Arguing that theism isn't necessarily irrational - Part 4: Science is All Well and Good, but Dude... There's a Time and Place!!
Offline This is the fourth essay in the series.
The first two essays, The Reason for Reason and The Roots of Logic tried to take a look at reasoning, focusing on why it is applicable to our everyday life. Where follow the rules of rules, why are they applicable and where are they not?
Aim was to show that where rules of logic/reason and are applicable, they are rooted in rules that we are already supposed to be following anyway, in the rules of the 'language game' that we were using to discuss the issue in the first place.
This is central to the entire argument as I think that the claim "Theism is necessarily irrational" is based on subtle mis-applications of reason in this manner, as I will try and show in later essays.
(Even with the definition of 'irrational' that Hamby put forward)
The third essay, Introducing the Paradigm, introduced a concept from the Philosophy of Science called the Paradigm. Kuhn's paradigm comes from two observations:
1) When we make empirical observations, how we make these observations and interpret them depends on many assumptions that we already have in place.
2) Throughout the history of science, work of the time has always been grounded in a background theory in this way. Such theories are not proved or disproved, but gradually replaced in scientific revolutions in response to the problems that the old one is facing in maintaining its coherence.
These paradigms don't mean relativity - there's a reason why the old one was riddled with problems that the new one appeared to solve. However, these paradigms can't be straight out evaluated in the same way that normal scientific premises are, as such evaluations require a background theory in place and when evaluating the paradigm it's the background theory that we are questioning.
So building on these three essays I bring you the fourth:
Science is All Very Well and Good, but Dude... There's a Time and Place!!
The scientific method has a prolific history.
Credited with countless acheivements in bringing technology and understanding to the world, the scientific tradition is understably well respected. However, with every successful phenomenon, there will always be that temptation to take it too far.
While science has had great success with the questions it has dealt with, some people would go further and claim that every question has a scientific answer.
This is surely going too far. While a hammer is great for banging in nails, that doesn't mean it's going to do such a good job at cleaning the dishes!
In the first essay reason for reason I specifically noted that the observation and logical methods would depend on the question at hand and our purpose for answering. We're not always looking for the most accurate answer, sometimes to prove something from the ground up just isn't appropiate for the situation at hand. There's a reason why we demand strict methodology when constructing technology and things need to be absolutely accurate and the same reasons don't apply to a personal worldview.
But hypothetically, imagine that we are trying to get the most accurate truth for the sake of truth, even then science doesn't always have the answer. There's more to reason than just scientific method!
Questions outside of the scientific method
As we saw in the essay about paradigms scientific method requires certain things in place before it can go ahead. Before we can do an experiment we need a background structure, a paradigm in place, in order to design the experiment and define the concepts involved.
Metaphysics is a paradigmatic subject.
In metaphysics we scrutinize the very nature of nature itself.
What exactly is a cause or a property?
When we say that something is a natural law, what do we even mean by that?
Once again, we are questioning the nature of concepts that are assumed to be in place when we use scientific experiment. To question propositions in these two areas we need a different approach.
The laws of logic still apply.
Paradigms must be logically self-consistent.
They must also fit the world as we experience it so we still use observations of sorts.
Metaphysics in particular is based around concepts we use like 'cause' and 'property' we examples of how we use such concepts can be used as observations to prove points.
The main difference between questions in paradigms and normal scientific fact is that in scientific fact there is an agreed framework by which individual facts can be confirmed or falsified.
In paradigms, the framework is the very thing being disputed and cannot be determined by a higher framework, otherwise that higher framework would be the paradigm.
Instead, paradigms are holistic affairs that are tweaked and refined rather than confirmed or falsified. We start with an intuitive grasp of the world, and as our opponent shows problems with our view, we are forced to make changes in order iron out contradictions and make our worldview more coherent.
As paradigms are holistic rather made up of individual 'facts', we tend to deal with 'the whole' rather than building it up from atomic premises. This means that it is more important to grasp the overall 'form' and 'shape' of the theory rather than getting the little details right. This is why having a couple of contradictions isn't such a big deal - as you're dealing with 'the whole' there's bound to be a few details that haven't been worked out.
It's also why intuitive world views are unlikely to be broken down by one or two logical arguments, as such arguments can only show problems with certain details rather than the picture as a whole. Arguments do make a difference though, because while a few contradictary details don't kill a worldview, an alternative without those contradictions will be much more favourable, so showing problems with an opponent's worldview will make an alternative that solves these problems more attractive.
This is what creationists attempt to acheive by poking holes in evolution.
What they forgot is that you have to understand a theory before you can spot it's flaws and that if you want to offer an alternative, it should make more sense than the one you're trying to replace!
Metaphorical Reasoning
In this essay we've dealt with areas of knowledge that are holistic rather than atomistic, where it's more about getting a grasp of the whole rather than precise individual details. When we are dealing with rough trends, the strict definitions of mathematical logic seem a bit out of place. We must now deal with looser concepts, reason in a more metaphoric way.
Concepts like 'force' and 'energy' were first applied in very metophoric ways.
They were gradually develloped into the mathematical definitions we see in Newtonian physics, but the point is that to get to Newtonian physics we had to start with metaphorical concepts that grasped a rough trend, and gradually refined them from there.
Metaphoric reasoning is essential to dealing with subjects where we don't have strict rules in place.
So far I've shown that metaphorical reasoning is essential rough guessing for where we don't have strict definitions yet. As it happens, some topics of discussion aren't suited to having such strict definitions full stop. When talking about scientific and mathematical objects, tight definitions are the order of the day. However, much of our conversation isn't suited to this tight style of language. In the [url=]essay on logic[/url] we looked at the concept of love and how it eluded strict definition. Our language is full of such concepts. Is there a strict definition to 'liking something'?
Wittgenstein famously stated that whatever definition you give to the word 'game' you could find a counter example, yet the concept is hardly random - all games are connected in some kind of way. It's a word that grew out of our need for the concept in our everyday lives rather than one that grew out of strict rules of definition.
The lack of strict definition means that strict logical rules aren't so easily applicable.
This doesn't mean that metaphorical reasoning is free from logic - rules still apply.
It just means that the logic is more subtle and less obvious.
You're less likely to find direct contradictions, but things can still come across mixed up and not making sense. There are still rules to be followed, just not the simplistic ones that can be spelled out in mathematical logic. It's more about an intuitive grasp of the concepts at hand, making it more of an art than a mathematical approach.
To conclude:
The precise language and methodology that we usually associate with science isn't always appropiate to the question at hand. Sometimes we need to start with a looser language for tighter definitions to evolve from, the metaphorical language being a necessary stepping stone towards a more accurate understanding of the subject at hand. Sometimes the topic at hand requires loose language by it's very nature and to try and re-word the question into scientific language is to simply change the subject and ask a different question altogether, leaving the original unanswered.
While the scientific language is perfect when we need precise descriptions of the world, for when we want to make accurate predictions and devellop technology, it's going too far to always go for a scientific explanation and assume that it's the ideal form of reason for every task. Like any tool or method, it's useful for some jobs and not for others.
So how does this relate to theism?
The billion dollar question is whether the claims of theism are relevent to science.
Even literal beliefs in supernaturalism appear to be rooted in metaphysical paradigms rather than scientific observations. So that the theist can't use scientific evidence to support their position doesn't necessarily mean that they are being irrational.
Not that their position is immune from criticism, just that a demand for scientific evidence is to miss the point of the question at hand.
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Well, I don't have much to say. I've already addressed your conclusion, so it seems pretty nitpicky, and not really productive, to nitpick this essay.
In short:
Thinking is using logic. Period. The only question is what degree of precision we will demand. Science is a precise and particular way of reaching conclusions based on experimentation, etc... Obviously we don't need to do scientific experiments to choose a melon at the grocery store. There are some questions which can be answered satisfactorily with less than scientific accuracy. Likewise, some personal philosophical questions need not be examined as if for a PhD dissertation. I don't think anyone here, or any sane person on the planet, has ever claimed otherwise.
But, and this is crucially important, an individual's perception of an issue's relative importance has absolutely no bearing on the external realities that might be involved in the issue.
There is no such thing as a question beyond logic. All questions have either no coherent answer, or a logical (and true) answer. The only question is how close we feel we need to get to this answer in our own personal life. This leaves us with the distinction I have already made. Some people may have a perfectly rational belief in things that are untrue. This does not make their belief any less untrue. Untrue beliefs are irrational at the objective level.
End of story.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
So you say.
I argued against this in the other topic.
The reply is still waiting for you.
I don't think you can state 'period' on your statement here as I don't think you even have contemporary philosophy on your side to make an argument from authority on.
I was concerned that you might've gotten fed up with debating in that topic, partly because I was justifying fuzzy logic and it might've come across as an excuse to be imprecise. Not sure if that's what you thought, but just incase I'll try clear things up:
I was saying that logic can be imprecise, depending on the situation, but our debate wasn't that kind of situation and I've been as clear cut and precise as I can. Yep, some of my work in progress arguments need sharpening but I am working on it.
As it happens, my latest reply took many of your criticisms on board. I'd be interested to see your opinion on it.
Yes. Those are the obvious black and white examples that we don't need to look into and think about. The question is, is there anything between?
Are these the only two possibilities or are there other practices that have rules of their own?
My point is simple:
Even if God has no place in 'literal fact about the world', there's more to reason than just 'literal fact about the world'. So there's potential for religion to be rational in it's own right.
Yes, straight-laced facts about the world are answered purely by strict logic - it follows from the rules of that language game.
The point is, not all significant questions are based in this language game so consequently will be evaluated by different laws of logic.
Even if you're right about logic being about how we think then put it like this:
Different language games show that we think in a variety of ways depending on the task/practice at hand. Once again, the rules of logic will depend on the language game at hand.
(As you can imagine, a later essay will try and claim that theism is rooted in a different language game, and is rational by the bounds of that game.)
"Beyond Logic" and "Outside Logic" are Meaningless
I'd like you to respond to the linked essay first. It might be that I'm misunderstanding your position, but I think DG has stated quite clearly why I equate thinking with logic, and why I believe I can state it unequivocably.
Only if we allow the equivocation between "objectively valid and true" and "locally valid enough and functional enough."
I see no reason to continue encouraging the equivocation.
Significance is subjective. All questions will be answered with varying degrees of adherence to the same laws of logic, which are literally incontrovertible. Without them, knowledge would be utterly without meaning.
The practice of critical thinking/skepticism will vary depending on the language used and the subjective interpretation of the relative importance of the conclusion. The foundation -- the logic, remains constant. It must.
Yes, I anticipated that quite early, and to be honest, I'm not ignoring you. I don't feel that your conclusion is particularly relevant, since I've demonstrated that it's based on an equivocation. Until we agree on the nature of this logic/language/critical thinking conundrum, I don't see a lot of value in addressing your final conclusion.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Wow ? why does deludedgod always write war and peace length suft,..... I think there might be some problems with it, one cannot prove an infinite for example, and how will logic work with extra dimensions ?
I'll give it a read.
As it happens, I mis-interpreted the above statement and my argument wasn't intended to be against it. So my arguments in the logic thread are of a different topic.
Having said that, I still disagree with "thinking is using logic".
Or atleast, if "thinking is using logic" was to be accepted as the definition of 'thinking', then I'd argue that thinking wasn't necessarily the most productive way to use the brain/mind/solve a problem.
This is more the topic of the next essay I'll post.
(Same title as this one except replace 'science' with 'reason')
In the meantime I'd like your opinion on the following points:
1) My revised argument on why the rules of logic are tied to what language game we are playing at that moment in time. (see the logic thread)
2) In the first essay you had objections to my points about reason having a 'purpose'. I've given clarifications and counter-points since. I don't mind if you don't have an instant answer but I'd like to see you read them.
It wasn't really an equivocation...
I didn't see the latter version of 'reason' as a coherent term at all.
You've since convinced me otherwise by giving me a coherent term.
As it happens, this is the version of 'reason' that I was thinking of when I made the above post.
It's not an argument I've made yet and it's not one I can begin to make until we've settled the ground work, mainly the two disputes I've numbered above. It's coming later and you'll recognise it when you see it.
This is what we need to discuss in the topic of logic.
I want you to go back to that topic while I read that DG essay you sited me.
Why?
As a little prediction, I think that you will justify this on practical reason. You will say that logic is necessary to debate.
I might then ask you why we should pick the rules that we do?
I've basically gone through this whole argument with BobSpence in the logic thread.
I wrote a reply to you, he replied to it and then I replied to his reply.
I want you to address those points.
(and the ones on 'purpose' in the Reason for Reason essay too!
I agree absolutely. There's a reason why I split this argument into 7 essays. As there are still points with the first two that you have issue with, and as the later ones are heavily predicated on the points I tried to make in these, the debate cannot really go forward until we've settled our disputes in the first two.
The main reason I keep on posting them is partly because I have this irrational idea of keeping a schedule, but also because seeing my later points puts my earlier points in context, making it that little bit easier to see where I am coming from.
It'll take me a bit. Don't panic. I'll get to it.
Same
Nah.
It's simpler than that. Logic is not really a construct. Yes, there is a construct of logic that we study in school, but we didn't make it. In fact, we didn't do anything to it except identify it. For me to get out of bed, walk to the toilet, and take a piss first thing in the morning, it takes logic. To figure out the tip at the diner, to decide whether to answer the phone when my mom calls, to plug my ears with my fingers when I hear a firetruck coming. It's all logic because logic is simply the description of how we think. If we think, it's logic.
Now, where there might be some confusion is this. There's valid logic and invalid logic, but notice we don't call it valid logic and hamburger meat. Invalid logic is logic.
In any day, we're going to use valid logic and invalid logic, but every conscious decision we make is making use of logic because it's making use of thinking. By the way, DG will have to chime in on this. I don't know enough about subconscious processes to say whether we subconsciously always use logic or not. I feel very hesitant about it. I don't think it's relevant, in any case, because I don't think you're talking about reflexive or instinctive reactions.
In short, any time our brain processes IF-THEN-THEREFORE, it's obviously using logic. Even more simple than that, any time we say, "That is a chair," we are relying on the axioms of identity, noncontradiction and excluded middle. We are inductively reasoning that our eyes do not deceive us. We are inductively reasoning that the sounds our mouths are making correspond to symbolic representations of concepts in the minds of our audience. While these are almost always at the very bottom of our mind, and in reality, we skip those steps soon after we become sentient, the foundation is essential. Without logic, we simply could not think.
Debate is about ten steps above what I'm talking about, honestly. Until we're clear on whether thinking is necessarily using logic, it's pointless to talk about how we resolve conflict.
By the way, I'm not really interested in nitpicking whether relying on axioms is using a particular brand of logic, or whether it's technically "before logic" or anything like that. It's not important. Reliance on axioms is so fundamental that it literally cannot be questioned. All our thoughts must rely on the axioms, and all logic is completely dependent on them. Anything beyond axioms is either deduction or induction. That's logic.
Everything that you've been talking about in your essays has been critical thinking, or skepticism -- making use of certain forms of logic/thinking. The "rules" of critical thinking are reached through valid inductive and deductive reasoning. The burden of proof must be on the claimant because the other option leads to instant paradox, etc.
Again, your premise, as far as I can tell, seems to be:
"With some questions, the standards of proof and evidence can be relaxed, depending on their subjective importance."
No argument from me.
I've read a lot of your opinions on language games, so I suspect that I know where you're going with it, but I will reserve judgment until I have read. It's the logical thing to do.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Hmmm... I don't really disagree.
Although I have my arguments mapped out, a lot of the details and my approaches to explaining it need a lot of work.
I was tempted to give answers to yours points in this thread, but I'd only be repeating the points I made in the logic thread.
I'll leave you to encounter them there instead.
Well, I certainly can't ask for any more than that!
I think this is a rather awkward way to define logic. It is almost as if you are switching the definition of logic for reason. Allow me to demonstrate:
Nah.
"It's simpler than that. Reason is not really a construct. Yes, there is a construct of reason (logic) that we study in school, but we didn't make it. In fact, we didn't do anything to it except identify it. For me to get out of bed, walk to the toilet, and take a piss first thing in the morning, it takes reason. To figure out the tip at the diner, to decide whether to answer the phone when my mom calls, to plug my ears with my fingers when I hear a firetruck coming. It's all because of reason reason because reason is simply the description of how we think. If we think, it's using reason."
Reason is usually the term used for this, where as logic is a system by which we can systematically arrive at an answer with a given set of premises. Reason is an attempt to arrive at the best conclusion--and we may or may not use logic depending on the scenario.
This is generally the definition that I was accustomed to. What say you Strafio? This is your thread.
you could replace "reason" here as well. "There is valid reasoning, and invalid reasoning," etc.
But now you are using reasoning (?) It almost seems like you are confusing terms. People certainly don't always use logic, quite often they accept something without asking "why?" We don't ask about the identity of a hamburger, we just eat the hamburger. If we used logic for everything, then we could not have any preconditions unless they were axioms (because everything would have to logically follow--but most preconditions are just preconditions because they are "obvious"
.
Quite simply "reason" is a more precise term for our mental functions simply because it is more broad. It covers everything that goes on, rather than just some things. Our minds are a continual desire to go from precondition to conclusion, but we do not always use "logic." People don't think of things in such structures. We use reason, which often involves more guessing and relying on experience than applying anything we know to logic.
It sounds similar to what I originally thought.
That said, I think that Hamby's point was that what we call thinking involves using the rules of logic subconsciously, so even if his definition was 'wrong' it wouldn't take away from his point.
Besides, I'm trying to avoid a debate in how we should specifically define logic and am concentrating on making points on the characteristics of logic that we do agree on as I think those are where the important points are to be made.
What's more; I think that 'reason' and 'logic', like all words in our language, are used in diverse ways and trying to tie them to an absolute definition will always be fruitless. That's why I'd rather try and work with what we already do have in common on the definitions front.
Did you read my thread on logic btw?
(There's a link to it at the beginning of this thread)
But what are the rules of logic, if not the aristolean and/or the modern logical system? I took logic class last year, is Hamby saying that I was somehow using modern logic before I ever knew what it was? Certainly I may have been using an incomplete and vauge form of it, but not "logic." I agree with you Strafio, logic is a set language game--a very good, very valid language game. Logic is axiomatically justified, it is absolutely true; but that doesn't mean we use it all the time. We have a sense of reason before we have a sense of logic. We make value (true/false) judgements before we know how to use "logic."
Logic: a specific set of rules by which we determine what is valid and invalid (determined by the form of argument); and then determine whether it is a strong or a weak argument (based on whether the premises are true or false).
Reason: the process of thought by which all humans attempt to arrive at the most justified conclusion given a set of premises. Many use logic to make reason more exact and arrive at more satisfactory answers.
These are the definitions I would want to use. Again, it is your thread though. However, I do not see the purpose in nitpicking these definitions, they seem very clear to me. Maybe there is just something I do not see.
And I did read you logic thread.
RationalDeist,
This is an excerpt from DG's Thread, which I suggest you read in it's entirety:
For the sake of this argument, I don't give a tinker's damn how anyone else might use the word logic in another context. For my purposes, the definition is:
Logic: The description of the way we think; specifically, an a priori necessary condition for knowledge (epistemology) to exist.
In this context, which I believe is appropriate to Strafio's thesis, all thoughts -- all knowledge, comprehension, etc -- can be described using the construct of formal logic as either valid or invalid, or it can be described through the construct of critical thinking as reasonable or unreasonable, or whatever other word you like. I'm trying not to use too many instances of the same word.
In short, within isolated systems -- subsets, if you like -- we may describe a person as being very reasonable despite the existence of invalid formal logic or conclusions which in a different system would be considered unreasonable to a critical thinker.
I'm baffled at why this is so difficult to understand.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Hambydammit Probably because so many of our greatest thinkers, went against the grain and the perceived logical rational way of accepting a particular way of thinking
But....... just to add more chaos
hypothetically
There is a box, labeled unknown contents, nobody has seen inside this box
1 ? is it rational to describe the unknown as unknown
2 ? is it rational to describe the unknown as the flying spaghetti monster, revealed in visions and ancient text and so on
Strafio, this is the end argument, and I'm eagerly looking forward to see how you can bypass thisHe's saying that formal logic is based on the way we naturally think.
Yeah. That's pretty close to the way I was seeing it.
The thing is, these definitions most certainly aren't absolute.
While we all more or less talk about the same thing, we will always have our own interpretations and emphasis. So rather than try to establish absolute definition, I'd rather blend with whoever I'm debating with at that moment in time and work with what we already agree on.
Lol! I think that both sides are thinking this!
You might find the next two essays very interesting then, especially number 6. Stay tuned!
This would be so much easier if we just had two different words.
The emphasis is the answer, of course. I'm probably going to step away from this for a while. I'm getting really frustrated because I can't for my life understand why there's even a discussion anymore. Strafio and I seem to agree that logic (the way we think) is foundational to knowledge, and cannot be any other way. That being the case, deduction must follow. Probability theory is linked to deduction, and induction relies on probability, whether we are conscious of it or not.
Formal logic is the deductively valid codified application of logic (the way we think). There's simply no possible way around rational and irrational.
Rational = using valid logic on the best available data
Irrational = using invalid logic on the best available data
IF we have bad data AND think about it with valid logic, THEN we are rational.
IF we have good data AND think about it with valid logic, THEN we are rational.
IF we have bad data AND think about it with invalid logic, THEN we are irrational.
IF we have good data AND think about it with invalid logic, THEN we are irrational.
Make a truth table if you need to, but it's damn simple.
Critical thinking is the description of the practical application of valid logic in day to day matters, which usually fall below the threshold of scientific accuracy.
We say that a person is rational if they apply good critical thinking to most or all of their daily decisions.
We say that a person is irrational if they apply poor critical thinking to most or all of their daily decisions.
********
We can refer to an individual decision as rational or irrational, with undetermined effect on our judgment of the person's overall rationality.
********
So, long way around my ass to get to my elbow to say:
If you don't know any better, theism can be rational.
If you know better and still believe, theism is irrational.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
well this just makes more sense. None of that nonsense about logic preceeding rationality made any sense. This is simply the statement that if one knows logic, then if they are using it validly on "the best" (a value judgement gained from previous logic no doubt?) data, then they are rational and if they are using logic invalidly then they are irrational. Makes sense. Much better to have this all worked out.
Quite simply, this is a litmus test to determine whether a person is rational or not. If they are using invalid logic, then they are irrational. If they are always using valid logic, we can call them rational. Simple enough.
We will see
Just to clarify, in this post I will be using 'a belief is rational' in the way that you defined in that other post.
Yes, I didn't recognise that definition before I posted these essays.
No, since I recognised that definition I've not made use of an equivocation, and although much of my argument was based around the other definition, there is also some argument based around this one.
I'm trying to show the necessary connection between the rules of the language game and the rules being applied at that moment in time. That is all am trying to do at this stage.
The reason why you don't see what this has to do with theism is because we haven't reached the crux of the argument.
There were 6 essays of setting the groundwork before the rest of the argument was possible.
The argument (the one in the logic topic that you still haven't replied to yet - it replies to your last post in there) goes roughly like this:
1) The laws of logic are rules of thought that may or may not be applicable to a particular proposition of language.
2) The rules of the language game are sufficient for there to be logic, logical laws that correspond with the rules of the language game.
3) The laws of logic only apply to propositions within a language game where it corresponds with a rule of the language game.
C) We can fully determine the correct rules of logic by working out the rules of the language game that we are playing.
This means that we observe a language game/practice as it really is, and that will determine what rules of logic apply. It will also determine how to judge 'true' from 'false', 'rational' from 'irrational' etc.
E.g. In world observation a proposition is true if it describes a scene that corresponds to the empirical world we experience.
In maths a proposition is true if it follows from the axioms of the particular mathematical system we are working in.
When we are joking or giving orders, there doesn't seem to be a relvent notion of true and false. etc...
Some people will take the rules of a logic from a particular language game and assume that these rules are universal and therefore language games should be in line to them. The thing is, if the rules of logic aren't rooted in the language game then what are they rooted in? Describing the way we think?
The thing is, if we are thinking propositions of a certain language game, then our thought is following the rules of that language game.
So where am I going with this?
If religion has its own language game then to criticise a religious belief as irrational would require one of the following two arguments:
1) The belief breaks the rules of logic that it's language game sets out for it.
2) The practice/language game that the rules are practically irrational, i.e. irrational on pragmatic terms.
If I made up a language game where the only rule was "Everything Strafio says is true" then by the rules of that language game, anything I said would be 'true'. You could then criticise the language game itself by pointing out that such a game was pointless and meaningless to real life. And you'd be right.
I've read your sixth essay already, so please excuse my jumping around/ahead in addressing what I think is the conclusion.
In your summary, you conclude that,
“We cannot judge rationality by the content of the belief, only by the attitude of the believer.”
Theism is the content of belief; not an attitude or approach, which is what your defense examines.
A rational approach can provide the impetus, and the means, to draw conclusions based on observation, or reconcile a claim with established knowledge. Without it, there's no causal framework, and information loses meaning.
However, the basic ability to function in the rational world doesn't demand detailed personal knowledge in all areas of interaction. Even ultimately justifiable beliefs can be held as personal assumptions, unjustifiably, without comprehension; in a sense, irrationally. Practically speaking, there is little each person has the knowledge to speak about authoritatively, leaving many of our decisions based on personal assumptions -- generally well-founded in precedent, but not otherwise logically defensible by us. We expect our cars to start, to move when we push the accelerator, and to stop when we break, but we can't account for every cam and lever or the digital logic that tells a given fuel injector how much to mete out for a given instance. There are many points of our daily routines that are too complex to regard outside of broad abstractions; many facets that break down into black boxes.
Because of precedent, we feel safe in assuming things will work; that they'll work whether we understand them or not; and that, if we had the inclination to examine them, we would find a detailed justification for the assumptions we held. We know a car works, and we may not know why, but because it does work--and other people make and work on them--we assume there's a reason it does, and that the reason can be understood. So, there are instances where we can hold legitimate ideas that, if we examined our own knowledge of them, we would be unable to explicitly justify.
Theism shares a couple properties with the aforementioned assumptions: a kind of precedent in the form of popularity, and a vagueness that makes it logically unjustifiable. It sharply diverges on the point that, at bottom, it hasn't been shown that knowing more about theism justifies it as a belief (or even that there's something to know). I would argue, quite the opposite, for it's only the unexamined variety of theism that is remotely similar to the ultimately legitimate assumptions we make (like our cars working). Examination will not support it or reconcile it with reality, and in some cases, will rule it out entirely.
Once we are faced with a contradictory proposition that reconciles itself more readily with established knowledge (like evolution to special creation, or monism to dualism), we have a choice to accept a new conclusion rationally, or continue to cling to our original, irrationally. To live in denial, in other words. So, the choice, as I see it, comes down to living without the knowledge that makes the belief irrational, and knowingly being irrational; as there is thus far no third option of understanding, in this case.
Strafio,
I've somehow lost the post I'm supposed to read. I've been through all the threads, and I'm not sure what I haven't responded to. Clearly I'm missing something.
In any case, I'll respond to your summary here:
Again, the laws of logic are descriptions of how we think, not laws in the prescriptive sense of the word. We cannot think without logic being applicable. Well trained thinkers can recognize constructs which may or may not be applicable to a proposition of language, but all language games are ultimately dependent on the foundation of a priori rules of logic (description of the way we think)
This seems to be putting the cart before the horse, but I'll let it go for the moment.
Language games are essentially subsets of thought. In other words, when we decide to play a particular language game, or when we do it without thinking, we are adhering to a system, which, to say it yet again, is entirely dependent on the a priori system of logic (the description of how we think). This is starting to reek of a fallacy of division. Logic is the umbrella under which all language games reside. Or, if you prefer, it is the foundation upon which they all rest. To claim that a system within logic is exempt from logic is clearly fallacious. If it is not division, it's equivocation, for if you are speaking of the codified rules of a particular formal logic, you are not using the word logic consistently.
Again, this is fine for as far as it applies, but it does not apply to the foundation, and the foundation is what gives us the objective knowledge to create the games and decide which rules apply.
As you said in the preamble to your sixth essay, your essays have moved beyond the point of our disagreement. I'm very interested to see how you respond to DG in his "outside of logic" thread, because it seems like he and I are coming from the same direction. Perhaps your answers to him will clarify things for me, or you, or both.
Um... yes. I'm confused now. You seem to have defeated your own argument in this paragraph. Or, are you saying they're not rooted in describing the way we think?
This seems a little silly. Why is it so important to establish that there are word games, semantic games, or tricks of language which can give local validity to a globally incoherent or illogical concept? I don't think anyone is debating that.
You mean to say that the language game itself is incoherent or irrational?
So, logically speaking, a language game in which theism is rational is meaningless to real life, because theism is irrational.
I make this point not to be flippant, but to point out that you're not doing a very good job of justifying what makes a language game relevant. It's quite possible that, using your justification, I can rule out many language games that have specific uses. Regardless, you're still going to come around to the exact same spot. Within the locality of specific language games, we can use the word "rational" to describe theism, and it's not incorrect. So what. Everything you say is also "true" in your word game.
I was going to go in a couple of other directions, but magilum has covered most of what I was going to say. I'll wait for your response to him and to me before responding again.
Atheism isn't a lot like religion at all. Unless by "religion" you mean "not religion". --Ciarin
http://hambydammit.wordpress.com/
Books about atheism
Magilum, if I understood you right you said that theism could be said to be irrational compared to driving a car without thinking, as our actions of driving a car could potentially be justifiable while theism cannot.
This is more or less the same place Hamby is coming from.
I'll actually try and show that theism can be rationally justified, but it will involve a radically different conception to what people think of theism/religion/faith in this forum.
That'll be the topic of the next in my series of arguments.
The post I was talking about was on this page - just hit "ctrl + f" and put November 19, 2007 - 11:49pm in the box and that should take you to where the essay starts.
Having said that, most of the points have been covered in DG's thread since.
Nonetheless, where our thoughts are expressible in linguistic form, that shows that they have been following the same rules of the language. Some say that learning language constitutes much of our mode of thought.
Ether way, I gave that argument in DG's thread how the rules of logic were relevent to a proposition at that moment in time.
Here it is again:
The law of non-contradiction states that the conjunction of a proposition with it's negation cannot be true, where the truth value is binary. This holds by the nature of these concepts.
However, when we are thinking in language, this rule will only be applicable where the language we are thinking of has concepts that are equivalent.
Usually our word 'and' is equivalent to disjuntion, and our word 'not' is equivalent to negation, but this will depend on the language game at hand. It is not an a priori necessity that the law of non-contradiction will have any relevence to the mode of thought at hand.
If Wittgenstein's building tribe who shouted "block!" and "slab" was reality then the law of non-contradiction would play no part in their lives as they do not apply the concept of conjunction at all.
It is? I can't see a justification for that.
I'm certain that I even gave a lethal counter example in the paragraph above using Wittengstein's building tribe.
Another counter example is the amount of non-standard logics that philosophers are taking seriously. If classical logic was a pervasive as you claim then this would be pointless.
Furthermore, it doesn't appear to be a position that is held in the contemporary philosophy of language or logic. As far as I was aware, most contemporary philosophers believe that logic is rooted in language.
Although Linguistic Determinism is controversial and not accepted worldwide, the fact that it's considered a serious option surely means that your position that logic constitutes.
I don't expect this argument from authority to convince you, but just to encourage you to look at my other arguments closer as they are mostly accepted by philosophers who have studied the issue.
This is a popular position on this site.
I've yet to see a justification for it though.
DeludedGod has argued for it in that other thread so it'll be interesting to see how our debate works out there.
Here we have another disagreement and another issue that Wittgenstein took a close look at in his Philosophical Investigations. We don't make conscious decisions on develloping a language. Once we have already develloped a language, we have the tools to make a new one, but our first language is just one we learn out of habit. It's a thing we 'do'.
When we first learn to do something, like screwing a nail, we first copy what the other person is doing. The more we do it, the more skilled and develloped we get at it.
Language learning is much like learning a skill in that respect, a skill that we use in day to day life. That's why Wittgenstein said that it's our 'form of life' that determines the rules of the language game. Through natural selection, the games that are most useful to us are the ones that we naturally continue to play.
These language games are what must already be in place before linguistic reasoning (i.e. reasoning using our linguistic rules and concepts) is possible.
The next bit is when I gave the two ways a statement could be irrational.
Because there's no such thing as this 'global validity'.
(As argued above and in DG's thread)
This 'local validity' is validity full stop.
So one way a belief can be irrational if it is logically invalid, i.e. it breaks the rules of its very language game.
Sort of, except we don't judge it in logical terms as there isn't a 'greater logic' that it should conform to.
Instead, it is to be judged as a practice.
So a person will judge their theological thought on psychological grounds. Is this language game beneficial to my lifestyle or should I give it up?
So a statement is logically valid/invalid depend on its language game, and a language game is evaluated as a practice through practical reason. So even if you accepted my claims about logic, you could still claim that theism is irrational as there would never be a need for such a language game in a person's life.
I like to think that I have cleared this up now.
We judge a linguistic practice using Practical Reason.
"Is Buddhism true?" is closer to "Is Wing Chun Kung Fu the best martial art?" rather than "Does a water molecule contain two hydrogen atoms?"
Lol! I didn't think of this argument.
As it happens, I am using rational in the language game that we are playing here and now. If my argument against you wasn't purely in a language game that you were playing, "So what!" would be the perfect response. If I didn't like that then I'd need to persuade you that this language game of mine had some kind of relevence to your life.