Free Will and Determinism
Offline In discussing Paisley's criticism of the term "freethinker," (http://www.rationalresponders.com/forum/13976) the question of how free will is affected by determinism has come up multiple times. Rather than further complicate the existing thread, I've deemed it better to create a new one.
Is it possible to have free will in a deterministic universe?
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Offline Ignore Paisley when he's talking about free will. He has many dogmatic views about atheists that he refuses to change and this is one of them.
Zen-atheist wielding Occam's katana.
Jesus said, "Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division." - Luke 12:51
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Firstly you're redefining the meaning of the word 'mind'.
This is how I've always defined mind.
Anyway, haven't you said before that you agree with eliminativism when it comes to the brain?That the only place for mental concepts is on the 'abstract level'?
In a sense, yes. Although as far as I'm aware eliminativists propose removing the entire concept, even from an abstract level. I think there is purpose for it at that level.
It's this 'abstract level' where the mind has it's definition.
If may be where we define mind, but it isn't what we define as mind. I think there is a difference.
Who talks about the mind without evoking one of these 'abstract' concepts?
I think the mind is the brain and that these abstract concepts are simply a manifestation of the totality of the brain processes. They are how we talk about the mind on a social, linguistic level, but that level is not the mind itself.
I think we can look at the mind at the level of the physical brain, for example, to study how they arise; how the brain can produce something like consciousness, etc.
It still stands that cause is a relation between physical events.i.e. you go back to reducing the mind to a physical 'thing'.
Right. I do think the mind is a physical thing; the processes/caacity of the brain.
I don't think the abstract concepts (what you call mind) is the mind it self. I think they are merely how we talk about the mind in a social context.
You can still change this by ammending your concept of cause, the same way I do to allow 'abstract concepts' such as decisions to cause physical events.
These abstractions are not physical. They are not casual. How does something non-physical cause physical events?
Decision making takes place at a physical level before we are consciously aware of the decision.
The thing is, the scenario isn't experimenting how we'd apply language if we were also a resident of Twin Earth.The experiment is to show how we, the observer/narrator in this imaginary scene, naturally apply our language of mind.
Who cares what we think. Putnam's question is that when Oscar and Twin Oscar say 'water' do they mean the same thing? It isn't asking what we think, it is asking what the characters think. And yes, they do mean the same thing since from their perspective there is no difference.
Remember what the claims is: some mental states are based on, and therefore require, external information. Thus, it's claimed, you change the external environment and you change the mental state.
I'm saying that providing the external environment is functionally the same, and that it doesn't interrupt the beliefs and other mental states, it have to be exactly the same. So the environment can be different but not effect beliefs which are based on external information, since they are not based on specific technicalities of the environment, but rather the general appearance and function of the environment.
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
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Offline This is how I've always defined mind.
I mean redefining it from the rest of the world.
We already have a word for brain - it's "brain".
The word "mind" is for something different.
Anyway, haven't you said before that you agree with eliminativism when it comes to the brain?Topher wrote:That the only place for mental concepts is on the 'abstract level'?In a sense, yes. Although as far as I'm aware eliminativists propose removing the entire concept, even from an abstract level. I think there is purpose for it at that level.
Right. So you agree that the concept 'mind' has no purpose in the context of physics but does have a purpose in the context of social interaction.
So perhaps that's a reason to rethinking defining mind as 'brain'?
It's this 'abstract level' where the mind has it's definition.
If may be where we define mind, but it isn't what we define as mind. I think there is a difference.
Where determines whether there even is a 'what'.
Why should mind refer to a physical thing if it's use comes from a language game that doesn't make such referrals?
Sounds a bit ad hoc...
You can still change this by ammending your concept of cause, the same way I do to allow 'abstract concepts' such as decisions to cause physical events.
These abstractions are not physical. They are not casual. How does something non-physical cause physical events?
The nominalogical version of 'cause', the most common version, requires physical events.
However, the minimalist concept of cause is much simpler.
"If A hadn't happened then B hadn't happened"
i.e. If "action" with physical consequences" hadn't happened then mental concept "decision" wouldn't have been applicable
The thing is, the scenario isn't experimenting how we'd apply language if we were also a resident of Twin Earth.The experiment is to show how we, the observer/narrator in this imaginary scene, naturally apply our language of mind.
Who cares what we think.
What we think is what a thought experiement tests. It's the entire point.
The experiment is about how we naturally apply our language of mind to give us results about how we apply our language of mind.Putnam's question is that when Oscar and Twin Oscar say 'water' do they mean the same thing?
No it isn't. Read it again.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/#2
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I mean redefining it from the rest of the world.We already have a word for brain - it's "brain".
The word "mind" is for something different.
The mind is what the brain does, what it produces.
Right. So you agree that the concept 'mind' has no purpose in the context of physics but does have a purpose in the context of social interaction.So perhaps that's a reason to rethinking defining mind as 'brain'?
I never said it doesn't have a purpose in the physical context.
I think there is a purpose at each level. I think there are two ontological levels of mind, one is physical, the other isn't.
No it isn't. Read it again.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/#2
Yes it is. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twin_Earth_thought_experiment
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
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Offline Ignore Paisley when he's talking about free will. He has many dogmatic views about atheists that he refuses to change and this is one of them.
Translation: "I want to be an atheist and still believe that my free will is intact even though I cannot logically account for it."
"Scientists animated by the purpose of proving they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study." - Alfred North Whitehead
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Offline Paisley wrote:At any rate, the prevailing scientific evidence based on quantum mechanics suggests that the world is fundamentally indeterminate. Moreover, prominent physicists have provided compelling quantum mind theories in which quantum indeterminacy is employed to account for free will.So what the fuck is the problem? If the universe is fundamentally indeterminate, then determinism fails. Why are you making us go through this ridiculous exercise? None of this addresses my point, which you have most definitely not addressed. The theist can no more reconcile an omniscient god with free will than an atheist who believes in a determinist universe. If god is not omniscient, then he is not all powerful, and must be part of a larger set of laws, which is to say that its existence is bound by the problem of determinism.
The glaring problem here for the atheist is that if the world is fundamentally indeterminate, then the atheist materialist cannot account for why there are "uncaused" physical events. If determinism is true, then the atheist materialist must admit that all intentional acts are determined by infinite causation. And if all intentional acts are determined by infinite causation, then logic dictates that infinite causation must be an intelligent agent (there's only one intentional act or will) or there is no intelligence in the universe.
From the theistic perspective, if determinism is true, then God is all powerful because God determines everything. If determinism is not true, then God is not all powerful because there are free agents also making determinations. Where's the conflict? The only thing at issue here is a matter of theology - namely, the difference between pantheism and panentheism.
"Scientists animated by the purpose of proving they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study." - Alfred North Whitehead
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Offline The glaring problem here for the atheist is that if the world is fundamentally indeterminate, then the atheist materialist cannot account for why there are "uncaused" physical events. If determinism is true, then the atheist materialist must admit that all intentional acts are determined by infinite causation. And if all intentional acts are determined by infinite causation, then logic dictates that infinite causation must be an intelligent agent (there's only one intentional act or will) or there is no intelligence in the universe.
The definition of "determinism" does not lead so quickly to an intelligent agent. If intelligence (that is, synthetic information processing) is an emergent property of the universe, and not an intrinsic property, there is no need for a God of any sort. You are jumping a huge chasm worthy of Evil Knievel.
Just as life arose from less-orgainized non-living matter, local decreases of entropy (information processing, in this case) merely requires an energy gradient, not some master control program.
"Yes, I seriously believe that consciousness is a product of a natural process. I find that the neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers who proceed from that premise are the ones who are actually making useful contributions to our understanding of the mind." - PZ Myers
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Offline I can present a fairly simple example to demonstrate how libertarian free will or indeterminism can coexist with determinism.
Most computer languages have some kind of built-in random function. The following presents a statement coded in a Perl program in which a built-in function will randomly "choose" a number between 1 and 10 and assign it to a designated variable:
$PickANumber = int(rand(10)) + 1;
Each time the program runs, all the statements in the program will be executed in a completely deterministic fashion. However, each time the foregoing statement is executed, it will "pick" a number that is (at least in theory) completely random.
There is one glitch here. The above function is not really random. The number that is actually chosen is based on the internal clock time of the computer. That is, whenever the program runs, then whatever number is in the "thousandths of second place" will be used. However, for all intents and practical purposes, the function is random even though in reality it is completely predetermined.
That depends on the implementation of /dev/random. For instance, Linux uses other "entropy" as well to randomize the system-level random number generator: input from peripherals, other fairly random things from the system environment.
But if this were truly a random function, then the number that was "chosen" would have been selected without any physical cause.
Yes, but without knowing the implementation details, how could you tell the difference?
That's the key point. So far, QM seems to be disconnected from the things we are able to control. However, we have no clue what the mechanism is, so any speculation on cause is useful only in helping direct study. There are potential chaotic explanations that would leave QM in the realm of the deterministic only in the strictest sense, the same way that /dev/random is deterministic only in the strictest sense. Unless you know the implementation details, it will seem completely random, and therefore indeterminate. A sufficiently chaotic system will appear to be without cause.
This completely ignores the philosophic question of "free will," but as I stated in the other thread, that's a naive question that has no real value or even meaning. We perceive we have free will, and so that perception is how we define free will. We perceive we have intelligence, and so that is how we define intelligence. The question of whether or not we possess either of these traits is irrelevent.
"Yes, I seriously believe that consciousness is a product of a natural process. I find that the neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers who proceed from that premise are the ones who are actually making useful contributions to our understanding of the mind." - PZ Myers
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Offline Paisley wrote:
How can I take a member of this forum seriously when he identifies himself as a kitty cat wearing a badge and carrying an uzi machine gun? ////
Well, how can I, a hard core atheist, take an ancient character we call "Jesus" seriously, who claimed to be god, to then be nailed to a cross ? By the content of the message.
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Offline Paisley wrote:The glaring problem here for the atheist is that if the world is fundamentally indeterminate, then the atheist materialist cannot account for why there are "uncaused" physical events. If determinism is true, then the atheist materialist must admit that all intentional acts are determined by infinite causation. And if all intentional acts are determined by infinite causation, then logic dictates that infinite causation must be an intelligent agent (there's only one intentional act or will) or there is no intelligence in the universe.
The definition of "determinism" does not lead so quickly to an intelligent agent. If intelligence (that is, synthetic information processing) is an emergent property of the universe, and not an intrinsic property, there is no need for a God of any sort. You are jumping a huge chasm worthy of Evil Knievel.
Just as life arose from less-orgainized non-living matter, local decreases of entropy (information processing, in this case) merely requires an energy gradient, not some master control program.
Emergence has nothing to do with this. (Incidentally, emergence, especially "strong emergence," is just a euphemism for "magic." Consciousness does not "magically emerge" from mindless matter.)
Determinism views the universe in mechanical terms. Thus, nature as a whole is apparently viewed as some kind of a self-programming computer. As such, all intentional acts must be predetermined by the "self-programming computer" in order for determinism to hold true. Therefore, we are left with making one of two inferences: Either the universe, in its totality, is an intelligent agent (why? because it is responsible for making all determinations which must include intentional acts) or there is no intelligence in the universe. You can't have it both ways; if you say that the human eyeball was simply the result of natural processes playing themselves out, then you must acknowledge the same for everything else. In other words, the development of a Swiss watch is completely the result of natural processes playing themselves out. Evidently, the Swiss are "blind watchmakers."
"Scientists animated by the purpose of proving they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study." - Alfred North Whitehead
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Offline That depends on the implementation of /dev/random. For instance, Linux uses other "entropy" as well to randomize the system-level random number generator: input from peripherals, other fairly random things from the system environment.
In my example, my program was running on DOS, not Linux. Besides, this is a moot point. The term "fairly random" is meaningless. Either it is random or predetermined. There's no middle-ground here.
Paisley wrote:But if this were truly a random function, then the number that was "chosen" would have been selected without any physical cause.Yes, but without knowing the implementation details, how could you tell the difference?
Free will may be completely illusory. However, until proven otherwise, we are forced to accept our first-person evidence that it is (at least the so-called rational atheist is...remember, you are not allowed the luxury to deny the evidence).
That's the key point. So far, QM seems to be disconnected from the things we are able to control. However, we have no clue what the mechanism is, so any speculation on cause is useful only in helping direct study. There are potential chaotic explanations that would leave QM in the realm of the deterministic only in the strictest sense, the same way that /dev/random is deterministic only in the strictest sense. Unless you know the implementation details, it will seem completely random, and therefore indeterminate. A sufficiently chaotic system will appear to be without cause.
QM emphatically supports quantum indeterminacy. Until quantum theory is falsified, you will have to accept the evidence. If not, then you have no basis to profess that you have a "scientific worldview." You can't have it both ways. If you insist that science is the only avenue of inquiry and knowledge, then intellectual honesty demands that you acknowledge that the present scientific evidence suggests that materialism is invalid.
This completely ignores the philosophic question of "free will," but as I stated in the other thread, that's a naive question that has no real value or even meaning. We perceive we have free will, and so that perception is how we define free will. We perceive we have intelligence, and so that is how we define intelligence. The question of whether or not we possess either of these traits is irrelevent.
What kind of senseless drivel is this?
Science is ultimately based on what we perceive. If we perceive that we have "free will," then we have evidence that we have free will. As such, you must accept that you have free will until it is proven otherwise.
Your duplicity on this matter speaks volumes about your intellectual honesty. This endless ranting by atheists that there is no evidence for the existence of the soul or for spirit is patently false. There most certainly is.
"Scientists animated by the purpose of proving they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study." - Alfred North Whitehead
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WOW ! 
Do I really have a choice in this matter?
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I suppose I should've clarified how I am referring to mind as I think it's the roots of our disagreement.
In once sense I agree that there is a parallel connection, in another sense I think there is a casual connection.
To me, the mind is nothing more than the processes or capacity of the brain, thus anything that happen within that capacity, or any process that takes place within the brain will be obviously physical. In this sense, the mind is physical and merely what the brain does, the processes.
At an abstract level (i.e. at the self aware, linguistic, social level; how we 'use' or 'apply' mental states) they can be seen as be purely language based, unrelated to anything physical. And there is a parallel connection between this and what the brain does.
I suspect you call the mind is what I refer to as the abstract level described above. That seems to be the difference and the cause of our disagreement. When I say that the mind is caused by the brain it then appears to you (as per your definitions) like I'm saying the brain physically causes the non-physical abstractions, which would obviously be confusing). Instead, what I mean by that is the cause and effect takes place at a higher ontological level (i.e. the brain), while the abstractions take place at a lower ontological level (i.e. language, society, etc).
If I were to call the abstractions the mind then I don't think there would be much difference.
No, I'm saying that I disagree with it. Disagreeing with a thought experiment is not "denying the results" of it because of "preferred conceptions."
From the first person perspective of the ignorant Earth/Twin Earth people, water does NOT refer to H2O or XYZ, it refers to the substance as they see it, and since they are exactly the same from each perspective, there would be no difference in application of the word, behaviour, or belief. If we transported the Earth person to the Twin Earth there would still be no difference since everything would be the same from their perspective. So the environments would technically be different due to the chemical structure of the water, but functionally they would be the same, which is what matters.
I agree with externalism in what some beliefs rely on external input, however what matters is how that environment functionally appears rather than how it objectively is. If the environment is objectively different, but appears to the individual in such a way that is doesn't matter (i.e. it doesn't interrupted their beliefs) then nothing has changed.
Well, like the Twin Earth thought experiment, our third person perspective is completely irrelevant if what matters is the perception of the individual (or frog in this case). If the frogs perception is the same in each case, there will be no difference.
That doesn't seem right. Are you sure it isn't the other way around?
If Strong Supervenience implies that the brain is all that is needed, then why would it imply Global Supervenience which states the brain isn't enough on its own (i.e. the eternal environment is needed).
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
My facts are straight, you indeed made a comment that indicated that you can't take him seriously, and if you are taking him seriously..... Then why make the statement to begin with?
As through a glass darkly you seek yourself,
But the light grows weak while under Yggdrasil. --clutch
Does the location one is born in come from a deterministic universe? This would be a random event and I would have no control over where I were born. If per chance I had been born Chinese in the 3rd century it is extrememly unlikely that I would have even heard of jesus christ. Hence, my fate would lie as an eternity in hell. Doesn't it seem odd that god would give people freewill to choose yet people never given a choice suffer the same fate as those that never heard the "good" news. The freewill arguement doesn't pass the lithmus test as it is arbitrarily assigned to those that would even know which god they are "supposed" to worship.
"Always seek out the truth, but avoid at all costs those that claim to have found it" ANONYMOUS
Firstly you're redefining the meaning of the word 'mind'.
Secondly, this would be reductionism.
Anyway, haven't you said before that you agree with eliminativism when it comes to the brain?
That the only place for mental concepts is on the 'abstract level'?
It's this 'abstract level' where the mind has it's definition.
Who talks about the mind without evoking one of these 'abstract' concepts?
This parallel connection is the strong supervenience.
It seems that we both agree that the supervenience is where the language games share rules, i.e. propositions are applicable to the same situation.
It's just that you believe that all mental concepts have this supervenience wheras I have a restriction to particular ones.
It still stands that cause is a relation between physical events.
i.e. you go back to reducing the mind to a physical 'thing'.
You can still change this by ammending your concept of cause, the same way I do to allow 'abstract concepts' such as decisions to cause physical events.
But until you make this ammendment your concept of cause must be from physical to physical and your position is reductionism.
Yeah. Just the strong supervenience vs global supervenience.
The thing is, the scenario isn't experimenting how we'd apply language if we were also a resident of Twin Earth.
The experiment is to show how we, the observer/narrator in this imaginary scene, naturally apply our language of mind.
It shows that how we naturally apply it doesn't restrict us to narrow content.
[quote=Strafio]My favourite example is the Frog.
The Frog's perception isn't advanced enough to pick out the details of a fast moving fly - it just sees a 'dot' appear that it reacts too.
If a fly zips past a frog and the frog sticks out its tongue then would say that the frog saw that fly.
If a wasp zips past the frog in the same way, and in the same way the frog sticks out his tongue then we'd say that the frog saw the wasp.
In each case, the frog's experience was exactly the same - just a dot blipping by.
However, in each case the intentional state we ascribe points to the actual insect it perceived rather than be based purely on the frog's perception.
See the bit in bold?
It is a proposition that is falsified by this thought experiment.
Claims about what belief and mental content are descriptive as to how we use these concepts, the same way claims about the physical world are descriptive about the physical world we observe. If we use concepts in a different way to how a claim says we should then it's the claim that is wrong.
Global Supervenience doesn't state that the brain isn't enough.
All Global Supervenience states is that if a world was copied particle for particle then we would have to apply the same mental properties.
This isn't enough to imply strong supervenience, so it allows for theories where the brain isn't sufficient. (e.g. externalism)
If strong supervenience is true then it's quite obvious that global supervenience will be true also.