Thanks for agreeing.  Now I know that God exists.

(1) g <--> ~g
(2) g-->~<>~g
(3) ~g-->~<>g
(4) (x)(Cx == <>x)
(5) ~(~Cg)
(6) Cg   AP
(7) Cg--><>g  4; UI,Equiv,Simp
(8 ) <>g   6,7; MP
(9) ~(~<>g)  8; DN
(10) ~(~g)  3,9; MT
(11) g   10; DN
(12) Cg-->g  6-11; CP
(13) C~g  AP
(14) C~g--><>~g  4; UI,Equiv,Simp
(15) <>~g  13,14; MP
(16) ~(~<>~g)  15; DN
(17) ~g   2,16; MT
(18) C~g-->~g  13-17; CP
(19) g-->~C~g  18; Contra
(20) ~g-->~Cg  12; Contra
(21) ~Cg <--> ~C~g 1,19,20; CD
(22) ~C~g  5,21; DS
(23) <>~g-->C~g  4; UI,Equiv,Simp
(24) ~(<>~g)  22,23; MT
(25) []g  24; Modal Equivng to the premise. 

Yeah, if something is not logically impossible, then it possibly could exist.

IOW, if you can't prove that something could not or does not exist, then it may exist.

Like Russell's Teapot.

So?

Now, how do you prove God actually does exist???

Humor us. We are not machines, spell it out in human words.

I think you may be a machine, but I digress.

If God exists, then God exists in every possible world.  That would include this actual world that we live in.

Therefore, if God does not exist in this world, he does not exist in any possible world, since existence in one possible world would entail existence in every world.

But you have just agreed that if something is not in any possible world, then it is logically inconceivable.  Since God is not logically inconceivable, there must be at least one possible world that he exists in.  But wait a minute, it would then follow that God exists in every possible world.

Therefore, God exists.

I've already debunked this objection.

The existence of unicorns in one possible world does not entail their existence in every possible world.  This is true of God, not of pink unicorns.

There, let us never use that crappy objection again.  It didn't work against Anselm and it is not going to work here.

For God, it does.  The reason is that any existence which is simply possible is sustained by contingent states of affairs.  Therefore, by claiming that God's existence is possible and not necessary, you are essentially claiming that God has to be caused.  But this would contradict the entire idea of God as being an eternal being who maintains an essential nature of maximal excellence in every possible world (i.e. without any preconditions).  

You are making the mistake of conflating the existence of God with the existence of other things which are not in the same category.  God does not share the same modality of existence as protons, stars, ice cream cones, etc.  It is true that the possibility of a particular flavor of ice cream does not entail its existence in this world.  But to thrust that same modality onto God is a category mistake on your part and it is a typical mistake that atheists make, particularly ones who do not make a concerted effort to understand just exactly what it is that apologists are endorsing. 

I'm actually in agreement with you here, but this is by no means a closed case in many academic circles.  There are constant debates going on about the ontological status of possible worlds, particularly actualism vs. possibilism. 

You can make that logical leap if you acknowledge that conceptually God is an eternal being who is omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good in all possible worlds.  In other words, if God exists, then he would not only exist without any preconditions (i.e. uncaused), but he would also maintain his nature without any preconditions.  Hence, there would be no physical events helping him maintain his omniscience or his omnipotence.  According to axiom S5 in modal logic, which is a generally accepted axiom, if it is possible that something exists in all possible worlds, then that something exists in all possible worlds.

You are overlooking the axioms of modal logic and also appear to not accept the apologist understanding of "God".  Let's put it this way:  you would probably grant that matter is eternal, which some atheists feel is a necessary implication of the law of conservation of energy.  This means that matter itself is uncaused and is not dependent upon contingent states of affairs for its being.  This would mean that matter exists in all possible worlds.  Keep in mind that I do not believe this at all, I'm just trying to help you understand how modal logic works. 

This is not the cosmological argument and in fact I do not believe the principle of sufficient reason is reducible to the law of non-contradiction, which therefore would not permit us to grant that it is the case in all possible worlds that the universe required a cause.  I would grant, however, that it is the case in all possible worlds that nothing can cause itself to exist.

It does not have to.  Nevertheless, it would still defeat atheism, since atheism itself makes no provisions whereby it strictly denies the Christian God.  Atheism denies the existence of all Gods.

We know that eternal things are in all possible worlds.  Otherwise, there would be a possible world where an eternal thing stopped existing, or a possible world where an eternal thing never began to exist, which is impossible given that eternal things cannot begin to exist and that there is some possible world where an eternal thing does exist.  Therefore, eternal things are either necessary or logically inconceivable.  Exclusive disjunction.

Appealing to our ignorance is a cheap tactic which can be employed to disprove anything.  I will argue that there is no way to prove that any scientific law is true unless we have a complete knowledge of reality, and therefore, there is no reason to trust science.  This is a functionally use form of reason and you can't pick and choose which areas you want to apply it to.

We do not have to know everything about the nature of God or the essential nature of reality to understand modalities, just as I do not need a complete understanding of how my computer works in order to continue using it.

It's not special pleading because in the very same paragraph, I explained how the modality of God differs from that of other objects.  It's only fallacious if God shares the same category of existence as other things.

The fact that you include causelessness in God's definition, does not make him "necessary or impossible". Claiming that God is possible does not entail that God must be caused.

Your disjunction fails because: in order for the existence of God to be necessary it must also be possible!

I hope I have put this extremely fucking dull argument to rest.

 Wow... an entire thread devoted to the logical proof that knowing how to use symbolic logic in no way equates to thinking logically.

Alvin Plantinga, Charles Hartshorne, and Kurt Godel are/were recognized experts in modal logic and they all would agree that my conceivability argument is correct.

Bob Spence agrees with me as well.  Are you telling me that he is wrong?

"Yeah, if something is not logically impossible, then it possibly could exist."  --Bob

Assume that something exists in one possible world but not some other.  According to the law of sufficient reason, there would have be an account for why this thing exists in W1 and not W2 and, as such, you would have to state that in W2, the causal states of affairs which would necessitate the manifestation of this thing did not take effect.  Therefore, if God is in W1 but not W2, then God had to be caused to be in W1.  Otherwise, he would exist in W2 as well.

Oh, okay.

Then guess what?  God exists.  I do not have to justify this in any way.  God just is.  I do not have to present any evidence because the principle of sufficient reason is an incoherent, outmoded idea.

I define my pink magical unicorn, Sparkles, as existing in every possible world. Ergo, if Sparkles exists in a world, he exists in every possible world. If he doesn't exist in a world, then he doesn't exist in any world. Something must be logically impossible to not exist in any world. My unicorn, Sparkles, is not logically impossible. Therefore, there is a world that Sparkles can exist in. Therefore, Sparkles exists in every possible world, per the definition of Sparkles. Ergo, my pink magical unicorn Sparkles exists in this world. QED. 

Or, even better. I define my pink magical unicorn, Sparkles, as something that necessarily exists. Something that necessarily exists must exist. Therefore, Sparkles must exist. Therefore, it exists.  

Why is this true of God, but not pink unicorns? Because you've defined it to be part of God's character or some b*******?

Ha! Well I define it to be part of unicorns' characters. The existence of unicorns in one possible world entails their existence in every possible world, per my definition of unicorns.

But you haven't established that the 'idea of God' describes any actually existing being having those attributes. The only area of conflict is 'eternal' vs. 'caused'. Attributes such as 'maximal excellence' have not been established as remotely necessary attributes of any eternal entity, even if you could define them coherently.

There may well be 'eternal' entities or aspects of reality, and some of them may be necessary precursors of our known Universe, and possibly other 'universes' within a wider 'Metaverse'. But there is no logical necessity that they correspond in any way to a God - no 'goodness', sentience of any form, whatever. Just some 'raw' potentiality, a quantum energy field, or something of that nature.

You are still assuming that this special category corresponds to any actual existing entity. You have not established that it applies to anything that actually exists.

'Eternal' does not entail necessary existence.

Your argument does not follow. A world where a thing defined as 'eternal' ceased to exist would entail a logical contradiction, therefore it is not a 'possible' world.

Alternatively, if the entity ceased to exist under some possible conditions, that just means it is only conditionally eternal. IOW it can only exist as an eternal entity in worlds where certain conditions never arise. It can still be eternal in other worlds.

We do not require proof 100% that any scientific theory is true. Laws are simply formulations described observed regularities in the behaviour and relationships of entities and processes, they are are true to the extent that they accurately describe observations. This only requires access to, knowledge of, a subset of reality relevant to the particular discipline. Theories are held to be provisionally true to the extent that they appear to accurately model reality.

Trust in science is conditional and justified to the extent that it makes confirmed predictions of what will be observed in novel places and situations. It earns what conditional trust we give it.

We would apply such trust to any methodology to the extent that its concepts pass similar tests of correspondence to reality.

'Knowledge of God' is not grounded in anything independently verifiable/testable, so it has zero ontological status.

FS,

I'd have more respect for you if:

1. You didn't steal much of your work from Godel.

2. You didn't get it wrong.

I have established that the concept of God refers to a real thing because by your own admission, something which is conceivable is possible.  Since God is possible, he has to exist.  Otherwise, you are claiming that an eternal being's existence is dictated by some contingent states of affairs, which is a non-sequitur.

There is no may to it.  I know that an eternal aspect of reality exists and is a necessary precursor to our universe.  Now let's examine the nature of such an entity:

An eternal substance is distinct from an eternal attribute.  Eternal attributes are themselves without beginning and without end, but are ontologically dependent upon subjects to which they are attributed. Eternal attributes cannot exist without an eternal substance.

Since we've established that an eternal substance must exist by logical necessity, it follows that such a being X cannot be sustained by contingent states of affairs Y.  This would be unintelligible because it would be saying that there are no possible worlds where ~X although there are possible worlds where ~Y. 

Anything substantial which exists by logical necessity, as an eternal substance does, has an existence which cannot be accounted for by anything external to itself.  It cannot be caused by a separate being, unless it is the case that it was logically necessary for such action to take place.  But since it is not a contradiction for any separate being to not cause, this clearly is not the case.  An eternal substance cannot be the instrument for its own creation because action requires existence as a precondition, thus the whole idea is a logical contradiction.  Further, in both cases, eternity would be violated because the substance, in order to be eternal, must be without origin or beginning. 

One may object that an eternal substance is made necessary by necessary states of affairs which are ontologically prior to the eternal substance itself.  But this argument is moot because states of affairs are made real by the objects which sustain them, not vice versa.  Therefore, the necessary states of affairs would exist in necessary beings themselves, which would imply either an eternal substance or eternal attributes which require an eternal substance.  Reality itself is what Aristotle defined as a "secondary substance", which constitutes a set of beings which share properties in common.  Secondary substances thus do not exist on their own accord.  Therefore, one cannot separate an eternal substance from necessary states of affairs.

Corporeal substances have a twofold structure of form and matter.  Form is the universal category, matter is the material. As matter manifests in a particular arrangement, it becomes an individual substance which is of a particular form.  Different arrangements of matter beget different forms.  Formless matter is logically impossible, even when matter is chaotic.  Matter itself does not manifest into particular forms by logical necessity, therefore it cannot be said with any logical backing that an eternal being is material since an eternal substance cannot be sustained by contingent states of affairs, which would be the case if an eternal substance consisted of one particular arrangement of matter and not some other.  Furthermore, material arrangements (corporeal substances) do not constitute their own sufficient reason for being; for example, your computer, which is a particular arrangement of matter, did not arrange itself.  Therefore, while the possibility of formless matter is precluded, matterless form is conceivable and would be applicable to an eternal substance.

Matter constitutes potentiality and form constitutes actuality. Matter itself is not actualized until it manifests in some form. Insofar that particular manifestations of matter, in addition to maintaining determinable attributes, are always spatially individuated from others, we will always experience matter in conjunction with form.  Thus, matter is actualized when it is arranged in a particular way.  Take a bronze statue; the statue is the actualization of the bronze, while the bronze itself is potentially something other than a statue, such as a dish or a spear.  Since potentiality exists in matter, it can be said that an eternal substance is pure actuality, given that the substance is at once both eternal and immaterial.  (Theoretically, angels, who occupy a mode of existence known as "aeviternity", are immaterial as well, but they are not eternal.  They are actualized to the maximal value that can be maintained by a finite entity which is not self-existent and sustained by contingent states of affairs.  Thus, the same inferences cannot be made about them.  "Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end." -Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, Q. X)

As form/matter conglomerates, corporeal substances also have a twofold structure of actuality and potentiality.  The motion from potentiality to actuality is called "change", thus it is said that anything which moves acquires something by its movement which it did not possess previously.  What follows is that anything which changes is in some way in potentiality.  But an eternal substance is pure actuality and therefore cannot change.

If every conceivable potentiality is actualized in an eternal susbtance, then such attributes cannot be possessed in any greater sense than they are already possessed.  We occupy a universe full of actualities with potentialities not yet realized.  This is due to the material constitution of the universe, under which we will never be able to maximize our actuality.  Imagine the basic structure of our existence as being formalized into a set of numerical values.  We have an intellect, potency, lifespan, and presence. Each one of these attributes have a finite value.  Yet in an eternal subsance of pure actuality, these attributes are of infinite value.  Infinitude is that value than which no other value could be greater.  It is in this sense than an eternal substance does not lack anything.  Most of us have an intelligence quotient, but none of us have omniscience.  Most of us have special talents and abilities, but none of us have omnipotence. All of us are born and then we die someday, none of us are eternal (The offer of "eternal life" is a Christian colloquialism and not part of this domain of discourse).  All of us have height, width, depth, mass, volume.  None of us are omnipresent.  We are existent beings not fully actualized.  An eternal substance is.

One may object that an eternal substance may be both impossible and not contradictory on the following grounds:  It may be the case that given the progression of events as they've occurred,  an eternal being does not exist and in actuality can never exist.  But it still could have been true that the axis of progression included an entity which never began to exist and continues to exist.  Ostensibly, this appears to be a valid objection but it trades on a notion of time that gained currency centuries ago yet has no philosophical tenability today.  Newton's idea of time treats it as an independent force moving on its own.  Thus people have a conception of time as some singular entity which is constantly moving forward where events arbtrarily get placed within it.  Yet barring any corporeal objects, there is no adequate account of exactly *what* this motion consists of.  The only tenable position is that time does not exist in itself at all, but is a product of non-temporal motions between the twofold structures of real being(potentiality/actuality or form/matter) and our capacity to retain events in our memory.  Time is thus our mental ordering of events according to our memory of potentialities which are now actualities. What is thus required for the aforementioned objection to maintain its footing is for an eternal substance to be a potentiality not realized into actuality. But this is impossible for the reasons previously specified.  If one argues that an eternal substance was a potentiality but is now an impossibility, s/he is making the claim that an eternal substance, if existent, is sustained by contingent states of affairs.  This cannot be the case because if an eternal substance exists, then there can be no possibility for it to not exist, an axiom which is violated if it is the case that eternity is sustained by contingency.

Any form/matter conglomerate, by virtue of it not being fully actualized, has an additional twofold structure of substance/accidents.  A substance is the irreducible "I", the protagonist in one's own personal narrative.  The attributes constitute the narrative, or the things which are said of the substance.  Yet in a being fully actualized, which would be true of a being which is at once immaterial and eternal, nothing could be attributed to such a being which is not already contained in its nature, or form.  What follows is that, unlike finite beings, an eternal substance is not the sum of its parts, or the net result of everything which is said about it; rather, an eternal substance is uncomposed, existing irreducibly as the "I".  Therefore, while the aforementioned eternal attributes ostensibly exist from outside the substance which sits atop of the ontological hierarchy, in reality eternal attributes are a partial image of fully formed entity without parts.  

Yes I have.  If God is logically conceivable, then he *has* to exist.  There is no way around this.

Then it would entail a contingent existence.  So what would a being without beginning and without end be contingent upon?  Some non-eternal phenomena? 

LOL.  Conditionally eternal?  So something can be without beginning and without end provided that certain conditions are in place?  If it requires certain conditions, then it means that in the absence of such conditions, it would stop existing which means that it is not eternal, since anything which has the potential to stop existing cannot be eternal, by the law of non-contradiction.  Any potential to end means that the being is not eternal.  You make no sense.

Correct.  Science tells us absolutely nothing about the essential nature of reality.

I just gave a proof of God without even presupposing from the outset that God existed.  So you clearly are wrong.

Something can be eternal yet be contingent, as long as what it is contingent upon are fixed attributes of some 'possible world'. 

Such fixed attributes could be the particular combination of the 'laws of physics'.

For there to be actual variety of 'possible worlds', ie not just one possible world, each must have some fixed, permanent, attributes, to distinguish it from other possible worlds, otherwise they will eventually blur into one.

An 'eternal' entity may only be able to exist in 'worlds' with certain attributes. Since we are talking about fixed, distinguishing attributes of each world,  we are not talking about things which could change and thereby cause the assumed 'eternal' entity to cease to exist.

So a 'possible', ie 'conceivable' eternal entity is not 'necessary'.

Please feel free to try again.

I may address some of your other points if I can find time and motivation....

I'm glad Fortunate_S believes in the Flying Spaghetti Monster. So do I.

Yes.

Only because you have to posit what you're proving?

'Fixed' describes the permanent distinguishing attributes of a particular set of possible 'worlds'. That different possible worlds will have different such attributes, that there can be more than one possible value for such a property, does not imply that the value or strength or specific nature of a given property within the context of any given possible world is not fixed or constant. As I said before, without such fixed attributes that can still have different values in different worlds, there would be no scope for 'different' worlds. It is as if the size of a planet was not subject to change in any individual case, but that there could be more than one exact size possible. 

Any given being might exist forever in one set of worlds, not be able or likely to exist at all in another, and possibly last only a finite time in another. Also, an 'uncaused' being, one that 'automatically' comes with a particular set of possible worlds, may still be vulnerable to something that exists in some of those worlds. All of these scenarios are logically conceivable.

There is nothing 'inconceivable' about an otherwise eternal being ceasing to exist if it encounters some particular version of kryptonite. Something can have the potential to exist forever but still have some  "Achilles' heel ". You have not demonstrated that there actually is such a thing as a 'necessary' being. There may be necessary attributes of the fabric of reality such that it can support something which we would recognize as a 'world' capable of persisting, and supporting life, but beyond something like that, you are just speculating.

There may well be 'necessary' attributes that only apply for a particular possible world.

]The distinguishing attributes are fixed for the duration of the world's existence as a distinct entity. If the world only has a finite existence, then it cannot contain eternal entities.

I explicitly claimed that the attributes of a world which might conceivably permanently block the existence within that world of some specific eternal entity, were assumed themselves to be eternal, immutable, within that world. I did not require that anything need could change, only that there could be more that one possible instance of any eternal thing of any given category, and that they could each manifest with different but still unchanging attributes. Some might be more powerful than others. That does not necessitate that the power of any particular instance could change.

You keep assuming that the existence of more than one eternal object with different attributes necessitates that that attribute could actually change. The possibility of more than one version of an object of a particular category, which surely is not inconceivable, does not require that one object can acquire the attributes of another. It may still be possible, but not necessary.

Individual objects within a set of permanent, unchanging, eternal entities, might still have, say, different colors, while the color of each one would still be unchangeable.

Do you finally get it?

immutable: "unchanging over time or unable to be changed".

This does not preclude the existence of variants of an immutable object. Interestingly there are such concepts as variants of immutable objects defined with computer programming languages.

Singular existing being who is sentient and intelligent, capable of action and agency.  This being has free will and exists eternally.  This being has attributes which are purely actualized and the attributes themselves are contained in the essential nature of this being.  This being has revealed himself to not only exist as a singular being, but as a category of existence in himself, such that other people are able to identify with his nature while maintaining their distinct personhood. 

Describe Eternity. 

Ooo, I am impressed.

Well I am learning a lot about modal logic from you and BobSpence and searching the internet. But it didn't take any research to see that if what you are saying is true, then it would be true for any being defined as eternal.