Well, nice to meet you Jack

First of all, I want to tell you I will be busy over the next week or so, I'll likely pop in and  out, but won't have a lot of time... 

Secondly, I didn't call this thread a "debate" because I don't expect to successfully change your mind, or you mine.  

I just want to have an intelligent discussion and hopefully we'll both learn something. 

OK, my take on Kalam is that it is seemingly logically coherent, in that if you agree with the first and second premise, you have to conclude that it has a cause.

I want you to know that I see all major apologetic arguments as puzzles.  They seem as those "trick" questions of where the extra dollar went.  All the premises seem correct, but one can't escape the feeling something was missed.  

When I considered myself a deist, my most convincing personal argument was Kalam.  It made sense, I thought.  I didn't make the illogical jump from my concluded possible deity to the Christian god, or any other known god, but I gave it a 50/50 shot at existing.  Anyways, enough about me

Now let's review Kalam C.A. as presented by WCL:

p1.  Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

p2.  The universe began to exist.

c.     Therefore, the universe must have a cause.

My first objection was regarding Russell's paradox.  If we agree that the universe is the set of elements with the property of "thing", U = { x : x is a thing }

Because one will have to include U = { x : x is not in x } therefore creating the contradiction.  You have to conclude that the universe cannot be included as part of itself.  Therefore your conclusion is incorrect.

Another way of looking at this is a category error.  The universe is not in the same class as things.

The second objection gets extremely loaded.  

p1 implies that there are two sets of things, those that begin to exist, and those that do not begin to exist.  In order for you to avoid begging the question, you have to have more then one thing that does not begin to exit.  

You mentioned that logic, mathematics do not begin to exit, but those are caused by god, or are parts of god as concluded by TAG (which is another argument we can touch on).

so your first premise changes to

p1. Everything that begins to exist, and some things that do not, have a cause, except for God. 

hehe, the argument still begs the question and becomes incoherent.  

Let me know your thoughts, I have to get back to work

Thank you Brian.

Hi Ktula,

I also am not one that is to be expected to reply to this 100 times a day. Aside from sometimes long hours at work, I have 2 munchkins at home that command a lot of my time. But more importantly, I am truly open mined on this and really want us to do some serious critical thinking. To do so, takes some serious thought. Regardless of worldview, any reasonable person must concede that when speaking of things like "nothingness" and "uncaused causes" it is truly mind bending! Anyone pretending they can fully grasp all the implications is, in my opinion, not being honest. In looking back at previous dialogue I had, I realized there were some valid objections that were raised by the other person that I initially overlooked. It was at that point I realized a serious problem. This was due to my being in such a hurry to refute the argument I was reading. I was already trying to think if my response before I even finished reading theirs. That is unacceptable on this topic. You, by all appearances, seem to share my view that this is not a quick discussion. So I have nothing but time.

Now for your current objection, maybe I'm missing something, but this seems to me to be easily answered. Russell's paradox applies to "naive set theory" and has no bearing in the physical world. In the real world, the Barber of Seville's situation is simple: the barber can shave another man, or the barber can shave himself. That's it. There is no paradox. There can never be a paradox with simple, physical objects such as barbers and customers. Russell's paradox introduces the abstract mathematical concept of the set which has no direct equivalent in the physical world, but it is this idea of the set (an object which can include itself) which causes all the troubles in the abstract mathematical world. We seem to have the equivalent of Zermelo-Frankel set theory at work in the physical world, which contains the Axiom of Separation which states that objects (sets) can only contain other objects (sets) as members but cannot contain themselves - thus avoiding Russell's paradox.

And on the second objection, I too believe it has been answered. It does not make special pleading for God. Since I have stated that their are multiple objects in the set that God occupies, it proves he is getting no special treatment.

I look forward to another provocative post from you. Thanks.

 You're welcome.  And in appreciation of the attempt by Jackspell to have a civil and thought out conversation I am altering the theistard badge back to theist.

I wanted to post this earlier. Unfortunately I'm at work, and restricted to using my phone. So I had to download a calculator with logic symbols. But this should help: Russell's paradox S={A|∉A} Real world solution S={s⊂A|P(s)}

I wanted to post this earlier. Unfortunately I'm at work, and restricted to using my phone. So I had to download a calculator with logic symbols. But this should help:

Russell's paradox
S={A|∉A}

Real world solution
S={s⊂A|P(s)}

I wanted to post this earlier. Unfortunately I'm at work, and restricted to using my phone. So I had to download a calculator with logic symbols. But this should help:

Russell's paradox
S={A|∉A}

Real world solution
S={s⊂A|P(s)}

Sorry for the duplicates. My signal is terrible.

Yes, fair enough... I was attacking the next part of the argument without it being proposed.  If taken in it's entirety, it begs the question, and we both know that this is only the first part of the KCA.  However, you are correct at this point. 

Edit:

Upon further reflection, I want to point out a fallacy of equivocation.  that is the in the word "cause".

Follow me on this one.  The argument is not just trying to prove any ordinary cause.  Mainly because cause, as we understand it, is a temporal dependent phenomena.  You have state A and then a cause and then state B.  The argument is trying the prove THE cause.  Meaning the cause that is not temporal dependent, because time is a property of the universe.  It is a thing that has no begging.  So the argument now becomes:

p1.  Everything except THE CAUSE has a cause.

p2.  The universe began to exist.  Therefore creating the environment necessary for temporal causation.

c.     Therefore, the universe must have a cause. 

where the conclusion should be, Therefore, the universe was created due to THE CAUSE.  Which begs the question.

You slippery, sandbagging SOB you. I actually thought I had you, until you made the edit. Lol. My assumption that you would be a formidable opponent has held true so far. I admit, it took some work for me to formulate a valid response. But nonetheless, here it cometh.

I believe our problem resides in our deprivation of defining our terms. cause\ˈkȯz\
noun
1 a : a reason for an action or condition : motive
b : something that brings about an effect or a result
c : a person or thing that is the occasion of an action or state; especially : an agent that brings something about
d : sufficient reason
2 a : a ground of legal action
b : case
3 : a matter or question to be decided
4 a : a principle or movement militantly defended or supported
b : a charitable undertaking
cause·less \-ləs\ adjective
Examples
His symptoms had no apparent physical causes.
She is the cause of all their problems.
The medicine was prescribed without good cause.
Origin: Middle English, from Anglo-French, from Latin causa.
First use: 13th century
Synonyms: antecedent, causality, causation, occasion, reason
Antonyms: aftereffect, aftermath, consequence, corollary, development, effect, fate, fruit, issue, outcome, outgrowth, product, result, resultant, sequel, sequence, upshot

This is courtesy of Merriam-Webster, and applicable as 1A in our context. In establishing this, the assertion of my equivocating is now demonstrated to be false. You based this fallacy on the idea I was arguing for a specific, unordinary cause. This is misconstrued on two levels: first, my argument conforms to the definition I have noted, which doesn't descrimate the nature of the cause. Second, even if I conceited that it did, the objection would remain invalid. One way to see the difficulty is by reflecting on the different types of causal relations. In event/event causation, one event causes another. For example, the brick’s striking the window pane causes the pane to shatter. This kind of causal relation clearly involves a beginning of the effect in time, since it is a relation between events which occur at specific times. In state/state causation one state of affairs causes another state of affairs to exist. For example, the water’s having a certain density is the cause of the wood’s floating on the water. In this sort of causal relation, the effect need not have a beginning: the wood could theoretically be floating eternally on the water. . . . Now the difficulty that arises in the case of the cause of the beginning of the universe is that we seem to have a peculiar case of state/event causation: the cause is a timeless state but the effect is an event that occurred at a specific moment in the finite past. Such state/event causation doesn’t seem to make sense, since a state sufficient for the existence of its effect should have a state as its effect.

There seems to be only one way out of this dilemma, and that is to say that the cause of the universe’s beginning is a personal agent who freely chooses to create a universe in time. Philosophers call this type of causation “agent causation,” and because the agent is free, he can initiate new effects by freely bringing about conditions which were not previously present.

In response to your alleged translation of P1, it is incorrect. Their are things that exist that are in no way mentioned in this argument ie logical absolutes, mathematical entities etc. If they aren't mentioned, then no question begging CAN be committed. And finally, to satisfy your request for a proper inference on Russell's paradox:

U=Universe

T=Thing

U={u⊂T|P(u)}

Just droping a line to let you know I haven't forgoten about this.  I have been extremely busy over the last week and this week is looking to be bussier still.  I should have some time this weekend for a proper response. 

It's cool man. Like I said earlier, take your time. There is no deadline for any of this. Let's just keep the well thought out, open minded objections and refutations coming. I think it is going well for us both.