Considering you seem to be making generalizations about people who have one particular thing in common, yeah, that would mean that it is a list of stereotypes.

1 - It seems to me that people all too frequently mistake an atheist pointing out the problem of evil as being a cynical view of all life. That is simply not so. I'm sure you'll find that many of the atheists on this site and others have other things that they talk about and do that they find quite fulfilling and it makes them happy. The problem of evil is pointed to as something that makes an all-powerful, benevolent god an impossibility. Just because we say, "hey, this doesn't add up because of the bad things that happen in the world," doesn't mean that we haven't seen very good things in the world as well.

2 - Most will likely understand what you mean about "heart" - in otherwords you are carrying on a tradition that was started through the misidentification of what organ was responsible for particular emotions. The association you have with one emotion and the emotion of "spirituality" (yeah, its an emotion ) ... the "spiritual" response people report feeling during particular activities manifests itself in the brain much like other emotions, through chemical changes and the firing of particular synapses causing physiological responses in our bodies. Just because I recognize that about human emotions does not make me "not quite human," it just makes me a human that realizes that what makes me laugh, cry, or have an elated response when watching my children play, or seeing pretty things in nature is something that occurs in my brain (some of which we know quite a lot about, and some of which we are still learning about).

If we wanted to re-define god, and find a belief in that definition, it would then make us not atheists. There is no evidence that your conscious experience is due to anything but neurological and biological processes. It is a nice experience, and I'm glad to have it, but that does not mean it has to come from some supernatural default explanation.

-SilkyShrew

I don't deny that any emotional state is caused (or correllated with) neurological, biochemical processes in the brain. Nor did I appeal to any sort of superstitious or supernatural entity.

Consider happiness.

Is happiness merely serotonin in the brain. Certainly, it *is* serotonin in the brain, but what about just the inner experience of it. Just because something *causes* happiness does not make it *happiness in itself*. There is the inner, immaterial realm of experience and emotions that is definable only on its own terms. Does happiness exist without serotonin? Certainly not. The reverse is also true. These are two separate yet intimatly connected things. My point is (and if you read about Ken Wilber's quadrants it will make this much more clear) that equating emotional states as merely chemical reactions is a fallacy. Your every day experience of your very conciousness is immaterial.

On the problem of evil. It is still such a pointless argument. Keep in mind, I *am* atheist. All it does is make it unlikely that a very specific God doesn't exist. Big deal. Of all the infinite number of possible Gods, you just pointed out that it is highly unlikely to exist. You didn't prove anything, negatives cannot be proven. Which is why when a theist challenges me to "prove God doesn't exist", I promptly hit them with a clue bat.

These are just *most* of the atheists I have met in my life. Of course I have read and met many other very kind atheists, just like I have met the same of any other belief system. I wasn't generalizing about people I have not met, I was commenting on people I *have* met.

Agreed.

You completely missed my point. Serotonin (or whatever variant of chemicals and such) is not qua happiness. There is the inner experience of it! You want evidence? Next time you are happy, it's right fucking there. There is the cause of happiness (neurological impulses) and there is the experience of it (happiness!). I can't believe you would claim that there is no evidence for this. Silly hard materialists...

Again, the evidence is self-evident. Unless I am talking to an automaton? How are you even thinking if you have no conciousness? Give me a break.

No, only omni benevolent. It could be all powerful and indifferent or even malicious.

His name is Austin Dacey. I saw him speak at a theological debate at Purdue. He was good except for this trying to prove negatives nonsense. He claims there are two ways. One is by showing that it is a logical impossibility. The other, and this is the way he "disproves" God, is by looking and if you don't find it you can reasonably conclude it is not there. The example he uses: It is your birthday and your roomate has promised you cake. You come home expecting to smell the smells of cake baking in the air. If find no evidence of a cake, then you can reasonably conclude there is none. Of course, this example cannot apply to an entity which is inherently a hidden being.

Is there evidence for God? No. That is why I am atheist. Dacey's argument only shows what is highly unlikely. Even in the Cake example, there are alternative locations for the cake.

No, it isn't a generalization. I am talking about people I *have* met, and seeing if others can relate. My point? There is spiritual/mental/experiential (whatever the hell you want to call it) growth beyond atheism that does not negate reason. Old religion has been destroyed and rendered irrelevant by critical reason and the scientific method. Religious folks need to let go of their archiac beliefs, atheists need to keep thinking beyond theirs. Quantum physics has disproven hard scientific materialism that most atheists seem to cling to, not to mention determinism. Keep thinking.

Next time I experience it, it will be (as always) felt in my brain and body.

Firstly, I said "immaterial" consciousness. As in, there is no evidence that there is anything beyond my body and brain through which I experience emotion.

No, the argument rests on the notion of an all-powerful AND omni-benevolent god. There are other depictions of deities that are limited in powers but are considered good and those that are all powerful, but are malicious. The argument does not work for those types of deities (though, it does make a good point as to the ethics of worshipping such a deity that is malicious). The argument is limited to refuting those that fit both the criteria of an omni-benevolent and also all-powerful god.

No offense, but I will try to look to the source for the explanation, I think there may be something that I am missing in this explanation.

Lack of evidence is why I lack belief in a deity and also why I lack belief in an immaterial experience of emotions ...

Please point to where science has disproven materialism and has shown that there is experience beyond our brain and bodies. I am naturally skeptical of such an idea. How does this relate to if an atheist uses the problem of evil as an argument in debate?

No, I think you missed her point. However, let's stick to your comments concerning immateriality:

And how do you know that this 'inner experience' is anything other than how you experience these neurotransmitters? Can you explain just how you 'experience' an 'immaterial mind' without stealing the concept of materialism?

If not, what sense can we make of your claim?

You call that 'evidence'? Your emotional insistence that it 'feels' that way?

And how would you know how to compare how a materialist sensation of a physical brain 'ought to feel' vs how an immaterialist 'sensation' of an 'immmaterial mind" ought to feel?

It seems here that all you have is an argument to personal incredulity.

The evidence that consciousness is immaterial is self evident?

Did you really mean to say that?

If you did, you're confused. I'll show you:

That only proves that consciousness qua consciousness is axiomatic... it shows us that that consciousness is required to question the existence of consciousness - ergo the axiomatic nature of consciousness is affirmed through retortion.

Nothing about the axiomatic nature of consciousness supports the claim that consciousness is immaterial.

There's literally no reason to believe that consciousness is immaterial - one only has arguments from ignorance vis the current state of neuroscience, combined with arguments to personal incredulity, which themselves are based on the irrational premise that one can 'know how a immaterial mind oughta feel'

If you do think that consciousness is immaterial, can you answer these three simple questions for me:

1) Can you show that anything exists other than matter or energy?
What are its "properties" - i.e. is it something natural? If not, how can we 'know" or "infer" anything about it. If we can't, what use is your 'hypothesis"? If it has no use, then why are we having this conversation?

2) How does something that is neither matter nor energy interact with our natural world?

3) How do you avoid violating the principle of conservation of energy? If no physical energy or mass is associated with "immaterial things", then there is a serious problem: a fundamental principle of physics is that any change in any physical entity is an acceleration requiring the expenditure of energy - but if these things have no matter or energy, where does the energy come from? what you have here is something akin to the impossibilty of perpetual motion - energy from nowhere. Dan Dennet states that these questions represent the fatal flaw in any dualistic argument (i.e. to immateriliaty) (- 1990 Consciousness Explained.)

For the same reason that we say 'god bless you' when someone sneezes - because socially inculcated behaviors continue on long after the original philosophical or theological motive is no longer considered a valid view of reality.

To actually hold to such archiac cultural behaviors as an implicit acceptance of the original underlying motive is simply irrational....

Oh, I just caught this comment from you, from another post:

Not sure why you feel the need to use the term 'hard' materialism as opposed to plain materialism... seems you want to create a strawman here and imply that materialism is somehow a dogma.

Anyway... leaving that aside, can you demonstrate just how quantum physics 'disproves' materialism? Can you cite me a physicist who holds that there is proof of immateriality?

Oh, and assuming that 'hard materialism' has been disproven, I'm guessing you'll be able to answer the questions above....

Quantum indeterminancy hasn't exactly overthrown determinism.... induction is alive and well.... as for using the term 'cling'... you're arguments reek of unfounded rhetoric - why must you use the term 'cling' when there are clearly rational reasons for holding to determinism?

Start thinking. Drop the rhetoric, and get to giving us a rational argument.

pkremid wrote: Nuclear physicists have seen subatomic particles actually disappear based on the observer. Quatum physics has shown reality to be a probalistic model, not a deterministic one. Quarks move in choatic patterns, and since they are the basis for all matter, puts the deterministic model into question.

Unfortunately this is another case in which someone with little to no educational background picks up a theory and runs with it, without knowing what they're actually talking about. Quantum theory is mathematics at its finest and even those theorists who propose it are very careful in saying that at best it may describe reality only at the subatomic level. While it is true that the fundamental thinking that the universe is deterministic has been altered by quantum theory, it in no way has been done away with. Newtonian physics is still accurate, but only in context. The problem is one of language, i.e. the descriptive devices used to describe larger forces like gravity simply do not work at the subatomic level and hence a new paradigm needs to be created.

pkremida wrote: The are all the *outward forms* of evolution, and not one of them represents how evolution looks from the *inside*, how the individual entities feel and perceive and cognize the world at various stages.

Mr. Wilbur is unfortunately, at least how his thinking is being shown here, completely unaware of his own metaphysical assumptions. Again, as was mentioned in my previous post in which I quoted pkremida and then refuted her claim, a point lost on the other in this discussion, Wilbur is another case like Chalmers of a naturalistic dualism. To begin discussion of any "entities feelings and perceptions" is to ignore the various means by which organisms differ. In the haphazard way that these words are being used, it infers that all entities think, feel and perceive like humans do, which is patently absurd. A rock has no more ability to perceive than a leaf does, not in any sense that makes perception intelligible. Granted, Mr. Wilbur may be going down the path of Liebniz's windowless monads, but I hope not as that was thoroughly debunked by Kant.

pkremida wrote: In other words, my mind is known interiorly "by acquaintance," but my brain is known exteriorly "by description" (William James, Bertrand Russell). That is why I can always to some degree see my own mind, but I can never see my own brain (without cutting open my skull and getting a mirror).

Having recently finished a study on James and Russell, it is a sad thing here to see their names associated with a theory they would in no way agree with. Again, if my previous post had actually been read and addressed, there would be no point here. Words are largely indexical in usage, they "point to" something, but that something does not necessarily possess independent existence. James and Russell would only agree with this theory of Wilbur's in the sense of being an examination of the different lingual paradigms being used, but not as saying there is any metaphysical difference between the mind and brain.

pkremida wrote: The brain is the outside, the mind is the inside - and, a similar type of exterior/interior holds for everything in evolution.

Not much more needs to be said about this than already mentioned. The assumption here, again, is that there is a metaphysical difference between mind and brain, a fact not at all substantiated. The mistake here is in assuming that simply because a word is being used it must imply some sort of ontologically independent existence, but that is completely unwarranted as seen in the example of a unicorn, a creature that can be described but does not in fact exist in any sense outside of an imaginative construct.

As a sidepoint, it is curious here to point out that in all of the language being used to describe the mind, it all has to do with physical directions; the mind is "inside" , implicitly giving credence to the point that the mind is simply an indexical term pointing to a process going on in the brain and not a thing in itself.

I truly wonder sometimes if certain people are capable of rational criticism. In no way was I saying that you were appealing to a supernatural cause to describe feelings, etc. In fact, I explicitly said that what you were promoting was a type of naturalistic dualism as put forth historically by Liebniz and more recently by David Chalmers.

Again, I find huge misunderstanding here about neurology and blatant assumptions about metaphysics that aren't being explicitly acknowledged. You assume that since experiences are individualistic then they must be immaterial as someone cannot do a brainscan and see it for themselves. This assumption only works if you believe that experience has a one-to-one relationship with neurons, a position that has long since been given up since the advent of studies and theorizing of Edelman in his "theory of neuronal group selection". Emotions, and experience in general (a point here concerning experience, as there is no such thing as experience in the sense of a thing in itself, but only particular experiences qualifiedly described) are aspects of neuronal processes and in no way must coincide with any particular neuronal structure or group of neurons.

Again, you are not paying attention to how you are using words. In saying you "observe" what is going on "inside" your head, what exactly do you mean by that? The terms, if loosely used, automatically create a bias towards a separate entity viewing the inner workings of teh brain, but this is an assumption and is not a necessary way of looking at things. Brain cysts in the frontal lobes of patients have shown to have the effect of removing the entire ability of cognitive reporting, the so-called "inner viewing" that you are describing. If you were correct, absolutely no change to the brain should affect the ability of someone to describe themselves, when this in fact is not the case.

No, it's shown that the quantum level is probablistic - not 'reality'. It's a fallacy of composition to apply these results to the macro level.

So you've not given us anything that unseats determinism... which is good... because if you did, then there' be no point in us talking.... seeing as neither of us could expect to be able to cause a change in the other's thinking...

Again, this is known as a fallacy of composition. You are applying a phenonemon observed on the subatomic level to the macro level world. You've not justified leaping from the quantum level to the macro level.

Ah yes! The purveyor of the ultimate one-ness, and the ultimate destroyer of evil Satan of reductionism!

Seriously, I've read several of his works, going back to 1996. I do hope you realize how poorly informed he is in the sciences, particularly biology (amazingly enough) and how much of a strawman his arguments against materialism are....

Quit making judgements about me, please.

All I'm doing is challenging you to back up your claims. Odd that you read this as dogma on my part.

You're the one who asserted a bunch of things as if they were dogmas that the world must simply accept uncritically.... I'm just challenging you on your claims.

I guess this rule only applies to me and not you?

The point here was to demonstrate that contentious behavior draws attention. Notice how much you're focusing on what you consider to be contentious behavior. See?

I wouldn't deny that we can make a distinction between behaviors and first person phenomenology. But I want to stress to you here that nothing about this distinction points to there being anything other than matter.... there's no argument for immateriality here... first person experience is 'experience' - i.e. how a material, sentient brain feels itself....

Well, what you mean is that we can't detect these things from the third person perspective - i.e. the behavioral approach.

Well, yes, we can't know these things phenomenologically - i.e. in a 1st person perspective, that is true... But clearly, it's an overstatement to say that NONE of this can be known from the outside.... if that were true, then how would we know about such things as celluar irritability in the first place? By the logic Wilber gives, I'd need to be a one celled organism in order to know about celluar irritability, wouldn't I?

So cleary we are able to infer some things about the 'inside' from looking from the outside... So clearly Wilber is overstepping himself here.... About all that is valid in Wilber's view is that the pure materialist view leaves out phenomenological data -But materialists know this! They simply choose to focus their gaze here.... and Wilber acts as if there are no materialist combining behavioral methods with phenomenological methods... which is simply silly....

Oh no, not Wilber's complaint about the 'bloody monological gaze of materialism'!

The only problem with his claim - for him - is that it's false. Sells books though....

Now, it may be that science focuses more on behavior than it does on phenomenology, but it's simply a strawman to say that science doesn't do what it can to deal with both. Wilber treats both concepts as if they are at war with each other..... as if materialists refuse to consider holism or phenomenology, and oppose it like muslims opposing infidels! The reality is that holism and phenomenology are tools in the toolkit of science, just as behaviorism and reductionism are! I can't tell you how many studies that I myself have been involved in that look at both behavioral and phenomenological data.... in fact, the pragmatic method is quite popular in psychology today... and that's just my field...

Oh, and again, none of this is a support for the existence of immateriality...

Not really. A behavioral focus can take place at any level... we can focus on the societal level, the level of the individual, or even within the individual - the organ level, the celluar level.. or as you have earlier, the micro and quantum levels.... each is 'inside' of the other....

Yes, this doesn't give us insight into the first person perspective... that is why we must combine the third person view with the phenomenological report from the first person view.

But again, none of this supports the existence of immateriality.

Which is why actual science is multi-modal..... science need not be simply behavioral/external in the sense that Wilber mistakenly believes it is. Science can and does also look into phenomenology. It's a myth that concepts like reductionism and holism must be 'at war' with each other, and that science is mainly reductionist. Both concepts are tools that can be used by the same investigator while looking into the same phenomenon.

Wilber's critique of science was one of my problem with Wilber - particurarly in 'Brief History of Everything" - his view of science was a straw man.... In fact, to further demonstrate how woefully unprepared he was to criticize science, you'll find that he actually endorsed irreducible complexity in BHOE. He even uses the 'half a wing' argument and he claims, straight out, that 'most everyone today takes a teleological perspective on evolution!' Bullshit! What a holon!

As smart as he is, he's flawed on many issues... which ought to expected considering how difficult it is to be an expert on 'everything''

ll of the concepts you have discussed are amenable to empiricism.. in fact, how could we even know these concepts existed unless we were able to 'sense' them?! Sensations are physical. Perceptions are physical - photons, sound waves, are physical things, striking physical organs in our physical bodies. Imagary takes place in physical brains - in neurons. Ablate a neural area and you eradicate a cognitve ability.

Emotions, impulses, these are physical. Everything you've mentioned here is empirical, and amenable to scientific investigation. There are branches of neuroscience or fields like semiotics that deal with all of these issues. Each one of them. The idea that science not interested in these things because empirical methods do not cover them, is not just false, its blatant ignorance parading as reason...

There's also a stolen concept fallacy in all of this... to talk of sensing or feeling is to talk of matter.

All of these strata of the brain, up to the neo cortex, are physical.

Again, you'ret presuming that you *know* how a physical brain 'ought' to feel as opposed to how an immaterial mind 'ought' to feel.

If you actually do, then you can answer my three questions.

Your presumption, of course, is rationally groundless. It's just an argument from personal incredulity, based on a false presumption.. it's just a feeling you have....

All of this is physical.

If you disagree, give an argument supporting immateriality.

Really? Why not? Give me a postive ontology for immateriality, so we can make the comparison.

Again, all you are doing is describing first person vs third person experience. This does nothing to demonstrate immateriality.. it merely shows that it feels different to be you, as oppposed to a chair across the room from you.

You've not shown that your is differnt from your brain. You've only asserted that it feels different.... but you can't explain how matter ought to feel vs how immateriality ought to feel...

If you have an argument otherwise, give it. So far, you've confused first person vs third person as an argument for immateriality...

No shit?

The point of the analogy was to show that we accept social terms like 'my brain' without necessariy endorsing the original intent - in this case, an acceptance of dualism.

No, what you are really trying to do is play word games based on the fact that "I/me/mine" speech is dualistic.

again, your argument is based on interpreting first person/third person distinctions as evidence for immateriality....

I'm sorry if you feel attacked.... but you do put forth your claims as if they are unquestionable and blatantly obvious... so perhaps that plays a role here in how you interpret my supposed hostile intentions... maybe you're feeling a bit hostile and condescending yourself?

Anyway, I invite you to drop all of that and just focus on the issues...

Here's a paper I wrote on wilber years ago:

http://www.candleinthedark.com/wilber.html

Precisely, his argument is a fallacy of composition.

Anyone who thinks that they could write a brief history of everything is likely to make more than just a few presumptuous assumptions...

Yes, good points....

Bingo.

Indeed... Again, immaterialists must steal the concept of materialism in every move they make, and every breathe they take.... sorry....

Todangst, I really love the stuff you write. I'm serious, that is not sarcasm.

I need to re-read your posts to address your points specifically. I think that my last post might make my position more clear, and that I don't endorse and mind/body dualism of any sort.

Thanks for your thoughts.

Among other thigns, what differentiates life from non-life is that in an animate system, something can go wrong, which introduces the possibility of *pathology* into the Kosmos. Prior to the appearance of life, we cannto speak of pathology, of things going wrong; there are no diseased stars, no dysfunctional galaxies, no disordered and victimized rocks. Inanimate nature accomplishes nothing, and is therefore infallible, incapable of making a mistake. But as Polanyi points out, "a living function has a result which it may achieve or fail to achieve." And "Achievement", "Sucess," "attainment," whatever you with to call it, these are *values* that do not exist prior to the appearance of life, and are unexplainable in terms of any principle known to physics. From the standpoint of physics, a living system is nothing more than a statistically rare lump of matter; there is actually no principle in physics that can tell us wheter or not something is "living" much less "meaningful."

Current evolutionary theory also does not speak of such values, in fact, banishes them from its purview. There is no higher or lower, no better or worse, no direction or aim in nature. True, biologists do speak of the value of *survival*, and survival is not a concept that we generally apply to the inanimate. But all survival is nevertheless value-neutral, even tautologous, in the sense that survival is equivalent to survival and does not surpass itself: the survival of bacteria is no better than the survival of human beings (and in fact, ranking biological entities in terms of the value of survivability, human beings would undoubtedly fall below insects, bacteria, and Fidel Castro).

It seems pointless to hold an ideology so counter to the way we actually live in and experience the world. Indeed, no one but the autistic, the sociopath, and the dogmatic materialist actually thinking of life in this bloodless, value-free way. However, even the most uncompromomising materialist cannot really think of himself "as a simply aggregate of the calcium, iron, phosphorus, and other elements to which he is reducible to chemically," but as "a creation consisting of more than the sum of all of these..." In fact, it is more interesting to contemplate the source of a materialist's passion for truth - which, let's face it, is a fervent metaphysical quest, however misguided - than it is to evaluate the fruitfulness or intellectual viability of a belief in blind materialism.

But deep down, no one really believes any of this - the barren idea that one may logically devote "one's life to the purpose of proving that there is no purpose." Beneath the veneer of academic correctness, beneath the counter-reaction to some naive or distorted version of religion inculated in childhood, we all intuitively understand that human beings are by far the most interesting and unexpected fact of evolution, the most philosophically arresting and that only humans can look at themselves and conclude that, after all, it's not so odd that a dead universe should come to life and start wondering about itself.

According to Polyani, even if we agree with standard evolutionary theory that living systems are really nothing ore than "darwinian machines," we must acknoledge taht the operation or any machine relies upon the prescence of two distinct principles. Specifically, a machine involves the imposition of boundry conditions on the underlying laws of physics and chemistry in order to harness theri workings. Analogously, the notes in a musical scale do not by themselves compose a symphony, or the letters of the alphabet compose worlds, sentences, and paragraphs. Rather, at each level of development, a higher principle exploits what is left open on the lower level, imposing boundary conditions on it in order to produce something higher. We cannot understand a great poem or work of music by focusing our attention on the individual notes or words that constitute it. Rather, in order to understand a work of art, we must blind ourselves to its particulars and see past them, toward the wholeness that reveals the meaning of the particulars.

The same is true in our attempt to comprehend the phenomenon of life. All of the parts of a healthy, living entity point toward and converge upon the whole organism. If we study only the parts themselves, we specifically lose sight of what they are pointing toward, their meaning: the living organism. Not only does conventional biology fail to follow the arrow that the particulars are pointing toward and converging upon, but it introduces its own reverse arrow, which points toward the even smaller, less meaningful particulars of physical and chemical reality. But there is actually nothing at all barring us from viewing life as a transcendent, cosmic power, and irreducible, dynamic *whole* that reveals the meaning of the parts that constitute it, parts that we mistakenly thought were just floating around meaninglessly in the universe until life revealed otherwise.

the idea that you alone experience emotions and mental images, in your nebulous "mind", and merely looking at a brain doesn't allow someone else to "see" that going on is an incomplete point and proves nothing. why? because the machine has not yet been invented that can keep a human brain alive while at the same time, delving into it at the cellular or even atomic level, tapping into active neuron groups, and then transmitting and organizing the impulses into an image on a screen.
this all also ignores the fact that outward sight is merely a transmission of light-energy data from the receptors in the eyes to the brain, which then processes that and forms what you see. so sight is not in your eyes, it's a function of your brain. your eyes merely collect the data. so since the brain contains the imaging properties, so could it, in conjunction with its imaginative functions, create its own imagery without any ocular input.
the answer to the question of what is the possessor of "my body", is the brain, while "my brain" is the result of exactly the kind of misunderstanding of 'consciousness' that pkrmedia is having right now.
'what you are', your 'self', is the organization of processes, at first influenced by environmental factors, and then built upon with the addition of 'experiences' (memory), this organization finally being referred to as a 'personality'.
hah, i've lost my self in introspection, which way is out?

Yes. His argument seems to conflate 1st person perspective with 'immateriality' - because of the inability of a 3rd person perspective to experience first person perspectives. But the fact that there is a difference between how you and I might potentially experience the neurons in my brain doesn't prove that first person experience of neurons is immaterial. It merely means that looking at a neuron isn't the same as being a set of neurons.

Also, he appears to reject dualism outwardly, why still implying it in his arguments... so I'm not sure if he's going for something along the lines of supervience...

Thanks for this info and for your analysis.

After reading my quotes given by todangst, I realized I needed to clarify a couple of things that I wrote. This is truly the problem of immediate posting and thankfully I'd never write anything so quickly for an academic paper.

To exist as a viable (though this does not mean legitimate) idea, dualism requires only one thing; ontologically separate entities. I previously used the term metaphysical, but that was an error, as it is clear that what is being promoted is a "naturalistic" dualism and hence the brain and consciousness are metaphysical similar by definition of being natural. What I mean by the use of ontology here is that the two parts are presented as not being necessarily of the same being. Let me try to explain: Cartesian dualism or any dualism of a spiritual kind presents consciousness or the soul as being capable of existing without the existence of the brain, it is sui generis. The naturalistic dualist does not agree with this and hence, to the casual reader, will seem as if they are escaping the problem, presenting consciousness as being "arisen" or, as Chalmers puts it, naturally but not logically supervenient upon the brain. In this thinking, while consciousness requires the specific neural substrate that homo sapiens possesses to exist, it is different in being enough that it does not necessarily or logically follow that it exists. The reason presented is phenomenology, i.e. the specific "feels" of the individual point to a new entity that while it would fade without the brain, exists in its own right and with its own rules.

Here is where the usage of such confusing and impossible terms as "immaterial" come into play. It is quite clear that the naturalistic dualist is faced with a quandary. He or she does not wish to delve into supernaturalism, but they assume (and that's all it is, an assumption based on egoism) that their experience is somehow essentially different that it escapes from the functionalism that the brain is described as. This was excellently presented by Todangst earlier, though I must assert a small caveat in that supervenience is not at issue, it only becomes a problem when it is used to get away from the descriptive paradigm of functionalism.

We all must remember, though only wilber and others like him seem to have forgotten, that evolution is a fact and when properly and consistently applied, we begin to see homo sapiens as simply an adaptive creature to the ever-changing environment, much like everything else. Consciousness serves a survival purpose or function. it is not something other, it is simply something new, at least in the type that we possess.

For someone who claims to "know more about critical reasoning" than I, resorting to name-calling and cursing doesn't seem to support that supposition.

As to the unilateral declaration that you aren't promoting any type of dualism, I would point out that you said you hadn't even heard of naturalistic dualism nor of David Chalmers and hence to say that you aren't promoting something of which you are ignorant seems rather presumptive.

In point of fact, you have never addressed any specific point written by me or todangst. Specific questions were asked and no answers were given except further quotations voicing the same problematic statements. At no point have you taken the time to specifically quote anything we've said and offer a critique. For example, you have not clarified what you mean by "immaterial" despite repeated questions by todangst; you have not elucidated the difference between you and Chalmers; you have not addressed the problems that were pointed out of your proclivities towards Leibnizian theorizing and the rather pointed criticisms made by Kant; and you have not made any attempt to defend your position that science necessarily requires a "hard-materialistic" stance except to simply repeat your assertion, which isn't an argument.

It is unfortunate that you refuse to study anything besides your own point of view, but as a student of philosophy that you claim to be, I would think it imperative to solve problems of ignorance, not curse the messenger that points them out.

RP,

You accused me of just cutting and pasting, without any base for that claim. That sounds like the actions of an asshole to me. You said that I am "incapable of rational thought". I see no other reasonable response to that than, "go fuck yourself."

I don't know how to do the quotes thing you guys do, show me and i'll response point by point for clarity.

pkremida said: You accused me of just cutting and pasting, without any base for that claim.

Not only did you say that you cut and pasted, but it was quite clear from a previous entry that it wasn't your words, shown by the completely different style of writing.

Second, I did not say that you were incapable of rational thought, only that it "seemed" as such given that you were refusing to answer any of the criticisms being raised other than simply reiterating your same points. In no way was I attempting to be derogatory and I apologize if that is what came across, only pointing out a problem in the conversation.

Thirdly, you don't have to do the quotes thing, all you have to is actually address the points being brought up. For instance, todangst requested an example of you of something in existence that doesn't have matter or energy and your only response was "consciousness." Todangst rightfully pointed out that using your own assumption as an example is circular reasoning, and given the fact you haven't proven consciousness to be non-material is also problematic.

First of all, and this is just out of curiosity because I never said so, why do you keep referring to me as a woman, Reason_Passion? I never said I was either one. Just curious.

I agree that words merely point to reality and are not reality themselves. One of my favorite isms is, “Finger points at moon, do not confuse moon with finger.” But, this is not damning to the theory I am advocating, no matter how much you seem to think it does. I am not advocating any sort of unchanging thing that is in any way separate from neurological phenomena. When I talk about the self, I in fact do think that it is as real as rock or plane. I do not, however, think it is a separate entity than the confines of my body. I merely think that my various experiences cannot be perceived by anyone other than myself, and cannot even be perceived by myself in the traditional sense! That is, evidence of my experience is perceived experientially, not through the senses or extentions of them. I offer experiential evidence, and you continually state that this is not sufficient. If the experience of your own consciousness is not sufficient evidence to you that experience is a real thing, then frankly I don’t know what to tell you. You say it is impossible to use the “experience” as a “logical justification for a self in any way removed from the relational system of the brain and all of material reality.” But I am not arguing for anything that is in anyway removed from material reality, just another perspective of it. Experiential perspective, where in the experience of neurological phenomena occurs. These experiences, which are very real based on the evidence that I actually experience them (or, said another way, this perspective of neurological phenomena that we call “experience”), are not able to be seen, touched, felt, smelled, or sensed in any way (except experientially) by anybody but me. And thus, since this perspective (subjective) does not meet the requirements of a material phenomena, it is immaterial. The subjective perspective is immaterial. I know this perspective exists because I experience it. Again, if experiential evidence is not sufficient by your standards then there is nothing I can say to convince you and the conversation ends there.
Your experience of it is in your brain and body, certainly yes, and nowhere else. It is hard to express this in a way that does not sound dualistic, with sentences like “my experience” and “my perspective”. That is not what I mean. I don’t mean that there is this separate self that is not within the confines of my body that has these experiences and sees this perspective. I just mean that part of being human and being this neurological phenomena means that you also get the inside view of the neurological phenomena. You are consciousness that is neurological phenomena. There are two halves of this neurological phenomena that is best expressed as “inside” and “outside” view. Outside being for everybody to see, inside being raw feelings of it. The outside is the electrical signal sent through the nerves to the brain that “something is amiss in this body”, the inside view is pain. They are two different “perspectives” of the same phenomena and both exist in the same reality, and are both part of one whole entity. I wish I could express this more clearly. Suffice to say that I am not arguing for an immaterial self, but an immaterial perspective and experience that is separate from the world of hard science.

I am not experiencing anything except neurotransmitters. Or, said more clearly (I think), I have no other experience besides the inside perspective of neurotransmitters.

I don’t mean to say that consciousness is self proof that it is immaterial. I mean that consciousness is evidence of itself. I was trying to make a point that experiential evidence is sufficient evidence. The evidence for immateriality is this: I know that this perspective of neurological phenomena is real because I experience it. When I try to record it or perceive it with others (perhaps share it with others), I can’t. The only way I can perceive this perspective, this view of brain states, is through experience. I can only try to express this perspective of neurological phenomena through poetry, song, art, etc. But, unlike purely material occurrences, I cannot co-experience it with another body. In the purely material world, when there is an apple, one body can express the existence of the apple to another (“There is an apple.”), and the other body can affirm that this is real through agreement (“Yes. Apple.”). This conversation takes place every Christmas in my family*.
This is not possible with the inner perspective. If one body experiences happiness and tries to affirm it with another body (“I am happy.”), this co-experience of this phenomena cannot occur (“Really?” or “Oh. Good.”). This conversation takes place every Easter in my family**.

What I mean to say is that Consciousness is material, but the experience of consciousness (or inner perspective of material neurological phenomena) is not material. So, in a way, it is both. One part material and one part immaterial. Just two different perspectives of one phenomena.

To answer Todangst’s questions.

1.) Well, I can’t show you that anything exists other than matter or energy. But I do experience something that is neither. It is the experience of the inner perspective of neurological phenomena, which I in short call “consciousness”.
2.) There isn’t a cause/effect relationship really at play here. It’s just a view of the material world that I experience. I’d like to point out again that I realize that the dualistic nature of language makes it look like I am advocating that "I" am somehow separate from this perspective. That is not what I mean.
3.) There is not violation of the conservation of energy because I am not advocating anything separate from the material world.

Question for clarity for Todangst: What do you mean when you say, “stealing the concept of materiality”?

I concede the point to Todangst about making the jump from micro to macro. I shouldn’t do this. However, the fact that any probabilistic phenomena can be observed in our universe does call into question pure determinism. Does that affect us? Well, you’d have to ask a particle physicist. Which, as you rightly noted, I am not.

I am pretty sure that this covers any misunderstandings? Let me know if I’m missing anything. I think this all comes down to whether or not you think experiential evidence is sufficient if it cannot be co-experienced by another body and thus reaffirmed. Reaffirmation and co-experience being things which regularly occur in the material world.

Also, in regards to the last lengthy post I made. Reason_Passion, I have explicity said that those are not my words. It was merely a passage that I thought was relevant to the conversation, but not to the argument. I never claimed they were my own. Everything you read here is my words.

I just realized I gave Todangst's analysis of my long Ken Wilber post amiss. I'll get to that.

*This is not true. But it is funny.
**This is true***.

***No it isn’t.

answer to questions: I have experiential proof of my conciousness. I know that my conciousness is real even though I have no evidence that I can show you, only evidence that I can experience myself. I know that my conciousness is a result of neurological activity in the brain and is not separate from it. I know that my experience of this neurological activity cannot be co-experienced and affirmed by any other body. co-experience and affirmation of events/phenomena/existence of objects by other bodies is what necessitates a material phenomena of any sort. Since my inner experience of neurological activity cannot be co-experienced or affirmed by another body, and since I myself cannot sense it as I sense other things which I call material (see, taste, touch, smell, hear), I therefore call this inner experience of neurological phenomena immaterial. I shorten "inner experience of neurological phenomena" to "conciousness".

Does this help?