Glad you concede that. So, how do YOU justify trusting it?

Nothing worth worrying about.  Just look at his name, that's the term given to people who use bad assumptions and build a worse phylosophical argument from there.  That's all any of his posts are, not a single one has been worth the time it took to read it so far. 

I've always thought of the "problem of induction" as not necessarily  a problem of inductive logic counting as "logical", whatever that means; although there is some large problems within inductive logic itself, that is to say which model is right. Rather, I think of it as more of an epistemelogical problem. Can we really say that knowledge is fallible? If we can rely on high probabilities to get knowledge, then there are a lot of epistemic puzzles that rise up. Two that are most famous now in contemporary epistemology is the problem of "Grue" and the lottery problem. Both of which are beyond the scope of this forum but here's a taste of the arguments.

First the lottery problem:

Suppose I have a large pile of lottery tickets infront of me, and I draw a single lottery ticket from that pile. Now, the probabilities are so low that the lottery ticket I have  drawn will win that I know the lottery ticket is a loser. Next I draw another lottery ticket from the same pile. I know that ticket number 2 will be a loser. I keep going, drawing tickets and knowing that each is a loser until i reach the last ticket. Now there are two options that I have, either the lottery ticket is a winner, or a loser. Deductively, If all the previouse tickets are losers, then this last ticket is the winner. This is odd. But Inductively, all the lottery tickets have the same probabilities thus I know that each ticket I draw including the last one, is a loser. This is just as odd, since there must be a winner. The other option is that I don't know which ticket will win and thus I also don't know which ticket will lose, after all it's possible that I may win. So, it is argued, I must not know the same sort of propositions as the lottery tickets: propositions that are based on probabilities. So, I don't know that I'm not going to have a heart attack, since it's possible that I might have one. I don't know that I'm going to be in school tommorrow, because I may win the lottery and quite school, or I might suffer an unexpected heart attack etc. And it follows I don't know very much at all.

The problem of Grue:

O = x is observed before today.
     F = x is observed after today.
     G= x is green.
     B= x is blue.

So grue is stated as follows:
(O&G) v (F&B).

In other words define grue as follows:

x is grue iff either (x is observed before today and x is green) or (x is observed after today and x is blue).

The skeptical argument is as follows:
1' )Your observations equally support the theory that all emeralds are green & all emeralds are grue.
2' )If (1) then the observation we've made provide no better support for the claim that the next emerald we see will be green than that it will be blue.
3' ) So, Obserations don't support (F&G) > (F&B).
4' ) If 3, then observations don't justify the claim that the next emerald will be green.
5' ) So, observations don't justify that the next emerald will be green.

Both skeptical arguments seek to question whether we can really rely on high probabilities for knowledge claims. Although most contemporary epistemologists seem to think that we can, none have really given a satisfactory reply to either the lottery problem or the problem of grue thus it is still a live debate within philosophy, and thus also the subject of inductive logic.

You need to concede to having a reading comprehension problem. He just said that that to say that there is no logical basis of induction is bizarre.

He just cited the way.  Of course, there is also pragmatism.

By the way, there's a difference between  uncertainty and utter epistemic chaos. Presuppers confuse the two.

Actually, presuppers confuse a lot of things.... mainly because they don't know what they are talking about.