It's about high time we have a no holds barred, all-out verbal brawl on the determinism issue.  I've spent many hours on other forums, a barrel full of philosophical angst, and thousands of words on this issue.

 I began a determinist, and converted to a free-willist, then settled on compatibilism.

 All philosophy comes down to questions.

 The question here:

Are your actions  derived from free choices, or are they merely the result of a neverending chain of causes that are outside your control (determinism)?

 Jake and I debated this issue in the chatroom, but I think the forums will yield some good discussion.

To cut it short and summarize...

 I am a compatibilist.  By this, I mean that there are 2 "orders" of freedom.  The "orders" are my own way of explaining compatibilism.  Compatibilism is not a term that I came up with, but explaining with "orders" is my own invention.

 So the first order is the "ability" to make a choice.  By this, I mean that an action is either a possible choice or an impossible choice.

The second order deals with motivations behind an act.  These are almost always determined.  In fact, I cannot think of ANY possible scenario in which the motivation behind someone's action does not have some explanation that can be derived from prior events or causes.

So in this way, I say that we have many choices that are "possible" to make, and in that way, we have free will.  On the other hand, all of our choices are based on some kind of reasoning dependent on other influences or causes.  In this way, our choices are determined.

For this reason, our choices can be seen as both free AND determined.

 It is a mistake of language and semantics to assume that it is one or the other.  Furthermore, I would contend that the angst and debate on this question derive from misunderstanding of the issue.  Clearly define your terms, THEN debate it.  We're going to have to clearly define both free will and determinism in order to debate.  The surprising thing is that free willists and determinists define terms differently, but would essentially agree to the deductive conclusions made from such definitions.

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 Examples:

1.  Should I choose a pastrami sandwich or a turkey club?

On the first order, you clearly have two choices.  You are ABLE to choose pastrami or turkey.  Those are possible choices.

On the second order, you may have a clear preference to choose pastrami because it tastes better to you.  BUT, you could STILL choose turkey just to rebel against your preference.  But even then, your choice to choose turkey would be based on a desire to rebel against determinism and your programmed preferences.  In this way, second order determinism is inescapably the result of prior causes.

2.  Can I choose to believe in God?

On the first order, you do not have any choice.  This is once again a problem of language.  What does belief even mean?  I define belief as a mental state, not as a choice.  In this way, I equate a belief to something like an emotion.  It is not possible for you to choose to be happy or sad.  Rather, it is possible for you to take actions to influence whether you are happy or sad.  You take actions, and happiness or sadness follows from those actions.  To be honest, I sometimes feel like I need to watch an emotional movie sometimes "just to feel alive".  I intentionally induce sadness just to bring myself closer to humanity.

In the same way, one can choose to study atheist literature, think about theism, and discuss with atheists.  The change from theism to atheism is an internal process that is not the result of an instantaneous choice.  In this way, there are many "choices" that cannot be made through a single act of volition, but only certain actions that may "affect" the state or consequences that you intend.  Think very carefully about this principle.  I think you will find that this process occurs for many of our supposed "choices".  The government institutes policies to "affect" problems -- such as bringing down crime rates.  The government cannot choose to decrease crime as though it were an instantaneous choice.  How ridiculous would it be if George Bush said, "I choose to end terrorism," and mean that by his sheer will, terrorist actions will simply stop?  This is the same thing as "willing" yourself to change beliefs.

On the second order, changing your beliefs is based on desires and prior influence.  This is why the rational response squad is so important.  Our ultimate goal is to foster a desire in people to "think for themselves" even if they provide arguments that defeat us.  Most of us agree, if we are posed with sufficient evidence, we will change our beliefs.  In this way, our goal is reason and debate; not mass conversion to atheism that is based on blind faith.  Atheism is an end result of a thought process that is not coerced.  In addition, we try to spur theists to READ, READ, and READ some more.  They need to think about these hard questions.  So on the second order of free will, that is, desires, we can truly influence someones desire to study in order to bring about the EFFECT of atheist belief, but we cannot ever simply tell someone that they need to "choose" atheist belief.

3.  Can I choose to run if a criminal has a gun pointed to my head and tells me not to run?

On the first order, it is a possible action to run.  Yes, I will die.  But the fact that I am physically able to run means I have free will to do so.

On the second order, it is brutally obvious that I have a strong desire to live.  For that reason, we can predict with almost 100% certainty that I will not run.  Yes, my decision not to run is "determined" in this context.  Notice how I use quotations there.  The reason I do so is because I am referencing only the "second order" determinism definition.  Second order determinism means that factors, causes, and influences are the basis of all actions.  Who would disagree with that?  By first order "determinism," remember, I mean only the physical possiblity to do something. 

4.  Can I choose to be the greatest basketball player of all time?

On the first order, it is impossible.  This is not a possible choice for me in any way.  I am uncoordinated, I suck at sports, I'm only 6' 3", and even if I worked every day of my life to be the best basketball player ever, it will never happen.  Period, end of story.  You will also notice the subjective nature of the question.  What constitutes the greatest basketball player of all time?  I could define this in such a way as to be attainable.

On the second order of desires, I may have been influenced by a basketball coach father to be a great basketball player.  I might watch sports all the time and truly want to be a sports hero.  So what?  Desires don't ensure effects.

And this final example is crucial to any of you who are going to truly advocate determinism and "social conditioning."

Because NUMEROUS desires cannot be satiated or realized, you have a severe problem with hardline, rigid mechanical determinism.  If everything were determined, ALL of our desires would and could be realized.  All of the people trying to affect us in a certain way would succeed.  This is not the case.  You have all sorts of factors trying to influence a person, but at the core of a human being, it is impossible to predict someone's actions.

For determinism to be true, you would have to claim that an omniscient being with perfect knowledge could predict with perfect accuracy every action by every human before they are even born.  Do you truly believe this?  And do you think it's a valid question?

 In essense, you must concede that there are these two orders of free will.  Because all desires and "influencers" cannot effectively succeed in bringing about IMPOSSIBLE actions by an individual, you must concede that the existence of "POSSIBLE actions" is an important part of understanding determinism.  And if we have an array of possible actions, we have free will to choose some of those possible actions.  EVEN IF our possible actions are "determined" by a complex array of factors; the existence of possible actions PROVES that some "order" of free will exists.

To reiterate:

Free will is compatible with determinism because:

1.  "First order determinism" is defined as the physical possibility to do something or have an array of physically possible options.  In this context, we have free will amongst many options.

2.  "Second order determinism" is defined as actions that are influenced by prior causes or factors.  Virtually no action that I can think of escapes this definition of determinism.  There are degrees of "probability" that one will choose certain actions based on their desires and past experiences.  But I am skeptical, dear friends, that an omniscient being would have the ability to predict actions of individuals years in advance even with perfect knowledge.

Thus, I hold to "compatibilism".