Thanks for the link to this, flats. Yes, I am lazy...see my sig. 

I don't think there's a presumption in democracy to assign any moral value to the desires of the people - the system is designed to allow for the coexistence of varying moral beliefs in a pluralistic society. In fact, most democracies have seen fit to put certain authoritarian restraints on straight mob rule out of the understanding that people in the grip of groupthink can commit grevious moral errors.

And I don't see where the question of "should" would come from except from something that already exists. We can't assign value to things that don't exist, therefore asking if something should exist must follow our observation that it does. This is not a problem when you turn the question on a particular object that stands outside of ourselves. But when you ask if the questioner should exist you are naturally asking if the question should exist. If your answer is no, then the question refutes itself. This is even more true in the case of "existence" in general. If you state that the universe shouldn't exist, you are likewise saying that your question shouldn't exist, since it's inside the universe. I just don't think that line of thought goes anywhere except to nullity. I feel that the statement "everything should not exist" is the same as the statement "nothing should exist," which is a tautology, since nothing does not exist.

Ouch. 

I use the term the way I've heard psychiatrists use it in the sense of a person who's thoughts and emotions are basically under control and delivering results that the person is satisfied with. Since most atheists are happy enough with the way their minds work, I don't think atheism by itself qualifies as a mental illness. On the other hand, Christians seem to share this ubiquitous delusion that they are innately evil inside...

No, human nature is indeed the horse and logic the cart. Remember logic is just a common standard for determining truth; it is very much an abstract concept that points to Reality only insofar as it helps us to manipulate the environment we can perceive. Our natures were evolved in response to a much deeper truth and more pressing imperative: succeed or cease to exist. It is this imperative that crafted all our feelings, both high and most base. Accordingly, we have an immovable loathing of nonexistence because our brains are evolved over eons to avoid it.

Now, we can decide that our feeling in this respect is an anachronism that we should overcome and ignore, but I don't think logic supports that position.

I just don't see how a line of reasoning that leads to its own extinction can be said to be valid. It is arguing against itself! 

Yes, I'll agree with that. It is our emotions and intuitions that drive us to seek moral values whereever we look.  And drives some of us to seek moral value in the universe itself. But does that mean there is some moral value to the universe? I don't think so. I certainly see no evidence of it. I don't see any moral message anywhere in the universe except between the ears of the people looking at it. We are fooling ourselves and aggrandizing our own thoughts when we assume that our moralizing might have relevance in the natural world. The natural world has the moral value, to us, that we assign to it, by whatever means we wish.  But that's the sum total of the moral value that is out there, unless you postulate God on no evidence.

Right. But you can observe that logic works and logically conclude that observation is our only source of knowlege about the world. So the two support each other.

But logic cannot deliver new information to us, it can only test the validity of information that we already have. We have no route to discovery except evidence, no matter how flawed it may be. Even our experience of logic is dependant on evidence: the evidence that our subconscious pushes forward when it processes information. Without evidence, logic has nothing to work upon.

That said, I consider logical deductions and inductions based on evidence to be evidence themselves.  And obviously we must be able to tie raw data to a particular theory before it can be deemed "evidence" of anything. But there is always that need for actual information from the natural world before we can make statements about the natural world. Otherwise there is no line between fantasy and reality.

That is all fine. And when I see logical defences of God that actually refer to some evidence from nature (as all the above scientists did) I'll be ready to entertain a belief in God. Still waiting.

No, there are limited ways that evidence can be interpreted through logic. And Ockam's Razor (which I know you don't like) is a necessary tool for arriving at useful conclusions.

Logic and reason themselves are part of the natural world. They can say things about the natural world only so long as they refer to the natural world. When they are applied to a purported supernatural phenomenon, they lose all facility because supernatural phenomena, by definition, do not play by natural world rules. 

Therefore I say that we can't say anything about anyone's experience with a supernatural phenomenon except to note that they claim to have had it. It's status in natural reality is entirely undetermined. Accordingly, if the person claims some status in natural reality for their supernatural phenomenon, we can reject it out of hand unless the claim is subjected to naturalistic tests and passes. At which point it would be a natural phenomenon and the science books would have to be rewritten. Happens all the time.

Since I've never had a supernatural experience, I apply Ockam's Razor to the competing theories and find it easy to determine that it is more likely that supernatural experiences come from naturalistic errors, hallucinations and hoaxes. I really hope I'm wrong, but I couldn't claim to be thinking seriously about the issue if I didn't apply at least the same intellectual rigor as I would use to, say, pick out a brand of laundry detergent. 

But you aren't giving reason its due credit for something rather important that it has accomplished: the existence of all life. Reason and logic are simply extensions of the most basic use of our senses. there is no presupposition involved: organisms have been surviving through reason and the principles of evidence -> fact, cause -> effect since long before any presuppositions ever existed. Now, most of those organisms weren't conscious of their use of reason, but they followed its laws slavishly. Does that not give reason and logic at least some claim to a higher level of accordance with reality?

At any rate, we have no choice but to use reason. It is the fundamental rule of how our brains work. The most fanatical theist on the planet is a stringent rationalist when he makes change at the grocery store. People who use faith must overcome their reason to do so, not the other way around.

And I don't see that empirical principles are based on circular logic. Ultimately they point to the object observed and the data collected itself, which comes to us through our senses. The empiricist says "it's real because it seems to be real" and stops there.

Lastly, the fact that we cannot arrive at Truth objectively a) presupposes that there is a Truth to arrive at and b) does nothing to mitigate the power of objective thought to deliver useful results. If we tried to use the presupposition of God and faith to build a house, we'd probably kill ourselves in the process.

In practice, in life, we don't need a logical defence for life. Most of us badly want to live. Most of those of us who don't are suffering from some identifiable illness and will regain their will to live if treated. The rare, rare few who are sane and have discovered a rational reason why they should die should be allowed to do so. Pragmatically, they will always be a small minority since once you're dead, you're gone.

Evolution contains a complete explanation for the will to live: those who had it, did, and those who didn't, died. The moral ramifications of living and dying are quite beside the point. 

Yes. But nothing in democracy holds that those interests are "good" in a moral sense, just that they are the only legitimate basis for power.

That would be an appropriate response if there were no outside context for the Nazi party. Of course you and I know that the Nazi party should not exist, based on a shared value judgement that comes from outside. But the only way the Nazi committee could reasonably come to this conclusion is if it also drew from this larger context. It would never makes sense for a Nazi committee to recommend the end of Nazis given only Nazi principles.

I'm saying the analogy is flawed because the Nazi party is not the same as an individual or existence itself. It can be terminated and some outside frame of reference remains from which to at least confirm that the termination happened. If a person answers the question "should I exist?" in the negative, they are assigning a null value to the sum total of their existence, since we only experience things through our sense of self. The very context in which the question is answered is taken away. The problem is only magnified when it's expanded to the universe as a whole.

People can and do draw from contexts outside themselves to justify their own non-existence, and if they die in a cause we can agree with, are lauded for it. Luckily, I guess, there are rarely good reasons to die. 

And I guess that interpretation depends on how serious you consider Original Sin to be. 

I agree. But this doesn't mean we should reify our thoughts into the universe itself. 2+2=4 isn't floating around out there - it's the consistent conclusion that our brains arrive at when we attempt to make sense of our environment. There is no ontology for these abstractions. Relativistic effects existed just fine long before they were discovered. And for every theory of relativity, there were 100 theories of the Ether and the like that held logically but did not meet the test of experiment. This is why we must always refer to some empirical observation, evidence, before we can confirm a correct link between our thoughts and reality.

1. I should not exist.

2. Anything that I do is a consquence of my existence.

3. I hold that that 1. is true.

If 3. is true, then 1. and 2. require that 3. should not be true. Perhaps it's not self-refuting, but it should not be true to the exact extent that 1. is true. Therefore an individual can't reasonably hold the position that they should not exist. 

But the whole idea of "ought" is that there is a moral position that stands outside the universe. I locate "ought" in our heads where it belongs - a consequence of the basic fundamentals of reason (and emotion, and intuition) which we have drawn from our long association with the universe itself. Therefore talking about "ought" is pointless without reference to what "is," since "is" generates "ought" and not the other way around.

Unless, of course, you take God as an a priori to everything, in which case we have to ask if that theory really reflects the facts we see. 

Of course. But not that there is any moral value in the parts of the universe that stand outside ourselves.

No, I'm pointing to the standard of evidence that you and every single sentient entity on earth uses. I'm asking that you and other theists apply the same standard you use when evaluating a car salesman's claims. And, I'll say it again, there are not many different ways to interpret raw evidence and stay within the bounds of reason.

I know you feel free to discard the concept of evidence because you've rejected Ockam's Razor. But I don't think you know what a big part of your own rational processes you've thrown out. When you wake up in the morning and feel hungry, do you compile a long list of ever-more fantastic theories for where you might find something to eat and start to investigate each, or do you just head for the kitchen because that's where you found food before?  

My grounds for evidence for God are simple: show me some empirical phenomenon for which the simplest explanation is God. I'm not being unfair. I'm not asking theists to do anything that I wouldn't feel bound to do myself when I make a claim that something exists.

This thing about not being able to know something unless you know everything is silly, Flats, and below you. We Know nothing, in the absolute sense. We might all be in the Matrix. Our only choice, besides laying down and dying is to pragmatically accept our sensory input and build an edifice of knowledge on it.  

No. Using faith as a source of belief does not "work" unless you apply it only to things that can never be tested naturalistically. Let's say I want to use faith to decide what I'm going to eat today. I know, I'll generate the faithful belief that I'm having chicken. There, now I hold it on principle that lunch today will be chicken, and my entire being is invested in this glorious fact.

Oops. I went upstairs and there was no chicken in the fridge. But I cannot change my belief in what I'm having for lunch - that would be losing faith! What to do...

I know! I'll form a new belief that I had chicken for lunch! Phew, that was a real epistemological crisis there. What a yummy chicken sandwich for lunch. Wonder why I'm still so hungry.

No, the fundamental precedents of reason, cause -> effect, observation -> theory...those did precede emotion and intuition and gave rise to them. Emotions are just pre-programmed reactions that  allow us to act without thinking. They are like a macro in your word processor that automatically corrects a misspelled word without you having to go back and check it. They have a very real function in our behaviours that has given us a cold, hard, rational, evolutionary advantage - otherwise we wouldn't have them.

When we use emotion and intuition to make naturalistic conclusions, we merely subscribe to anthropomorphism and error, because we are using tools that were never meant for this purpose. I guess that's my complaint about the "should we exist" question: we are applying moralistic, emotional, intuitive terms and frames of reference to something that is a bald empirical fact: we exist, and if we don't exist we don't.

All this is not to say that we don't refer to our emotions and intuitions when deciding moral questions. That would be irrational, since we have ample empirical evidence that emotions and intuitions exist. But I think they should be given their proper weight: pointers to our internal mental states and nothing else.

Only if you assign yourself the task of seeing through the Matrix and insisting on an arbitrary and fake level of certainty in your deliberations. You are right, there is an infinite regression problem - for people who claim there is an Ultimate Truth to know. The empiricist sidesteps this problem by confining himself to the evidence of his senses and using those mental tools that seem to work. he is unconcerned with the fact that he is almost certainly wrong about everything, and content in the knowledge that everyone who claims to know better is, too.

But why subscribe to a presupposition that has no explanatory value? If God is merely the moral imperative hiding behind all things, why not simply locate that moral imperative where it seems, empirically, to reside (in our heads) and go forward? What is the sense of applying God to an rock or a star? These things are, to all appearance, perfectly outside our moral context. Can't we just call God what he is: our desire for security and meaning in the universe?  

But it must! It is real! It doesn't matter how much we want the universe to conform to our expectations, we must observe and understand that it does not. How does attaching a moral parable to the murder and rape of a daughter change the fact of what has happened? It is an emotional sop, a retreat from reality and nothing less.

They have observed explosions in space, probably from colliding black holes, that produce gamma ray bursts so powerful that they can affect our atmosphere from twenty light years away. If one occured anywhere in our vicinity, it would be lights out for the entire solar system - painlessly, instantaneously, total obliteration. We have no way of knowing when or where one of these events could occur, but we know they are fairly common. This means that at any instant, the earth could cease to exist. Pointlessly, irrelevantly wiped away with all its history amounting to nothing more than a subatomic blip. 

Can you really hold that any of our moral values have larger relevance in a universe where such a thing is possible?

I think the question of should we exist is the most useless intellectual wank imaginable. We should just get about feeling lucky that we do.

I guess that makes me a wanker, considering the amoung of time I've spent responding!!  LOL!!! 

I have a houseful of inlaws, Flats...I'll try to get time to respond Monday.

In laws, eh Tilberian???  Yikes!  Haha… Good luck with that!

OK, so it looks like my mission here is to defend empiricism as being a necessary (rather than arbitrary) component of rationality.

First of all, I would say that this is true only when making conclusions about the natural world. Metaphysics deals with constructing a philosphical framework for the universe, and therefore only needs to hang together logically since the only place where metaphysics is "real" is inside our heads. Discussions of the supernatural likewise don't resort to evidence, since the whole paradigm of "supernaturalism" is incoherent and doesn't conform to rationality, much less empiricism. 

The question "does God exist" is, however, such a naturalistic question as long as by "exist" we mean in this universe and is he real in the same sense as other things that we consider real.

A rational conclusion must conform to logic, and logic gives us the law of identity in that once a thing is deemed to be something, it is considered to be that thing. For instance a chair is a chair and not also not a chair. This is how we construct the category of "chair." But we have not, yet, referred to any natural object. In fact, it is perfectly common to construct categories that don't refer to any natural object. There is no such thing as a square, for instance.

Now we move to wanting to describe natural objects. But on what basis will we attach identity to an object outside ourselves? If we admit non-empirical means, then one person could look at an object and place it in the category "chair" and another could look at it and place it in the category "telephone." We know we have a logical violation, since the same object cannot be both a chair and a telephone. 

Now what? We could throw up our hands and declare that the object has no reality outside our minds, and that it is a chair to the first person and a telephone to the other person and both are valid and everyone should learn to live together. But the purpose of rationality is give everyone a common standard for determining truth, and thereby admit the possibility of discourse. If our shared reality admits logical violations in which one object can have two identities, then either our logical rules must change or we must admit that reason is a useless waste of time. 

But our purpose here is to determine whether empiricism is needed in our present model of rationality, so solutions involving rewriting the law of identity or rejecting rationality altogether would seem to be failures.

The only way we know of to arrive at a common identity for a natural object is to agree on a theory of "chair" that breaks down the idea of chair into fundamental concepts, then to compare the sense data each observer collects from the disputed object to our theorectical model. We call it empirical observation and we know of no other way to establish the identity of natural objects and to hold that identity as a rational fact. Therefore, empiricism is necessary to rationality when describing objects in this universe.

The empiricist position only becomes circular if he claims to be discovering the Ultimate Truth through his observations (ie seeing through the Matrix). But there is no need for the empiricist to make that claim, in fact, to stay true to his principles, the empiricist would merely note that he has no evidence of any larger Truth to be discovered. The empiricist's only claim to superior method is that his method is in coherent agreement with reason and logic, as I've demonstrated above, and that, when using this method the empiricist continues to exist and can therefore claim to have established some level of control over his environment.

Belief in God is not necessary to the operation of reason in making conclusions about the natural world - the use of empirical observation is. So empiricism and God are not on the same footing in terms of rationally justified belief. Belief in God is subsequent to and dependant on rational thought, and therefore should be subject to examination under the basic tenets of rational thought, like empiricism.

God comes in handy if you want to say that you know something about Truth, that is, the Big Truth that (purportedly) lies behind the curtain that we can't penetrate with our senses. But when I apply reason, and the Razor, to this theory of a Big Truth I hit the following problems:

1. If reason and our senses can reveal Truth, then empirical observation should suffice. If they can't, then theists have no more way of knowing Truth than I have, and God is not distinguishable from pure fantasy.

2. I have a coherent worldview that works in all circumstances using only reason and empiricism. A larger Truth is an unnecessary added element, and therefore Razored out of my theory.

3. Since the use of my reason requires empiricism before I ever get to the point of theorizing about larger Truths, I would first employ my rational, empirical principle and look for evidence for such a Truth before I admit of it. Seeing none, the only reasonable approach would be to discard the theory.

I think I've shown that empiricism is connected to the very foundations of reasoned discourse. Any attempt to discover meaning through rational means will rely on it. 

Belief in God (as an real entity in the natural world) can only be held on an irrational basis because our only tool of identification - empirical observation - has yeilded no data. Natural phenomena always have a better explanation through science - always. 

Belief in God and belief in the findings of science do NOT rest on the same rational plane. Theories that rest on empirical evidence are superior because they are in coherent alignment with reason. A theist cannot get to God without almost immediately abandoning the same central tenets of reason that he uses and finds indispensible in his everyday life. It is far easier to believe in your toaster than in the supposed omnipotent creator of the universe.

There are probably reasoned arguments for the existence of God in metaphysics. There are also reasoned arguments against the existence of God. But metaphysics, floating free from any need to associate its conclusions to the real world, demonstrates the need for rationality and reference to evidence in this one. The metaphysical wrangles will probably go on for all time, unsolved, as there are nothing but different configurations of human brain tissue informing them. We can't afford that sort of deadlock in this world. Pragmatically, we need reason in order to allow discourse, discovery and action. If we wish our actions to be informed by the real world and to be effective in the real world, we need to tie our beliefs to the real world through evidence.

So many of us atheists think that the world would quite literally be a better place if our beliefs were aligned with reality all the way down to their fundamental beginnings. That's why there can be some passion and rhetoric and intermperant talk on this site.   

So our knowledge starts with our language and reason, and from that we can infer what conditions are necessary for language and reason, and the result would be reality.
(something I should note is that I haven't fully studied linguistic philosophy in detail, but think that it will have some important results when I do)

It's basically recognising reason as the linguistic activity that it is.