Is it just me or do people always see these baises in other people, but never in themselves?

What is the "real world" and what does it mean to look at it "neutrally?" The idea that one can view the world neutrally, that there is a real world that could be grasped without presuppositions, has been discredited for a while now, at least in many strains of thought (and many of the advocates of such positions are atheists).

Indeed, to assume that one can adopt a completely neutral position regarding the world is itself a fantasy, a myth. This applies to theism, atheism, and all other isms. Of course, we can suspend certain beliefs to a certain extent, but to assume that such suspension can be total is, I think, intellectually dishonest.

I agree that there are different qualities of knowledge, but I would still insist that this does not get rid of the presuppositions inherent in thought and action, presuppositions that are required to get anything done. In this sense, nihilism (and there are many ways to define nihilism, though I take it that you are defining it as the absence of reference to objectivity?) is quite practical and relevant. (Gianni Vattimo has developed this in an interesting direction, though I part ways with him on key points.)

Take, for instance, your definition of the real world as that which we can measure through our senses and that which ultimately determines our lives. Implicit in this definition are certain presuppositions--such as our senses are reliable indicators of the way things really are. I am not necessarily saying that this is a wrong definition, only pointing out that there are presuppositions involved that enable the production of knowledge.

Ultimately, such presuppositions help determine the form that knowledge takes. If you suspend the presuppositions, which is possible to an extent, and change them accordingly, then the type of knowledge itself changes. In this sense, the production of knowledge requires fundamental axioms, which must be decided upon (Alain Badiou develops this quite thoroughly, it seems.) I hope that this clarifies what I was saying.

That is a crucial point, on which we
shall often return: knowledge, as theory, is (dialectically) opposed to practice.
Theory and practice form a unity, that is to say, for the dialectic, a unity of
opposites. But this knowledge (theory/)practice contradiction is in turn the
very object of the theory of knowledge. In other words, the inner nature of
the process of knowledge is constituted by the theory/practice contradiction.
Or again, practice, which as such is dialectically opposed to knowledge (to
theory), is nevertheless an integral part of knowledge qua process.

Thanks, again, for your response. And don't worry about being blunt--I don't mind blunt. We also agree, I think, on what knowledge is for--improvement. Of course, this is where the problems begin: what constitutes improvement or progress, what type of knowledge is adequate to improvement and in which realms of human experience, and so on.

Before going any further, though, I must correct something you said. Your statement about Vattimo--and I hope you don't mind if I am blunt--is simply wrong. It is true that he opposes "strong thought," but in the latter's place he develops a "weak thought" or a "weak ontology." He derives this, in part, from Nietzsche and Heidegger, and reads them as contributing to the project of nihilism, which for Vattimo is a type of liberation. In other words, Vattimo fully endorses and explicates, and he is more than up front about it, a type of nihilism, which for him is synonymous with hermeneutics. One only needs to look at the title of his most recent collection of translated essays, "Nihilism and Emancipation," to figure this out.

You accuse Badiou and myself, I think, of wanting to ground everything in philosophical knowledge. There is some merit to this claim in reference to Badiou (and perhaps myself); however, it completely ignores the complexity of Badiou's position. For Badiou, ontology is mathematical, so, in a sense, he displaces it from the domain of philosophy proper. Philosophy itself does not provide the conditions for truth; rather, it thinks truth on the basis of his four truth procedures: art, science, politics, and love. The mode of truth varies in each, and philosophy is conditioned by these; philosophy reflects on the conditions of truth as these are given to it. If you say that you agree with Badiou, then I think you run into some problems--most notably, you seem to reduce truth to science, which Badiou does not do. If I am wrong about this, then let me know, but based on what you have said I find it hard to think otherwise, since you assume that the scientific method is primary for human experience.

I agree that science has contributed to the human experience--I would be a fool to think otherwise--but this does not entail acccepting science as valid to determine all aspects of human experience. If one accepts that there are other realms of truth--and you have already committed yourself to Badiou, so don't back down--then it is illegitimate to apply the methods of science to all realms of human experience. Indeed, I think it is simply wrong (and often quite disastrous) to apply science to love, to art, and to politics. Here are some other areas you can rely on, I think, to answer the question you posed to me.

In this sense, your experience over the last nineteen years has not played out only according to our scientific knowledge--there are other things in play. Badiou also holds to the idea of the event, a rupture in the order of things--this is fundamental to his philosophy. The event is completely non-scientific--it cannot be predicted according to what we know. In this sense, the event can very well shatter the smooth procession of your life over the last 600 million seconds, ultimately calling into question the very notion of the scientific method which you hold. Without this idea, there is no Badiou.

I know that we have drifted a little bit off the original topic--but that is how things go.

When I mention realms of human experience, I am only pointing to the idea that human experience cannot be reduced to science. These other realms can be defined according to Badiou's four conditions, or otherwise, if you like.

You are correct that Vattimo's position is postmodern; however, Vattimo equates postmodernism with nihilism. Really, there is no way around this. Vattimo flat out refers to himself as a nihilist and a postmodernist in numerous writings. Morever, he traces this tendency back farther than Nietzche. And, for Vattimo, weak thought is nihilism. What do you mean by complete nihilism?

1. Total rejection of prevailing religious beliefs, moral principles, laws, etc., often from a sense of despair and the belief that life is devoid of meaning. Also more generally (merging with extended use of sense 3): negativity, destructiveness, hostility to accepted beliefs or established institutions.

1812 J. STEWART Revol. of Reason 69 All the creatures of error; as ghosts, monsters, gods, and the more dangerous subtleties of metaphysicians, necessity, optimism, chivalry of virtue, and nihilism. a1817 T. DWIGHT Trav. New-Eng. (1821) II. 238 Hence the transition is easy to mere Nihilism, and a total disregard of moral obligation. 1854 J. C. BUCKNILL Criminal Lunacy 8 In Germany, rationalism ending in absolute nihilism has led to results of the same nature. 1881 J. S. BLACKIE Lay Serm. (1886) iii. 118 The hollow vacuities and negative absurdities of Atheism or Nihilism. 1926 R. H. TAWNEY Relig. & Rise Capitalism (1972) iv. 236 The commercial classes..even before the Civil War, more than half converted to the administrative nihilism which was to be the rule of social policy in the century following it. 1970 J. C. BENNETT in In Search Theol. of Devel. (Sodepax) 5 There have been great gains that should not be squandered in a moment of nihilism or revolutionary recklessness. 1992 Utne Reader May-June 43/1 The band members' main dissatisfaction with their public portrayal is the media depiction of them as rock brats simply mirroring the nihilism they rail against.

2. a. Philos. The belief or theory that the world has no real existence; the rejection of all notions of reality.

1842 W. HAMILTON Diss. in T. Reid Wks. I. 129/2 Is the acknowledged result of the Fichtean dogmatism less a nihilism than the scepticism of Hume? a1856 W. HAMILTON Lect. Metaphysics (1859) I. xvi. 294 Of positive or dogmatic Nihilism there is no example in modern philosophy. 1857 F. MAX MÜLLER Chips (1880) I. xi. 284 Buddhism..cannot be freed from the charge of Nihilism. 1887 W. PATER Imaginary Portraits 128 Actually proud at times of his curious, well-reasoned nihilism. 1909 A. M. LUDOVICI tr. Nietzsche Will to Power I. 16 The extremest form of Nihilism would mean that all beliefall assumption of truthis false: because no real world is at hand. 1964 P. ROUBICZEK Existentialism vii. 125 Thus it is no cause for surprise that Sartre lands himself in complete nihilism. 1994 Philos. & Phenomenol. Res. 54 509 (Phenomenalistic) idealism occupies the ontologically middle ground between the extremes of nihilism and realism.

b. Nothingness, non-existence. Obs.

1856 R. A. VAUGHAN Hours with Mystics I. VII. ii. 335 [To] lose, in utter Nihilism, all sense of any existence separate from the Divine Substance. 1866 Athenæum No. 2006. 454/3 To aim at nihilism as the supreme good.

c. Psychiatry. The delusional belief that the patient's self, the outside world, or parts of either have ceased to exist or to function. Cf. NIHILISTIC a. 3.

1927 D. K. HENDERSON & R. D. GILLESPIE Text-bk. Psychiatry viii. 160 The most characteristic involutional qualities lie in the content of the psychosis, especially in the apprehension, hypochondriasis and nihilism. 1957 E. MAYER in P. A. Schilpp Philos. K. Jaspers xi. 451 Jaspers vividly describes nihilism as a symptom of mental illness or..as a manifestation of ultimate situations in which a human being can find himself in depressions and schizophrenias. 1965 J. POLLITTDepression & its Treatm. iii. 33 The most extreme form of hypochondriacal delusion, referred to as ‘nihilism’. 2001 Internat. Jrnl. Geriatric Psychiatry 16 1088/1 Twenty two psychotic patients expressed delusional ideation of paranoid content,..and 7 of nihilism.

[3 irrelevant definitions omitted]

As for the quotation from Badiou, you originally stated that you agreed with Badiou philosophically, and then went on to state that you only agreed with this quotation. Fair enough. But to be totally fair, and in order to continue the discussion, please state what it is that you agree with in the quotation from Badiou. In other words, give me an interpretation of the quotation, so that there is a little more to go on. Doing so will help me discuss the other points you raise.

I know that this response is a bit inadequate, but I can only do so much right now, since I am in the middle of working.