LOL...

Principally, your failing was arguing that "it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist". Identity is the antecedant to coherent existanceL

Common Counter-Argument: Just because there is no identity does not mean it does not exist!

This fundamentally misses the point of the argument. The point is not to demonstrate that it does not exist, but rather that there is no “it” to speak of! Otherwise, the corollary of this exclamation is the simple question “What is it that you speak of “existing”? Make up a word. Does this word have meaning? Well, you may have proposed that the word refers to an concept that suggests existence, ie the word denotes a real-world concept. But suppose you have not, but you still hold that this word should denote. In this case would you ask whether or not the referred to something that existed? Not yet. First, you have to ask “what is it that we speak of existing”? Identity is the antecedent to existence. It is meaningless to speak of existence without identity, since that requisite is axiomatic and any attempt to argue against it would refute its own premise, as I have already established.

In what sense are we referring to existence in this context? What sense is there of speaking of existence without identity? There is none. To exist is to exist as something. But this particular proposition is unique in that there is no coherent established property by which we have identity, there is only an eliminative lack of it. If God has no identity, then there is no entity, for how can speak of entity in this case? In what sense is it an entity? The “non-physical” sense? This is unhelpful because it simply returns us to the question above, we still have no identity for the entity in question, thence what sense is there speaking of it existing? It is rather like claiming that my computer on which I am typing could “exist” without plastic, silicon and liquid crystal. Well, then, in what sense does it exist? In the non-plastic, non-silicon, non-liquid crystal sense? You can see how the reductio ad absurdum is generated. How is it that people can operate under the delusion that they can reference “God” without identity, the satirical eliminate fashion in which I defined “my computer” above is simply an elimination of existential identity. That’s exactly what the word “supernatural” is. There is no difference between saying “God is supernatural” and saying a boat “exists” as “not a boat”. To exist is to exist as something, I cannot "exist" as "not a something"/

The trick card up your sleeve is "higher being".

You haven't given your proposition any identity. 

But now your definition is simply ad hoc and is not in concordance with the theistic description of the "supernatural", forthermore, you are forced into making an unclarified special pleading fallacy which would seem to indicate you are stealing attributes from entities about which we do have a posteriori knowledge except that you are begging the question by asserting that it is contigent to say that your supernatural being may have these attributes despite being in a different category. This is rather like a pick-and-mix child's game of "if you could have superpowers, what would you like to do?", "Well, it would be rather nice if I could shoot heat rays? Hang on, I thought you just said you wanted to be cold-blooded, you'd have no method of Homeostasis? "Damn. Well, I'll just pretend that I have some hitherto unclarified method of keeping temperature stasis so I can do both simultaneously".

Similarily, your proposition is subtly requisiting that you project your coherent understanding of our universe, that in which we live, to something you claim is outside it. You cannot defend this proposition on grounds of the possibility that there might be "other models" describing the a priori nature of the thing in question, like time, because then you're just playing pick-and-mix again! You might as well just admit your whole proposition is appeal to ad hocism. Once you start appealling to ideas like "the personality of this agent" and "consciousness", you are abandoning all pretense of metaphysical propositions, and adding empirical propositions into the fray whenever you please!

And you still haven't given me the identity of the entity in question. I don't want to know what this mysterious thing can do. Theists tell me that all the time with their threats of damnation! I want to know what the thing is. It is propositionally unhelpful to say "my computer is an "agent" capable of performing calculations and hooking me up to the the internet". Rather, my computer is a device constructed out of liquid crystal, plastic and silicon where silcon chips are arrayed in parallel circuitry slotted into containing locks inside the laptop clustured around a large silicon chip called a motherboard.

I'm sorry for the delayed reply Deluded; now I think I may have something satisfactory.

After considering your replies, I agree that my argument failed and fell victim to the identity issue; or in other words, my argument was too ambitious. I feel that my argument should primarily focus on the concept of 'supernatural' in its simplest terms and leave out God (for now). Perhaps we may find that the issue involves attaching 'supernatural' to a controversial being, and not 'supernatural' itself. This is what I will attempt to explain.

'Supernatural' as a Predicate Noun

Stemming from my definitional view of 'supernatural' I would like to explore the possibility of 'supernatural' conceived of in the following example. Consider the space shuttle when it was first launched. While watching the space shuttle launch, a spectator may exclaim "that's amazing!" In this setting, I would illustrate my conception of 'supernatural' as being expressed similar to "amazing" i.e. "that's supernatural!" Granted, this may not be what most people say at the sight of an "amazing" thing or event, but it seems that when most people say "amazing" you could plausibly substitute "supernatural".

Now how my conception of 'supernatural' would apply to the space shuttle analogy is this: the space shuttle appears to exceed the normal laws of nature. The sight of a huge metal vehicle being thrust into the air, and eventually passing outside of our atmosphere, would seem quite an extraordinary event. "Extraordinary" is my key emphasis on this point. The conception of 'supernatural' that I am supporting has everything in common with 'extraordinary'. This is so because 'supernatural' in my conception merely means 'something that greatly exceeds the normal course of nature'. Therefore, in the case of the space shuttle analogy, the space shuttle would be "greatly exceeding the normal course of nature." Which obviously would allow me to insert 'supernatural' in place of its definition resulting in: The space shuttle launching out of the atmosphere would be something supernatural.

I hope Deluded, that I did not make the same error that I did before dealing with th axiom of identity. If I have made an error in my argument, I at least hope that it is a new one. I concede that if what I have described is correct, then I may have an impossible task of applying 'supernatural' coherently to the idea of 'God'. However, I am not dissatisfied by that prospect. I look forward to your criticisms.

Note: I understand that in today's world, and maybe even the world during the time that the space shuttle was first launched, it may not be accurately described as 'greatly exceeding the natural course of nature'. For example, physicists can show how the space shuttle merely has the required force and velocity to thrust it out of the atmosphere; which is something completly "natural" to a scientist. However, this objection appears inapplicable when we concieve of putting ourselves in a spectator's shoes from during that time period. The true thought or concept that would concievably be in that spectator's mind while witnessing the space shuttle thrust smoothly into the air is apparently accurate to that of "that' supernatural!" Alas, if you feel that this example does illustrate a failing to my argument, then please explain how that may follow. I imagine that the failing of my argument maybe a fallacious appeal to the ignorance of the spectator and his incorrect labeling or misunderstanding of a completely natural event. However, would this deem my conception of 'supernatural' incoherent and/or incorrect? Or would it merely show that my example does not apply to my conception?

So, does the argument for the incoherency of the concept of 'supernatural' not apply if 'supernatural' is not used as a metaphysical proposition? 

You think I'm a swindler! I am hurt. Nevertheless, and all joking aside on my part, I do see your point. I take you to be saying, that when I use 'supernatural' in the completely non-related to the metaphysical sense it is a coherent term. However, this in no way helps to lead towards my end goal of attaching the concept 'supernatural' to God.

As of this point then, I would have to concede that my argument, as far as I have described it, does not successfully address what it set out to address: the incoherency of the (metaphysical) concept of 'supernatural'. Would you say that this is an accurate summation of what I've laid out Deluded? Oh and I meant criticism in the purely academic sense, not in the ad hominem sense.

Note: I could envision someone saying that 'supernatural' can be conceded as possibly used in a non-metaphysical sense (i.e. purely physical sense) and retain coherency (in the non-trivial way of an exclamation or mere saying-of-speech). However, on that point, I would definitely agree with you Deluded that this move would be unnaccetable, and as of yet, unargued. And just so you know, I will reattempt to formulate an argument which would lead to acheiving a successful reply to T.D.'s paper. Although, It may be a while before I come up with something.

This is most certainly not what my thesis was attempting to establish, and if it is what is being inferred, I need to clarify. My proposition was not that existence is the necessary antecedant to identity, but rather identity is the necessary antecedant to existence. It is propositionally coherent to speak the following:

Unicorns exist

Coherence theory of truth has largely been abandoned, but that not mean it cannot be employed, even if truth statements cannot be derived from it.

What I was not entailing, as you seem to be suggesting, was Fido-Fido theory, for when I speak of referents, I am not referring to the necessary entailment of existence, but rather identity, such that for any proper name p has description D entails that there are certain properties associated with p, this does not mean that p exists, that it has direct referent in the external world. It may not, but that is irrelevant. I am not Millian, to me, the sentence

Unicorns Exist

Is perfectly meaningful because it imbues certain recognized quantities onto the predicate. It's a white animal with a horse's body and a long horn. These predicates do not have to exist directly, in reality, no such animal exists, but that is irrelevant, it is still perfectly conceptually coherent. The word may attempt to refer to an existent thing, but I think my principle description was unclear. I was not suggesting that it is entailed that the description d need to refer to some existent entity, but rather, for there to be such an entity, we should be able to give it referents. It doesn't necessarily entail that what is refers to actually exists, but since I am unconcerned with the truth value of the proposition, that was not what I was focusing on. What I was advocating was denotation as apposed to Millian Descriptivism.

Although denotation works tidily for certain concepts lke "blue" or "lamp" it breaks down when we consider words which don't denote anything, like "hello". When I speak of denotation, it does not entail necessarily that the thing in question exists in the real world, but it should have conceivable property nonetheless. What I was suggesting was that certain words, by their nature, needed to . I was not concerned in any way with whether or not this referred to something in the real world, or whether it was a true statement, my principle and only concern was whether the entity had identity.  That is my litmus test (It's actually Quine's, but meh)

I think, then we are working with tow different senses of referent. TO me, in this case, a referent does not entail existence in the actual world, because that would make numerous either false statements on those propogating imaginary concepts unclear, when they are not. Rather, the predicate in question should be denoted, because speaking of the "supernatural" does not appear to be coherently speaking of any actual concept, ie it does not appear to denote a thing which could possibly have identity, because it appears to be solely defined in a negative universe of discourse where it is not coherently established what it means to refer to something as only: ~N, where N stands for "natural". We can define objects by their opposites so long as we are aware what is left over, ie

"This number is not even"

which is coherent because it is established what remains, odd numbers. THis means that since there is something left in the universe of discourse, we can coherently define it. It has not been established what, if anything, is left over or what we mean when we say "supernatural", and it does not appear to have any identity attached to it (see the "pencil case universe" suggestion at the bottom).

Principally, I was not concerned whatsoever with the truth value of the utterance, it is impossible to speak of a something being "true" when you don't even know what it is conceptually expressing.

Anyway, I needed to revise that paper, since I'm trying to finish drafting something on Multiple Realizability, I had ignored that one for a while.

Supernatural is not appropriately defined as ~N. If this premise of your argument is removed, then your argument against my position dissapears.

This concession further supports my position concerning the rentention of the coherency of 'supernatual' if we define it as "above the normal course of nature" and not "outside of nature." It is quite feasible to see how the concept would retain coherency even we can merely denote its properties, yet not have an object in existence which can be referred to as 'supernatural.'

Argument from Analogy

The properties of a Unicorn would be:

white animal, with a horn, and a horses body.

The properties of something (existent or not) supernatural would be:

Speed: Super fast!

Power: Super power!

Intelligence: Super smart!

etc.

The only difference between the unicorn and the properties of 'supernatural' is level or quantity; not the actual properties themselves. I could add the following properties to the unicorn analogy:

Normal Unicorn:

white animal, with a horn, with a horse's body, normal intelligence, normal physical power, normal running and walking speed.

Supernatural Unicorn:

white animal, with a horn, with a horse's body, super intelligence, super physical power, super running and walking speed.

A super unicorn would then just quantify the normal unicorn's properties. There is no necessity to imagine that the properties of a super unicorn would be ~natural. Instead, they merely exceed the normal course of nature for a unicorn.

note: of course I agree, that if this analogy can hold water, and somehow lead to rescuing the coherency of 'supernatural' then possible reworking to the concept of God would be necessary. But let's take this one step at a time. I am in no hurry. First rescue the concept of 'supernatural' (somehow) and then let us move on to greener pastures.

O.k. so our last 20 hours of posts have been deleted. Bad luck. I remember most of what I said in my reply to your last reply deluded, so I will attempt to sum up the point that we are in at in our discussion.

--4 billion people define God in a way that falls susceptible to your argument. It is not that you are defining God as outside nature, it is that the 4 billion theists of past and present have been defining God this way. I understand your point.

--In my last reply I really wasn't trying to suggest or bring up the ontological argument. I personally don't like that argument either.

--I take fault for not being clear what I was saying and what todangst said in his paper. I will try to be clearer next time. In reference to the analogy that I was attempting to draw, I withdraw that analogy as not necessary to my aims.

Summation--It appears deluded, that after discussing with you at length the concept 'supernatural' and 'God' the ball is in my court so-to-speak. I have attempted to avoid your argument by defining 'supernatural' as remaining in the natural realm, in a "that which is superior" sense of what is natural. Furthermore, I have attempted to show how the concept of 'God' could conceivably be defined as 'supernatural' in the sense that I have described (rendering it in conflict with the 4 billion strong definition).

So far as I can tell, the position that I am advocating is coherent conceptually, however it risks being so disconnected from the mainstream 4 billion person endorsed definition that I am no longer talking about the same concept. In light of this description it appears that I have arrived at the following conclusions:

1. I have managed to avoid your argument, but not refute it, by suggesting a different conception of 'God' and 'supernatural.'

2. If I've avoided it, then it is my burden to show how a concept of God, conceived of in the way that I've described, is even remotely related to the mainstream conception of God.

Going off of memory deluded, this is where I think my argument stands. If you disagree that this is where it left off, or that I have attempted to somehow mislead you, then please let me know how so I can attempt to clarify.

When we say that super-man is super, we define certain limits that a 'man' has that a 'super-man' doesn't. We see how people cannot fly but a super-man can.
So super-man's 'superness' is defined in terms of his abilities and characteristics.

The charge being levelled at theism is that it the 'limits' that 'supernatural' wishes to leave behind are the limits that allow the concept to be meaningful. The limits that the supernaturalist tries to get around at the rules of language that are necessary for the concept to make sense. The challenge that DG and Todangst have set you is to define 'supernatural' in a way that makes sense.

Unfortunately the challenge doesn’t make much sense. I define “supernatural” as equal to and greater than natural. Just as “superman” is equal to and greater than a man. Granted superman has properties that we don’t find in a normal man, but he still does have features that we do find in men; he has thoughts, moral consciousness, desires, love, and even can have a son. It does not due to treat “superman” as “non-man” because that would negate all the properties that we find in common with men, we might say he is not a mere man, but we are still committed to him having the properties of men, but greater, more powerful. “Superhero” is also a linguistic expression we use that will not function well as simply the negation of “hero” because a superhero is still a hero. The theist is not trying to get around rules of language, if there is such a thing, the theist is expressing something that they find greater than yet within nature.

Name calling is not necessary, not to mention slightly fallacious. As far as using a fictional character to argue for epistemology, I don't take myself to be doing this at all, I made no reference to the nature of justification, or knowledge. I have used linguistic evidence to suggest that "supernatural" is a prefix in the same sense that "superman" is and "superstrength" and "superhero". Now you suggest that "supernatural" can be replaced with "non-natural". But what happens when we replace "super" with "non" in the other phrases? "Non-strength", and "Non-hero", this does not capture the meaning of "superstrength" nor "superhero" because super strong people are still strong, and superheroes are still heroes. So the linguistic evidence is there; unless "supernatural" is a unique expression which is what most of you are trying to do. But the burden of proof is on you to argue that "supernatural" is a unique expression. It certainly seems that "super-" is a prefix in most cases that we have discussed, why can't it be for "supernatural"?

I've provided linguistic evidence to the effect that "super-" functions as a prefix in the term "supernatural". As far as evidence that "supernatural" is a unique expression and is not a prefix, I have seen no convincing evidence.

Why? If you're arguing for a linguistic expression that is unique in character where "super-" looks like a prefix, yet functions as a negation then you're the one that needs to provide evidence.

What about "God is worshipped by Christians" or "Christians worship God" or "Theists worship a creator of the universe" ? I've heard atheists utter such phrases, so atheists are just uttering meaningless sentences? When you give a thesis for meaning you should try to explain our linguistic intuitions for why particular phrases that we take to be meaningful are meaningful, at least that‘s what I take philosophers of language to be doing; those who take the antithesis of this project are what my philosophy of language prof aptly calls “Quiners“. Since meaningful expressions express propostions or beliefs that have a truth content, then it is also important to explain our intuitions about why particular statements are true as well.

Thomathy, if you consider all the definitions you listed, then you would see the alternative definitional accounts of 'supernatural' that would support the word 'supernatural' as not referring to something that is outside or beyond nature (i.e. not-natural) in all cases. Specifically I am looking at

1. of, pertaining to, or being above or beyond what is natural; unexplainable by natural law or phenomena; abnormal.
3. of a superlative degree; preternatural: a missile of supernatural speed.

1.Attributed to a power that seems to violate or go beyond natural forces.

In all of these accounts of the word, supernatural would not need to be deemed as outside of natural, or in other words, non-natural. How? Consider the first (1.), it refers of course to something 'being above or beyond what is natural,' but does this support a non-natural conception of 'supernatural'? I don't think that it does because it appears to ambiguously use the word 'natural'; it appears that natural in this first part of the definition refers more to 'what is typical' rather than 'what is natural' i.e. the nature we are discussing i.e. science and nature. This explanation is of course not enough to show how 'supernatural' can be defined in the way that drummer and I are attempting to define it as.

The second part of the first definition (1.) is where I find access to a favorable position.

"unexplainable by natural law or phenomena; abnormal."

The key here is that it notes that 'supernatural' would not be explainable by natural law, however, it does not say that it is outside of natural law or phenomena. It may be the case that with more studying and understanding,a supernatural event or thing could be explained using a completely naturalistic terms, in accordance to natural laws either not yet discovered or not yet concieved of being applied in such a way. The bottom line is just because something is not yet explainable by natural law, does not mean that it is necessarily outside of nature. It may very likely be the case that natural law cannot explain the event with the available laws, however, these laws alone do not have the power to rule out whether something is natural or not-natural.[Unless you hold that nature consists of only the things that can be explainable by natural or scientific law. If this is the case, then I would need to hear how you justify such a position.]

Of course the conception I am recommending does pose problems with attaching 'supernatural' as an adjective to the concept of God, however these issues will be faced once 'supernatural' can be sorted out and better understood. So in your reply, consider the fact that I have removed the ability on my behalf (I don't know about on drummer's behalf) to attach 'supernatural' to the concept of God at this time.

This third definition is exactly what drummer is referring to in his superman example. Of course you may say that under a naturalistic conception of the concept 'supernatural' we have not yet shown how it can be attached to the concept of God as a meaningful adjective. However, I feel that if we excluded God now as a supernatural being, because our attempt to define 'supernatural' in the way here described, then drummer's superman example would be a non-equivocated use of the word super if he takes out the correlation to God. Let us take a look at the definition for (3.):

3. of a superlative degree; preternatural: a missile of supernatural speed.

The missle of supernatural speed does not need much explanation; it appears to directly correlate with drummer's superman example. However, I do feel it necessary to define 'superlative' in order to better understand the definition's meaning.

adj.

1. Of the highest order, quality, or degree; surpassing or superior to all others.
2. Excessive or exaggerated.
3. Grammar. Of, relating to, or being the extreme degree of comparison of an adjective or adverb, as in best or brightest.

1. Something of the highest possible excellence.
2. The highest degree; the acme.
3. Grammar.
   1. The superlative degree.
   2. An adjective or adverb expressing the superlative degree, as in brightest, the superlative of the adjective bright, or most brightly, the superlative of the adverb brightly.

This is the manner in which I (and it appears drummer as well) want to define the concept of 'supernatural.' On this usage, directly in line with your given definitions (at least some of them), drummer's superman example is not fallacious as long as we don't try to attach 'supernatural' as an adjective for the concept of God (yet) (A separate argument would be needed in order to attach supernatural to the concept of God at this point).

And lastly, I wanted to note the second definition (1.)

1.Attributed to a power that seems to violate or go beyond natural forces.

Again I am hammering home the 'seems' part of the definition. Now, I don't want to appear to be saying that just because something seems not to be one way that it is. Rather, I am merely attempting to show that 'seems' in the definition suggests that a power could be explainable by nature, but currently is unable to be explained or unable to be understood.

Lastly,please remember that if I what I've said makes sense, then I must seperately argue that my conception of 'supernatural' could be used to explain the concept of God (deludedgod has helped me realize this fact. 4 billion, 4 billion!!!) [The post in which deludedgod points out the 4 billion Christians strong definition of God that conflicts with my position concerning the concept of 'supernatural' was unfortunately deleted by a server reset.] 

Thomathy,  

A grade high school list of prefixes and root words with "super" as a prefix of the root word "natural":

http://www.mcps.k12.md.us/schools/senecavalleyhs/satroots-fall07.pdf

Wiki also has a list of prefix's with "supernatural" as an example:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_prefixes

Valarie Adam's lists supernatural as an example in "An introduction to modern English word formation".

And did you look at the latin etymology of the word supernaturalis on your own list (super+natura)?

I can live just fine with the definitions that you provided, however when you look at the definitions I don't have to be committied to the conjunction of all of these definitions. Indeed I do philosophically deny (1) and perhaps (2) in the American Heratidge dictionary, but I do accept most of the other definitions just fine. 

I also can't recall stating that "supernatural" is not a lexical item. Further, I am not presenting "my own definitions", I am working with the definitions that are in your own dictionary and then moving beyond those definitions by attempting to give a philosophical account of the supernatural. An account I find to be most consistent with the idea that God acts. But make no mistake when a person utters a word or a sentence, that person is not committing themselves to a conjunction of all the definitions within the dictionary, but rather with a particular intention and context in mind ,the speaker is communicating a particular meaning that might be found in one or more of the definitions given in the dictionary. It is for this reason that we must think of the definitions given as more of a disjunction than conjunction of all meanings within the dictionary. 

In addition, the same source says that "natural" is the negation of the supernatural, so it appears to me that natural is just as broken a concept as supernatural is, does this mean that the word "natural" and "supernatural" don't mean anything? Of course not.

Also you had stated something to this effect:

I'm not sure what your getting at here, are you saying that "broken concepts" have meaning? Is what your getting at "we can communicate broken concepts and grasp the meaning of a broken concept"? If so, then this is exactly the opposite thesis of what I understand DG is arguing. Indeed, "meaning" itself is a hazy philosophical concept, that doesn't mean it is not a concept, or a word without meaning.

Show me where I've conflated in my own words (using recent posts).

Then why do appear to deny an ontological inquiry here? :

I see your point deluded that we may be arguing about two different conceptions of 'supernatural,' however your general thesis appears to be arguing that generally 'supernatual' is a broken concept. Either qualify your claim in the paper's title or admit that under one conception of 'supernatural' your argument fails to assault it.

Because of your adopted ontology; not because of a point of fact. (as you mention below concerning needing an onology to include immaterial things. But then your just attempting to draw me into another dilemma because you also argue that the concept 'immaterial' is broken.)

Please be clearer about what you mean here.

Very funny. It's called an analogy.

You seem to be using 'naturalism' as you would 'existence.' Your statement sounds like "for what would we be speaking of magnitude of such that we say 'of greater magnitude than existence.'" If naturalism does intend to act as it appears to, what are your grounds for having it act this way? You appear to be making the term 'naturalism' as inaccessible to be a magnitude of quality as existence is. If this is as it seems deluded, then how would you justify deeming naturalism this way?

Please explain the category error. If 'supernatural' is still within the 'naturalistic' realm of discourse then how is it in a different category? Are you going to suggest that all properties of nature are neither greater than or less than one another, but completely equal and worthy of no notation of difference and distinction in magnitude or quantity? If so, then please explain how this would be.

This is not meaningless and needs a case to show how "God is including and greater than natural." If you say 4 billion then we obviously have identified our problem: a problematic definitional conception of God, not an equivocation of natural.

I would love to know more about this naturalism. It seems so bland. Everything's the same. Nothing is greater than or less than; it just is. Why is this flatness of quality necessary?

How can this statement match up with what you said here:

The goal of my thesis, is to give 'supernatural' an identity in the natural realm. But again, if you reply and say that things within naturalism cannot be distinguished in a greater than or less than fashion, then I would love to hear about that.

This deals with 'immaterial' principally and I am not attempting to argue for or against this concept's coherency.

Naturalism=ontological status...why is naturalism an ontological status? Isn't it more of a description of what a thing is, not that it is a thing because it is natural? You are conflating natural and existence. Is this intetional?

Again this may be so when used in theistic terms following readily accepted theistic definitions. However, your thesis argues more generally. I am attempting to limit this generality or atleast understand how you argue that it can be so general.

What do you mean by produce? Imagine or prove? How is your naturalistic ontology any different?

he doesn't even appear to have READ my essay.

Glad to hear it.

You're getting it backwards. The attempt to make the supernatural coherent necessarily fails no matter what sort of 'ontology' one wants to make (as if there could be something other than naturalistic one)  because any attempt at coherency requires that a term either have ontological status, or serve as a contradistinctive.

Yet each of your points is dealt with in my essay.  

Ok, that explains things.

Glad to hear it.  By the way, my points on the term and its incoherency aren't the slightest concern to negative theologians, in fact, they'd find the attempt to make a reference to the un-referencible to be wrongheaded in the first place.

Contradistinctive is a term from logic, means 'opposing' quality....

As for Darwinism being on trial, it is, in the same sense that the wright brothers are on trial.... all science is on trial...

As for chaos and chance. I don't agree that chaos means "beyond our ability to grasp." I think chaos points to the ungraspable, literally, that no ability will ever make it graspable. And I think there is such a thing as chance.

Thanks for the clarification, my formal logic is a bit rusty at times.

I think the quote may be getting misconstrued here. I put that quote in my signature to express what you just said. However, my primary reason I have the quote is to target charges put forth by creationists that, essentially, evolutionary scientists are being dogmatic (in a sense) concerning evolution's status as a scientific theory. Many times creationists will view evolution as being raised up on a pedestal, above the rigors and critiques of the scientific method. After a fair bit of research on evolution, I find this type of charge by creationists ludicrous. I put that quote up as a reply to anyone who attempts to argue that evolution is a type of scientific dogma.