the other contributors to this discussion, when they demonstrate that they know what they’re talking about.

This actually continues your pattern of argument from the beginning, where you assert the truth based on your own circular reasoning.  You've shown, again, that your argument is purely your own personal opinion.  Saying Bob is not familiar with philosophy is absurd to anyone reading the interaction between you both.

Now you've created your own straw man versions of science and the humanities, applied a broad philosophical brush to both and claimed victory by default.  Congratulations.

Do you smell that?  That is the reek of ego wafting off a person who deifies their own cleverness based on some university philosophy classes.

That’s a good summary of a metaphysical perspective. Natural scientists have difficulty admitting that naturalism and physicalism are also metaphysical.

Rutherford’s claim that physics is the only science was indeed arrogant. Strong sociologists likewise could assert that their perspective is the only social science, which I think they do.

The difference between strong sociology and solipsism, is that solipsism maintains that one’s own mind is the only reality. Strong sociology maintains that reality is what it is agreed to be by the minds that make up a social group i.e. it’s a social construct. So from that perspective, the world/universe is inside a group of minds, rather than just one mind.

The reason why I contrast strong sociology against physics is because physics is the most extreme version of physicalism and naturalism in the natural sciences. And strong sociology is the most extreme perspective in the social sciences. These extremes express the ultimate difference between social science and natural science, which is metaphysical. It can be argued that the stuff in the middle can only be understood when one knows the extremes.

Strong sociology includes social constructionism and the sociology of knowledge, and it asserts that the only objective, consistent, and coherent reality, is human ideas which are created socially.

Message to all readers: mellestad lies.

I understand the difference.

I say 'science' in a similar fashion as Nigel said.  The scientific method is entirely empirical.  Any insertion of idealism into a field renders that field as no longer being scientific.  This is why I refer to the social sciences, as you have presented them, as pseudo-scientific.  Your continued assertion that a field of science can assert any form of idealism scientifically is erroneous.

"It’s a method. So when strong sociology asserts that the world/universe is inside human minds, that does not make sociology any less scientific than natural science."

Yes, it does.  You cannot formulate a hypothesis, test it, and conclude what the data means in any objective means without empiricism, which is what idealism lacks.

"To be termed scientific, a method of inquiry must be based on gathering observable, empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning." -Wiki

Idealism lacks these, and consequently is not scientific in that sense.  This is why I have said that you are conflating the social sciences to idealism.

These lack the lack the proper requirements to be considered scientific.  Hence my argument that they are pseudo-scientific.

But you are wrong in saying that the scientific method presupposes naturalism.  It doesn't.  It just typically leads people like me to the metaphysical conclusion that the natural is all that is.  The method is a method.  Anyone can use it.  Anyone can develop a metaphysical position based on what they find.  The method is limited to the natural, but it does not require that the natural is all that exists.  I concede that the supernatural may exist.  I just wish that people would call it natural if whatever it is interacts with nature.

Like Bob said, they may not be equal. 

I need to ask you something.  Do you hold logic to be the most fundamental aspect of what constitutes truth?  Because as I have said you can readily argue whatever you want if it isn't.  Pointing out these conflicts, as you are, should tell you they need resolving if there is to be ANY coherent metaphysical position regarding reality.  I have asked you before, and it is important in the discussion about conflict.  I get the impression that you are suggesting naturalism is somehow wrong without telling me what can be right.

As I said above, I use science to collectively refer to all fields of study using the scientific method.  You seem to be doing the same thing in arguing that the metaphysical positions based on science are in conflict with the metaphysical positions based on idealism are conflicts in the studies themselves, and not the metaphysical positions.  This is what Bob pointed out.  The error is at the metaphysical level, not in reality itself.

From a physicalist perspective, reason is a form of thinking adhering to logic.  This thinking is brain activity.  If you understand physicalism/naturalism, you should have known that we posit that the human mind is synonymous with the body, in the sense that is fundamentally complex brain activity.  Brain activity can be observed.  Consequently, there is no error in saying that in my worldview, it is possible to observe reason.  Whether or not it will ever be practical or predictive is another topic, but observed?  Yes.  I find it amusing that you accuse others here of not understanding certain metaphysical positions when you seem to not understand this one.

You can't have truth without some standard for truth.  You can't have standards for truth without a worldview.  Multiple worldviews lead to conflict in what is true.

Welcome to the party, you now know absolute truth is impossible to obtain.

My reasons for picking the physicalist/naturalist worldview?  Pragmatism.  The sciences (they are all natural for me) lead to extremely accurate and predictive models of realities.  The non-sciences are filled with disagreement and often contradict the findings of science (which are accurate).  Like others here have said, until someone finds a better way to model reality, the scientific method wins.

 To BobSpence1 and mellestad: Stop using rhetoric. Stop the personal attacks. Stop name-calling. Stop lying. Stop talking about smells and dead animals. Stick to the discussion topic. If you want to say something that has nothing to do with the discussion topic, DON’T SAY IT. Otherwise you are just spamming and creating a smoke screen.

To everyone else who has contributed to this discussion: Thank you for sticking to the topic, and for your very thoughtful and helpful ideas. I particularly thank: Kapkao, cj, KSMB, butterbattle, Whatthedeuce, Jormungander, v4ultingbassist, Zaq, Tapey, nigelTheBold, Thomathy.

The discussion topic is this: The metaphysical conflict between the sciences and humanities.

These are the two sides of the argument:

1) I have been explaining that the conflict exists and that it is fundamental.

2) Other people in this discussion first said that the conflict does not exist. Now BobSpence1 admits that the conflict does exist, but he is refusing to concede that the conflict is fundamental. That natural science proceeds from a metaphysical perspective has also been admitted by v4ultingbassist and nigelTheBold.

Contrary to what mellestad said, this discussion is not flogging a dead horse. It’s flogging a horse that is alive and kicking, and it is kicking with extreme violence.

The metaphysical conflict between strong sociology (strong social science) and physics (strong natural science) has been discussed. The metaphysical conflict between mathematics (strong formal science) and physics (strong natural science) has also been discussed.

The very essence of this discussion is the metaphysical conflict between mathematics and physics. At the moment, this conflict between mathematics and physics is raging over string theory.

From the perspective of physicalism, mathematics and physics are called the queen and king of the sciences, respectively. Physics is called the king of the sciences because it is regarded by physicalism to be the primary arbiter of reality. Mathematics is called the queen of the sciences because it is regarded by physicalism to be the secondary arbiter of reality. However, metaphysical idealism switches the order; idealism views mathematics as the king, and physics as the queen.

This is the conflict, which is described on the Nova science documentary ‘The Elegant Universe’: Some physicists are saying that string theory is physics. Other physicists are saying that string theory is not physics, but mathematics. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/elegant/program.html

If string theory is not physics but mathematics, it raises this important question: Is string theory true knowledge of the world/universe? This question, and the answer to it – yes or no – is metaphysics/metaphysical i.e. metaphysics is the difference between mathematics and physics in this context.

If you answer ‘yes’, you are siding with idealism. If you answer ‘no’, you are siding with physicalism/materialism/naturalism.

Idealism and physicalism/materialism/naturalism are alternative, conflicting metaphysical perspectives. Idealism maintains that the world/universe is inside human minds, and therefore can only be known, ultimately, through reason. Physicalism/materialism/naturalism maintains that the world/universe is external to human minds, and therefore ultimately, can only be known through observation (empiricism).

The conflicting metaphysical perspectives of idealism and physicalism began as Platonism and Aristotelianism respectively. This metaphysical conflict has raged at the centre of science and philosophy for 3500 years.

My only point is this: The claim that this metaphysical conflict does not exist, and that it is not fundamental, is an absolutely false claim.

I must emphasize that I only accept the definition of science by Ernest Rutherford, who said: "there is physics and there is stamp-collecting." Physics is the only science. All other sciences, including neuroscience, are pseudo-sciences.

Ah! I see the origins of your misunderstanding of science.

Rutherford was hardly presenting a definition of science, or even a description of science. He was presenting his personal contempt for other branches of study. Science as an epistemology encompasses far more than physics. Science as a methodology is applicable to quite a few surprising areas of knowledge.

If you were only to accept that Rutherford's arrogant statement as a definition for science, of course you'd come to the conclusion that science is in conflict with many other areas of study. That's built right in to the statement itself. But this would be a question-begging strawman, and not a basis for any kind of real discussion about the metaphysical assumptions of science, and how they relate to naturalism/physicalism/whatever.

So, your arguments about this "fundamental conflict" all boil down to the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian systems of philosophy?  

There is a fundamental conflict between the worldviews expressed by Plato and Aristotle, but I'm at a loss as to how you moved from this to there being a fundamental conflict between physics and mathematics or a conflict between science and the humanities. 

Mathematics is essentially the study of quantity. Studying math does not automatically obligate you to believe that all the math represents reality. In fact, in physics courses, we frequently utilize mathematical models that do not accurately represent reality simply as a tool for understanding scientific concepts. And, mathematics itself is certainly not "inherently" opposed to physics; I'm not sure what that even means. With mathematics and physics, just like with all other fields that you've previously posed as intrinsically opposed to each or something, it seems like you're attaching your own extra definition. You're implying that mathematics supports idealism; what is your justification for this?

Perhaps you are still confusing fields of study with philosophical positions.

I've watched the entirely of that program before. I don't remember any point where it said anything like that, and I do not know of any physicist that ever said or wrote anything resembling either of those claims. It does, however, seem like a claim you might mistakenly derive from it; you have certainly repeatedly demonstrated a strange understanding of the definitions of important terms. There is still widespread debate over string theory, but asserting that string theory is physics, but not mathematics or mathematics, but not physics, is just completely butchering the definitions of string theory, physics, and mathematics.

String theory attempts to merge the scientific fields of quantum mechanics and general relativity. There is a conceptual model of string theory, but it also incorporates a bunch of math. So, string theory strictly includes physics AND mathematics. I *think* it could be mathematics, but not physics, in a certain sense, if string theory does not accurately represent reality, but even that would be quite a stretch.

I think he prefers long responses with lots of jargon.

We've been telling him that from the beginning and he can't decide whether he is debating:

1) a fundamental difference between science and the humanities (both of which seem to have a fluid definition)

2) if he is debating the validity of some particular metaphysical ideas

3) whether physical scientists and social scientists are in a battle of philosophical metaphysics that neither side seems to be aware of or care about but is nonetheless absolutely critical to...something.

I don't know why you are still giving him your time, you're obviously more patient than I am this week.  I wouldn't mind the debate if he would decide what his point is and stick with it.

I still don't think he's made a case for the humanities (or social sciences) are anti-naturalistic in a broad sense.  If he wants to say, "Some people follow a metaphysical perspective that is anti-naturalistic" then great, but I have yet to see any evidence for the humanities or social sciences having anti-naturalistic metaphysics at their core by definition.

Epistemologist, I have repeatedly asked you how we are to define the truths that you posit are in conflict.  I have also pointed out that idealistic interpretation of a field of science is NOT the same thing as the science.  You say social science conflicts with natural science.  You have failed to explain how.  All you have said is that there are idealistic truths to certain areas of science, without giving ANY examples.  We will continue our stance that these truths are misinterpreted and their fields misrepresented until you present specific evidence instead.

You cannot continue talking in such broad generality about the existence of truths in 'idealistic science' when no one here accepts that.  We don't know what they are, because you won't tell us.

And I did NOT say that science comes FROM a metaphysical perspective; I said it applies TO only one that is based on the natural.  That is why I refuse your definition of the social sciences holding idealistic scientific truth.

My understanding of physicalism is that most philosophers refer to the physical as the 'scientifically natural.'  In that sense, physicalism holds that all is natural and that a complete scientific model of reality can be created of nature.  I rarely see philosophers use 'chemical, biological etc,' so my understanding was that they picked physics to represent the rest of science.  Physics is no more important than chemistry is in scientific inquiry of reality. 

Seriously, this is not a trivial error.  The human mind is NOT external to the world/universe in naturalism/etc.  This is a glaring oversight in light of your arrogance regarding philosophy.

As others have pointed out, this is incorrect.  This shows a lack of understanding of science on your part, and certainly hurts your position on conflict within it.

People just tend to use 'he' as the convenient pronoun, me included. It's sexist, lol. 

Eh........what? 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem

Edit: Jesus f***ing Christ, where do you get all your definitions from? (ahem, rhetorical question..)

Wow, you are a moron.