Yep.

So, in short, it's possible that believing/acting on false information can have a statistically better moral outcome if the agent providing that false information has the same (or compatible) moral axiom as us, is intelligent, and knows more than we do, but can never have a certainly better moral outcome regardless of how knowledgeable the agent is.  However, false information can have a certainly worse moral outcome.

The spectrum of results of relying on false information range from statistically better, at best, to certainly worse.

As I've mentioned, and bears repeating, that there is no case of false information that can be certainly better is very important.  Probability rules here.  If given a choice, if the false information is probably better, it would be better to go with it, if it's probably worse, it would be better not to, and to stick with what true information we have.

Now, let us very briefly examine religion in terms of those situations.

Which (which letter) situation represents an intelligent deity with the same moral axioms with access to all of the relevant information passing on that tailored* false information?

Which situation represents an intelligent deity with incompatible moral axioms with access to all of the relevant information passing on that tailored* false information?

Which situation represents a bunch of goat herders with compatible moral axioms with access to less information than we have passing on that tailored* false information?

Which situation represents a bunch of goat herders with incompatible moral axioms with access to less information than we have passing on that tailored* false information?

There's another situation I'll get to a bit later which isn't represented in these- I don't want to complicate this array.

*Tailored is very important, and I'll also address this later.

Yes.  Now, I need to digress briefly to note the most probable correct knowledge.

Our knowledge and observations are either correct at face value, or to some degree (any degree) influenced by internal or external forces and conditions to be biased or even outright fabricated.

Outright correct  vs.  Somewhat influenced (to any degree)

I want to make sure you follow that, because it's crucial to the next steps.

Not exactly, but almost... I'm talking about the (flawed) idea that we just have perfect observations in one form or another, and there aren't any forces affecting them to perhaps make them less correct- v.s. the idea that there are forces that can and often do affect our observations, be they internal or external, generally to the end of inaccuracy (unless they were to cancel each other out- which is more or less the same as the former)

My point is that, if we don't have to worry about such forces affecting our observations and making them inaccurate, we're going to be right anyway.

If we do, in order to achieve the most probably correct knowledge, we have to use scientific methodology to correct for those biases in our observations.

In such a case as that wouldn't work, such as the intelligent meddling and distortion of our perceptions, we have no objective way to correct for it and knowledge is fully inaccessible anyway, so it makes no difference.

The bottom line is that scientific methodology can't hurt, but it certainly can help give us the most probably correct information regardless of (without knowledge of) the circumstance.

That is, logic necessitates the scientific method as delivering us the most probably correct information possible.

So, science is the metric of most likely valid information, regardless of any other factors.

But is it morally necessary to subscribe to the truth of science?

Lets get back to the four cases of false information I mentioned earlier (which should here be understood with reference to those cases wherein religion conflicts with science- that is not to say religion is always in conflict with science, but wherein it is a choice must be made):

F. An intelligent deity with the same moral axioms with access to all of the relevant information passing on that tailored* false information.

---We agreed that this false information is statistically more morally optimal.

L. An intelligent deity with incompatible moral axioms with access to all of the relevant information passing on that tailored* false information.

---We agreed that this false information is statistically much worse with regards to moral optimization.

As such:

With regards to a deity which possesses more information, the crucial determinant as to whether it is moral to act on the tailored* information given to us by the deity is the character of the deity.  If the moral axioms it acts on are the same as ours the answer is quite the opposite to the case of those axioms being incompatible with our own.

I.  A bunch of goat herders with compatible moral axioms with access to less information than we have passing on that tailored* false information.

O. A bunch of goat herders with incompatible moral axioms with access to less information than we have passing on that tailored* false information.

---We agreed that these cases of false information are both statistically worse with regards to moral optimization.

As such:

"Checkmate goat herders". 

It is never, under any moral axiom, moral to believe the false information given to us by relatively ignorant goat herders over the most probably correct knowledge.  Under any moral axiom, that is, such a belief is an immoral action. 

Where science is completely lacking, the goat herders' guesses are as good as any-- but where there is even the tiniest inclination of scientific knowledge to the contrary, it is morally necessary to act as if that were truth, as opposed to the information handed to us by even the most noble of goat herders.

Indeed, the question of where this false information came from (wherein religion does contradict science) is of utmost importance in determining whether subscription to the religion, as a meme, is objectively immoral or not where it encourages belief in its information over that of science.

And how do we determine where the information most likely came from?  We don't trust the source- we do this objectively, through science, as the source of all most probable information.

The question, then, comes down to this:

Given the two options of deity or goat herders (independent of the morality of said deity or goat herders), what is more probable?

(Again, there's another situation/option I'll get to a bit later which isn't represented in these- I don't want to complicate this array.  And again *Tailored is very important, and I'll also address this later.)

double post...

 DP

I've been talking about descriptive systems.  The description in religion is wrong, and thereby immoral- no matter what axioms we are working from (secular or religious in origin), believing the descriptive account by religion of the world is markedly less conducive to carrying out those axioms.

Religious descriptivism distorts moral actions where they occur, and is in itself immoral as a belief for any moral person to hold.

I haven't gotten to religious prescriptivism yet.

Yes God means different things to different people, but the discussion is resolvable as soon as we know what God means to the theist engaged in the discussion.  I can give good reason that you shouldn't hold the belief in god you hold as soon as the definition is presented (define God how you choose).  What I find interesting, and something that leads us down the path of atheism is that no two gods are alike.  Why?  Ask 50 Christians leaving Church about their God and you'll get a little something different from each one.  Are they each believing in their own version of God?  I believe they are.  This helps us realize that God doesn't have the power to convey to us who he/she really is, making us realize that most peoples version of God is impossible.