I'd say that if the universe can be proven to be entirely determinist, then no. If, even at the level of quanta and particle-antiparticle pair creation and self-annihilation, we can prove that all things occur only because prior conditions force them to occur, then there is no room for free will. At that point, we are merely expressions of aggregate stimulus-response conditions overlaid on complex electrochemical cascades.

If, on the other hand, as deeply as mankind can ever go, there remains a level of causality we cannot nail down, the door remains open.

Regardless, however, of the 'truth' of free will v no free will, as I have said in PDW's thread, when we make (or think we make) decisions, we must do so under the premise that we have free will, or else we completely abdicate the concept of individual responsibility (which, after all, is one of the factors in the stimulus-response aggregations), and embrace nihilistic fatalism, which will rapidly lead to a complete breakdown of the Social Contract.

In other words, if there is free will, then we're well-served not denying it. If there is no free will, then the consequences of acknowledging that will likely preclude such acknowledgment, purely as a defense mechanism. And, if there is no free will, and no such defense mechanism exists, eventually we'll acknowledge it and kill one another, but that's ok, because we won't have the choice. So, in closing: Choose to act under the premise that you have Free Will for as long as you can. Because once you can't, well, you didn't have a choice in the matter anyway.

This depends on how you define free will. The incompatibilist would say "no" because he defines free will as the ability, given the same situation and circumstance, to choose otherwise. On the other hand, the compatibilist says "yes" because he defines free will as the freedom to fulfil one's desires or intentions without external interference. 

I can present a fairly simple example to demonstrate how libertarian free will or indeterminism can coexist with determinism.

Most computer languages have some kind of built-in random function. The following presents a statement coded in a Perl program in which a built-in function will randomly "choose" a number between 1 and 10 and assign it to a designated variable:

$PickANumber = int(rand(10)) + 1;

Each time the program runs, all the statements in the program will be executed in a completely deterministic fashion. However, each time the foregoing statement is executed, it will "pick" a number that is (at least in theory) completely random.

There is one glitch here. The above function is not really random. The number that is actually chosen is based on the internal clock time of the computer. That is, whenever the program runs, then whatever number is in the "thousandths of second place" will be used. However, for all intents and practical purposes, the function is random even though in reality it is completely predetermined.

But if this were truly a random function, then the number that was "chosen" would have been selected without any physical cause.

It must also be stated that the prevailing scientific evidence suggests that the world is fundamentally indeterminate based on quantum mechanics. Furthermore, prominent physicists have proposed quantum mind theories to make a compelling case for libertarian free will.

Incidentally, there may be a "third option." Time is relative (according to the theory of relativity). That being the case, causality would be relative too. It all depends upon your frame of reference.

A "premise" is a belief or presupposition.

I'm glad to see you acknowledge that you must operate upon beliefs. This is progress. However, you have just stated that "free will" must be taken as a basic presupposition. This is making an argument for the existence of a soul. I would say that this is very strange for someone who professes to be an "agnostic atheist."

Perhaps when you say it, but obviously (see Paisley's response) not in all cases.

At first read, I seemed to agree with your first reply Paisley. But this bugs me,

"The problem is that [it] undermines the worldview of atheistic materialism." P

   Atheist = not Theist - Materialism = All Reality     So how does that P quote make any sense ?  Help a dumb guy , me ....         I can barely fly ! Set me free !

   ((((  "third option" , the middle say the buddhists ....

   BMcD , you is very kind .....

   Eloise, can you briefly summarize that ? I will read and try .... maybe, ((( it's my choice?!!  Ain't it  ?     

Our decision making language is different to the language of describing the world.
When being taught to describe the world, we were taught to point at objects or pictures and use a word to name them, to refer to them in conversation.
That's very different to how we learned our language to decision making.
Instead we'd convey 'intentions' to a person in a way to communicate and make sense of behaviours.
We learned to predict what a person would do based on how they explained their 'intention'.
So decision making concepts are concepts of prediction.

Our descriptive language refers to physical objects that follow the deterministic rules of physics.
This is why decriptions of the events of the physical world are deterministic.
When it comes to our concepts of decision making like 'will' and 'desire', we aren't referring to physical 'things' so these same rules don't apply.
Instead, the rules are rooted in their predictive use.
When we say some desires something, this means they have a disposition to a certain sort of behaviour.
This behaviour is quite probable then. But 'desire' is predictive rather than absolute, so while it makes a behaviour 'probable', it is never certain.
So when we apply the concept 'desire', that does not determine what behaviour is to follow.
So there is potential for spontenaeity, because applications of our choice langauge deal with probabilities and likelyhoods rather than determinations.
 

Why not?
Buddhism was all about a practical guide for a personal guide to enlightenment.
Granted, lots of Buddhist traditions have involved supernatural beliefs, but the core of it was a practical approach to life and separate from any metaphysical worldviews.

Paisley, I'm not asking this flippantly.  Do you actually read the posts, or do you just skim until you see a word you recognize from church and then run with it?

First, determinism is not linked in any way to atheism.  One may hold to any philosophy one desires and be an atheist, so long as the question, "Do you believe in god?" is answered with a "no."

Second, even if one holds to determinism, we still have the local perception of choice.  In other words, without being aware of events at a cellular or atomic or quantum level that are making my choice inevitable, I still perceive, and therefore experience, what can only be described as a choice.

Third, it is not the determinist, but the theist, who cannot properly define free will.  The very idea of "choosing" to believe in a deity falls prey to the same deterministic paradox.  If God knows what we will do, then god has predetermined our course, and so we have no free will.

You can't have it both ways.  If God is omnipotent and/or omniscient, then there is no free will in the theist mindset.  If there is free will in the theist mindset, then you cannot use the same criteria to prove that there is not free will in an atheist mindset (sic!).

So, which is it?  Is God omniscient?  That's a yes or no question.

Who cares, enjoy the ride, etc etc.

Strong Supervenience
If entity x has mental property M then it also has physical property P where all entities with physical property P therefore have mental property M.
(E.g. If x has mental property Desire then it also has physical property BrainState1 so all entities with BrainState1 also have mental property Desire.)

Global Supervenience
Any two worlds with the same physical properties will therefore have the same mental properties.
(E.g. If there was a duplicate of this universe with the exact same physical events, it wouldn't make sense to ascribe differing mental properties too)

Global supervenience is sometimes called 'weak' supervenience.
Both are physicalist positions.
Strong supervenience declares that the physical properties necessary for mentality can be isolated.
Global supervenience claims that mental properties can only be ascribed within the context of the whole world, rather than isolated to particular physical properties.

The externalist position claims that some of the content of the mind is not determined by what the person themselves know.
That is, we can have "Jim believes proposition X" where X contains information that Jim doesn't know about.
A simple example that you might not find convincing is as follows:
"Jim believes the chair that jeniffer sat in is broken."
This is a true belief as Jim believes a chair is broken and it is the one that Jennifer sat in.
However, he doesn't know that Jennifer sat in it so the content of his belief contains information that he doesn't know about.
A major problem for the identification of desires and beliefs with brain states is the difficulty with reducing mental content, i.e. propositions, into brain states.
This shows that the way that we apply statements about belief and desire and other intentional states are not contained within the person's own knowledge so cannot be reducible to a state of the brain.
There have been attempts to get around this, saying that the brain state contains enough information to 'point' to the mental content.
(i.e. the brain contains 'narrow content' that is enough to point to the 'wide content' out there, but I don't think this kind of explanation has worked yet)

Putnam used the classic "Twin Earth" example.
He imagined there being a twin earth - exactly the same as ours except rather having Water that is H20 it's actually T-water which is XYZ
It looks, behaves and tastes like water and they even call it water.
Imagine both Earth and Twin Earth are set in the times of Ancient Greece before they discovered the molecular structure of water.
Socrates and Twin Socrates are both drinking what they call water.
Socrates knows he is drinking Water. Twin Socrates knows he is drinking Twin Water.
The belief in each case is different but both are having the exact same experience and have the exact same information in their brains.

My favourite example is the Frog.
The Frog's perception isn't advanced enough to pick out the details of a fast moving fly - it just sees a 'dot' appear that it reacts too.
If a fly zips past a frog and the frog sticks out its tongue then would say that the frog saw that fly.
If a wasp zips past the frog in the same way, and in the same way the frog sticks out his tongue then we'd say that the frog saw the wasp.
In each case, the frog's experience was exactly the same - just a dot blipping by.
However, in each case the intentional state we ascribe points to the actual insect it perceived rather than be based purely on the frog's perception.
Once again, it tells us about how we are inclined to apply intentional states, giving us clues to how this language game functions.
This externalism of content supports a non-reductionist view of mental states, one that doesn't quite fit the theory you have in mind.

Materialism itself is a metaphysical worldview. Buddhism can properly be identified in philosophical terms as idealism, panpsychism, or neutral monism. However, it is definitely not compatible with atheistic materialism.

The key word here is "spiritual." A spiritual worldview is not compatible with a materialistic one. By the way, you do know that Tibetan Buddhists believe that the Dalai Lama is a reincarnation of a Bodhisattva (i.e. an enlightened spiritual being)? Right?

How can I take a member of this forum seriously when he identifies himself as a kitty cat wearing a badge and carrying an uzi machine gun?

Agreed. However, you must subscribe to determinism, indeterminism, niether or both. If there is another option, then I'm not familiar with it.

Whenever I encounter a professing atheist who makes the argument that "atheism is simply the disbelief in God," then I know this atheist is vainly attempting to hide under a negative definition in order to safeguard his beliefs from public scrutiny. If you want to engage in a public debate or discussion, then I'm afraid you will have to take a position. Fair play demands this much.

Translation: "I believe that I have free will because it appears to be self-evident." If your first-person experience is providing you with evidence that you have free will, then how do you account for it based on your worldview of atheistic materialism?

This is not a problem with the definition of free will per se. Free will (i.e. libertarian free will) can simply be defined as the ability of an agent to choose otherwise if the same past situation and circumstance were to be replayed. That being said, your argument does not logically follow. Who says that God knows what free agents will do? I can assure you that there are many in the evangelical community and philosophical theologians who believe that God does not. This viewpoint is called "open theism."

Yes, I can. Regardless of the position the atheist takes concerning the "determnism vs. indeterminism" debate, I win.

If you subscribe to determinism, then as you have just stated there is no free will. Why? Because every act an individual performs, every thought he entertains, and every belief he cherishes are completely predetermined and could not have been otherwise. What he calls "will" is simply an extension of infinite causality. And since inifinite causality must ultimately be the determininer of all intentional acts, then only infinite causality can be ascribed with the banner of "will" or "intelligent agent." Of course, the term that is properly applied to this universal will or intelligent agent is "God."

If you subscribe to indeterminism, then you have the burden of explaning how physical events are uncaused and unbidden. I would think this would be problematic for the worldview of atheistic materialism.

At any rate, the prevailing scientific evidence based on quantum mechanics suggests that the world is fundamentally indeterminate. Moreover, prominent physicists have provided compelling quantum mind theories in which quantum indeterminacy is employed to account for free will.

That is an AK-47, at least it looks like it, an Uzi is short barreled and has the clip behind the trigger not in front of it.

Afraid he's got you there, Paisley. It's definitely a Kalashnikov-derived rifle.

The Stanford Encyclopedia will probably explain Externalism better than I can!

Paisley, I have noticed that your main tactic for debating me is ignoring everything I say.  Would you mind responding to the following statement, please?

The discussion of determinism is irrelevant to either theism or atheism because the sentience of the agent of determinism is irrelevant to the question of whether the universe is deterministic.

On a lesser note I would like to say hi to strafio and topher. (you two may know me from map as blind.)

You know, Paisley, I find it odd... and somewhat telling... that you can't even acknowledge your error on the completely trivial issue of whether Hamby's avatar is wielding an uzi (submachinegun, short barrel, in-line foregrip and magazine in the pistolgrip) or a kalashnikov/AK (assault rifle or carbine, classic banana-shaped forward magazine, rifle stock, 135-degree angled stabilizer above the barrel). I mean, yeah, it's trivial bullshit, but a simple 'whups, my bad', maybe with a joke tossed in, would go a long way toward re-humanizing your forum presence and showing you to be more than a simple rabid adversary.

And I'm not saying this to get on your case. Really, I'm not. It just strikes me as odd that the simplest little human gestures that we'd make without hesitation when talking face to face can get so casually thrown aside when discussing issues in text... and that casual disregard for the things that reinforce social commonality is so often a part of what turns 'discussion' into 'argument'.

Just something to think about.

Okay, I stand corrected. Let me rephrase....

"How can I take a member of this forum seriously when he identifies himself as a kitty cat wearing a badge and carrying an AK-47 machine gun?"

I have already responded. It is relevant because the subject matter of this particular thread should be related to the subject of the forum which is entitled "Atheist vs. Theist."

I said that I did respond to each of his arguments as is made evident in post # 28 of this thread. Perhaps, you should get your facts straight instead of making off-the-cuff comments.

I have already responded thoroughly to this in post #28. Both determinism and indeterminism imply some kind of theistic-belief. I suggest that you make an honest effort and actually read my post before you comment.

By this logic, an atheist also has a position on vacuum fluctuation as the precursor to the Big Bang.  Disbelief in god requires nothing but disbelief in god.  In fact, all it really needs is never hearing about god.  Are you suggesting that people who have never been exposed to the idea of a god have all formed philosophical positions regarding determinism?  That's borderline insane for you to suggest.  The question of determinism is a complicated philosophical question that involves advanced physics and mathematics.  Demanding that atheism (a simple "gut feeling" answer for many people) be tied to it is disingenuous at best, and hypocritical at worst.

Very simply.  I do not function on a subatomic level.  Though I am a conglomerate of subatomic particles, I am more than that.  I am a sentient trillion celled organism whose direct perception judges time to be linear and space to be three dimensional.  I can only perceive a limited number of events, and though my brain has cataloged millions, or maybe billions of bits of information, I cannot consciously process all of them at any given time.  Because I am unaware of the chemical processes dictated by my neurons, I do not perceive my actions as predetermined.  Instead, I am forced, by nature of my own existence, to perform the mental process commonly called choice, in which I spend time weighing alternatives before I reach a conclusion that was previously unknown to me.

Again, it is an error of composition.  To assert that the whole operates under the same parameters as the parts is a logical fallacy.

Define "choose."  Prove libertarian free will exists. 

Theists.

Right.  And they fall victim to the same quandary.  If god is not omniscient or omnipotent, then his actions must be in accord with the rest of the universe... i.e. they are determined by his existence.  You do know that omniscience and omnipotent are interdependent, right?

You didn't explain your position.  You just went right back to attacking atheism.  Explain how determinism is defeated if god is omniscient.

It depends on what your definition of free will is.  Furthermore, I've already explained numerous times that it is an error of composition to demand that the whole act like the parts.  Again, limited knowledge creates the perception of free will, which is for all intents and purposes, the same as free will when it is impossible to interact on the level of determination.

So what the fuck is the problem?  If the universe is fundamentally indeterminate, then determinism fails.  Why are you making us go through this ridiculous exercise?  None of this addresses my point, which you have most definitely not addressed.  The theist can no more reconcile an omniscient god with free will than an atheist who believes in a determinist universe.  If god is not omniscient, then he is not all powerful, and must be part of a larger set of laws, which is to say that its existence is bound by the problem of determinism.