I agree with your distinction between social (or political) and scientific (or naturalistic) truth. The former is constructed, the latter is discovered. It goes all along with the axiom that science isn't politically correct, it's not a democratic process. Scientists don't vote on the best theories, they compete with each other or they collaborate, but scientific truth is guided by research, the aim of which is discovery.

 

Consensus would be intersubjective, where a subjective proposition is agreed by many. Many people tend to assume that lots of people agreeing on something makes it objective which isn't the case.

 

Right.

 

I would add that with objective truths, language is used to communicate, but the objective truth is not contingent on language or indeed anything else mental. Whereas social truths are contingent on language.

 

I wouldn't say the dichotomy applies to behaviour, but rather to propositions. A propositions truth status either relies on mental concepts (such as language), or it doesn't. If it does then it is fundamentally subjective, if it doesn't then it is objective. And by "relies on mental concepts" I mean that without minds it would not have a truth status... for example, 'ice cream tastes nice' depends on human minds in order to be true (or indeed meaningful), whereas light travels at 300,000 km/sec is true regardless of whether there are minds.

 

Absolutely. Don't see why not. It will be more like a spectrum, although the spectrum would fall under [inter]subjectivity.

 

 

But perhaps all truth is objective. If the human consciousness is considered part of the same nature that produces rocks and light, then can't we say music patterns produce a neuro/chemical reaction in humans that often produces pleasure scentsensations. This is an objetive truth is it not?

If scientists study a bee colony, are the facts about the bees getting nectar objective facts or are the bees just getting the nectar cause it brings them pleasure(their social truth)? Wouldn't the truths about what makes bees do what they do be objective?

You need to say there is something special about humans/human consciousness in order to have social truth. If so, what makes our consciousness and thinking separate from the rest of nature?

 

Concepts like money, law, citizenship etc... statements like 'ice cream is nice', or 'this painting is beautiful'. 

 

There is nothing objective about statements like "I am a British citizen" or "money is valuable". Such concepts/statements necessarily require a subject to give them a truth value or to even mean anything. They are necessarily contingent on minds - without minds no truth value would exist.

 

Perhaps it is wrong to narrow the focus on language? I pointed out language because it seems to be via language that we construct these social truths, which are then [inter]subjectively agreed upon. In any case it is 'minds' which are the necessity.

A statement containing objective elements does not mean that statement itself is objective.

If a statement requires a mind in order to have a truth value or even to make sense, then that statement would necessarily be a subjective issue. "This ice cream is nice" doesn't even begin with make sense unless there is a subject (person) that puts that meaning/truth value to the statement. Without the subject, the statement is neither true or false, or even meaningful.

If a statement is mind independent (i.e. it does not make, nor need, a reference to a subject in order to be true, false, or meaningful) then it is objective. The speed of light is an example of this. Regardless of what humans believe about light, or even whether humans exist, the statement "light travels at 300,000 km/sec" is objectively true.

A statement may (and probably will) contain references to objective things, but that is not what makes a statements truth or meaning objective. What makes it objective is whether it is dependent on minds/subjects in order to be true, false, or meaningful. The fact the statement "this ice cream is nice" contains a objective reference--ice cream--is irrelevant as the key part of the statement is 'is nice', which is an individual subjective value, which necessarily requires reference to a subject that give ice cream that value.

The key question is this: would X have a truth status without minds? If yes, it is objective. If no, it is subjective.

These two types of truths--objective and subjective--are clearly and obviously distinct from each other.

 

 

I'm talking about the truth status or meaning (i.e. the value one gives).

 

Mind independent means X does not make, nor need, a reference to a subject in order to be true, false, or meaningful.

 

Sure, but the preference/value is nevertheless dependent on mind. Forget about language. It seems to have gotten in the way of my point: subjective truths are contingent on mind, objective truths are not.

 

I'm not talking about the statement itself (of course a statement necessitates a human mind capable of language) but rather the truth status, meaning, value, of that statement.

 

Clearly you see the difference in the truth of the following truth statements:

 

"light travels at 300,000 km/sec"

 

and

 

"ice cream is nice".

 

Both are truth statements, however the former is objectively true, irrespective of whether minds exist, whereas the latter necessities a subject/mind that subjectively finds ice cream nice. 

 

Right. And it's the same with truths claims. Some statements are true only because a mind exists that give the statement that truth status, whereas other statements are true independent of minds.

 

All this is completely irrelevant to the point. Yes, the ice cream maybe material, the girl maybe material, the action of choosing and eating the ice cream maybe material, however, the truth status this girl assigns to the statement "ice cream is nice" (i.e. that the statement is true or false) is necessarily dependent on the existence of the mind of this girl. If no mind existence, the there would be no truth status to the statement at all.

 

 

That's true. The law of excluded middle dictates that she finds the statement "ice cream is nice" as either true or false. However, while that is objective, the value she places on ice cream is subjective. A value requires the existence of the person who is making it. There is nothing objective about the value "ice cream is nice" or "ice cream is horrible".

 

Can you define objectivity and subjectivity so we can ensure we are on the same page.

 

I am defining objectivity as independent of mind, and subjectivity as dependent on the mind.

 

For reference, here the wiki article on objectivity, which I agree with:

 

 

You don't need to scientifically verify a subjective claim. Subjective claims are verified merely by the person making the claim. If Susy claims she likes ice cream, then she likes ice cream. Unless we have reason to doubt this (e.g. maybe we know she has never ate ice cream, or we remember her saying she in fact disliked ice cream), then it would be truth that she liked ice cream.

 

Technically, you could hook them up to an fMRI and scan their brain but that would miss the point (and I don't even know how you could even conform the subjective value she gives ice cream). Subjective truths are not mean to be treated in the same way as objective truth.

 

Right. This is precisely what I am saying.

 

Right. When lots of people agreed on a subjective matter (like value), it is intersubjective.

 

Exactly. While there is a material objective basis behind these value judgements (the brain, the external world, etc) the value judgement itself it subjective.

 

 

Yes, I can't stand post-modernism either.

I was originally discussing this with Strafio. He holds that all truth is dependent on, and relative to, language, which pretty much puts him in the camp of post-modernism.

 

Interesting post.  I think you're right on with the ontological distinction between objective and subjective/intersubjective truth.  There is truth that is ontologically determined by human mind(s), and truth that is objective and not ontologically dependent upon human mind.

 

But beyond the ontological discussion is, of course, the epistemological discussion on how the human mind knows objective reality--namely, whether or not, or to what degree, humans can have confidence that we are truly perceiving objective truth when they see it. 

 

The modern/Enlightenment notion seems to be that the human mind is passive in the process of knowing: it simply observes.  Postmodernity is right, I think, to acknowledge that we are not simply passive, but active in the process of knowing; but I think it is mistaken whenever it assumes that activity is necessarily an ontological construction of truth. 

 

One interesting option that critical realist epistemology brings to bear (if I understand it correctly) is that the human mind is active even when it comes to objective truth by suggesting that objective truth can only be seen through a presuppositional matrix which has been (often tacitly) appropriated by the knower. 

Thanks for the response, Topher.

Does the scientific method not rest on some (qualified, but not absolutely certain) assumptions?  For example: the assumption that the senses yield information that is true, and we are not brains-in-vats (like the Matrix).

 

Moreover, since it is not feasible or possible for a single individual to apply the scientific method on everything that there is to know about reality, would this not also entail that people trust or assume that scientists record and present information truthfully?

 

 

I'm sorry if I wasn't clear.  That is not what I am suggesting.  I am suggesting that the "activity" in knowing objective Truth lies not in "construction" but in interpretation (especially the appropriation of an interpretive 'grid').  Construction (as I see it) is ontological; Interpretation is epistemological.

 

 

But would these latter results still not be resting upon the assumptions I mention above?

 

 

That is in the ballpark of what I believe, yes.  Critical Realism does assert the need for presuppositions.

 

 

By "presupposition" I do not mean "mind" but rather a 'grid' through which the mind encounters and interprets reality (or you might say, a necessary 'lens' through which the mind perceives that which is objectively true).

Cheers.

Thanks again for your response, Topher.  And thanks to the links on atheist refutation of presuppositionalism, TAG, et. al.  I did not see anything there, however, that really confounds what I’m speaking of.  Van Til, Bhansen, et al, are not who I am following epistemologically; rather, I am resonating with what I have read of others who are following (and tweaking) the Critical Realist epistemology of Roy Bhaskar and others.  I think there may be similarities between the two camps, however, which is why I said it was “in the ballpark” of what I’m speaking of. 

Calling a concept a name does not debunk it, as I’m certain you agree.  I’d like to see a justification of this statement.  I, of course, do not believe the BIV scenario is the case, but I do certainly believe that it is a possibility (as do most professional philosophers I have read who have argued against it).  I’ll explain more below, and perhaps you can interact with these thoughts to establish your notion that BIV is “pure pseudo-philosophy.”  Or perhaps we will find ourselves on the same page.

I’m a bit confused, then, how you jump from “usually accurate” to “absolute certainty.” Is that not a non sequitur ?

Whether you are trusting an individual or trusting a community, you are nonetheless ‘trusting’ (with good reason).  As such, the element of trust is inextricable from the process of knowing, as is the element of testimony.   Would you disagree?  (On 'testimony', you may like to know that the latest issue of the Episteme journal is on that topic and has some insightful pieces.  For the next week or so, you can download the entire issue for free.)

It allows for confidence, yes, but not “absolute certainty” in any foundationalist sense.  This is where I think the BIV scenario provides a helpful illustration.  Inasmuch as we assume that the signals being sent to our brains are true to reality (and not an artificially constructed and imposed virtual reality such as BIV), the scientific method is very helpful.  Yet it is a confidence ‘from the inside’ of that trusted assumption.  If that assumption is incorrect, and BIV is true, then it wouldn’t matter how many tests were run according to the scientific method, because the method would not have any correlation to actual reality, but only to the virtual reality of the BIV. 

I am not saying, however, that the mere possibility of BIV means that people should believe in it, obviously.  Possibilities do not necessitate belief in themselves.  They should, however, shape the way we perceive reality by fitting into the epistemological equation. 

One way I think that BIV helps us with the epistemological process is that it provides an example in which presuppositions are necessary.  Namely, it is a possible scenario in which I think the scientific method is rendered almost completely impotent.  It also provides a framework of understanding in which we plainly see that you cannot use the scientific method to justify the accuracy of the scientific method. 

It also raises the important point, I think, that “proof” is not the only factor in the epistemological process, and it is very likely not the most important factor in that process.  We do not believe things only because they have been proven (although proof certainly plays into the equation).  We believe p because p seems the most probable, and best resonates in equilibrium when all epistemological factors are considered.

 

But is not the scientific method biased toward the scientific method?  It can be helpful in limiting other biases, but it should itself be limited and understood to be a bias.  Otherwise I think it is taken to myopic and irrational extremes.  Agnosticism, I think, is the closest thing to being truly unbiased.  From what I have seen of Critical Realism, I think it is the most rational approach to dealing with bias and objectivity.

 

Thanks very much for your response.

I'm not sure where the misconception is.  I'm in full agreement with this statement of yours.  It is not I, but Topher who suggested that "absolute certainty" is possible.

I'm not sure if you are understanding what I mean.  Inasmuch as we cannot personally and rigorously apply the scientific method to everything, and yet claim knowledge of that which we have not scientifically tested, we are implicitly relying upon an epistemological tool other than scientific method: testimony.  There are reliable testimonies, and there are unreliable testimonies; the more reliable testimonies one has (from scientists, for example), the more confidence we can have in our knowledge. 

My point is simply this: in our understanding of reality, we are dependent upon epistemological tools other than scientific method, such as testimony.

I don't think by "more sure over time" that Topher meant "absolute certainty". My usual approach is to speak in terms of probability. Facts discovered with a rigorous scientific method are certain to a great degree of probability, within a reasonable margin of error. Were you referring to his use of "objective"?

Oh certainly. But in the case of a scientific study, the full details of the study are available so that the reader can duplicate the experiment described in the study. There are also usually multiple studies surrounding things considered fact so that we have more at our disposal than simple "testimony". It's not simply  "he said she said" - the process is very stringent.

But yes, we absolutely trust a community of scientists and peer reviewers to care about the material they're studying. Sometimes it turns out that bias has, in fact, crept into scientific studies, and it doesn't come out until much later. The scientific method, like any human behaviour, is fallible. It just happens to be the most successful epistemology available.

 

I think it is pseudo-philosophy because it is philosophy for the sake of philosophy. Yes, it's possible that we are in a Matrix reality. It's also possible that we were all created 5 minutes ago with fabricated memories. And maybe we are all philosophical zombies... These things are pseudo-philosophy because not only could we never know if they are the case, we have not means of finding out, which renders them useless. Furthermore, even if we were philosophical zombies, even if we were in a Matrix reality, even if we were all just created a few minutes ago with fake memories of the past, none of it would change anything. We could not distinguish between this reality and what we normally call reality, which in turn means they have no effect on us.

 

To me, possibility, in of itself, is not a justification for something to be taken seriously. It's true that something must be possible in order to even get off the ground, however I think it must also be useful, it must make predictions, and it must have some way of being tested. Otherwise, you have a useless theory.

 

I said practically certain with some theories about reality (i.e. we can be certain 'in practice' that evolution is true, although technically we cannot), and absolutely certain about facts (e.g. facts are necessarily true).

 

We can't be absolutely certain about theories, but we can about facts, since fact are certain by definition.

 

Right, but it is not without justification. Also, this 'trust' should not be equate with 'theistic faith'.

 

I never said absolute certainty other than with facts.

 

I don't even know what this means. The scientific method is just that, a method. It doesn't tell you anything in of itself. It is only a means of examining claims, much like logic only tells you whether an argument is valid or not.

 

The only thing that could even consitute as bias in the scientific method is it starting with methodological naturalism (i.e. it rejects supernatural explanations) but this is only because such explanations cannot be tested, and so are useless.

 

I was referring to his statement that we can be “absolutely certain with facts” (see his first response to me). But this could be a miscommunication of terms.  I do find terms of probability helpful in this discussion as well. 

 

This is an excellent assessment of things, I think.  I imagine where we may differ is in our interpretation of what the success of science means, namely the scope of its implications.  

 

 

Oh, I see the context. Well, if you're 99.99999% sure, you're absolutely sure in practical terms. It would be a bit unreasonable to say otherwise.

The scientific method is just an epistemology, so its scope is whatever we can get our hands on (or observe indirectly). What would the "scope of its implications" mean?

I asked you several really easy questions.  Please answer them.

Another hot and irrational response.  You are trigger happy with your conclusions, aren't you?  Of course there is always the absolutely wild and irrational possibility that I have other things to do besides writing posts on RRS, and was also writing a careful response to Topher's post (which precedes yours in order) before I got to yours. 

I don't mind intellectual conversation, but this line of conversation is a waste of time, wouldn't you agree?

FYI: Don't expect another post from me today.  I've already spent too much time on this today, and have some work I need to get finished.

No, I believe in someone who created science.  But this statement of mine, like yours, is loaded with as-of-yet unjustified presuppositions.  Your response to me was non sequitur because the conclusions you presume I will make do not necessarily follow what I actually said.  In other words, that is not where I'm going with this. 

Well, if you would not jump the gun so quickly you would see what I am doing. It is my hypothesis that one of the major fallacies of atheism is in its epistemology (e.g. the Enlightenment notion that we are simply passive observers recording information, and have no active part in the process of knowing). Right now, however, I'm simply trying to establish a common ground of epistemological parameters, things to which all of us might agree.  It leads us no where fast if we just talk around each other making loaded statements that are full of unjustified presuppositions. 

 

 

Thanks Hamby.  I'll do my best as an amateur, but it will be difficult simply because the issues are so complex and multi-disciplinary. 

To everyone here,

If you really want to know where I am coming from, you should read Alister McGrath's newest book: The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology.  It is not a book on apologetics, but does have implications for apologetics.  It's greatest contribution, I think, is that it propounds a holistic epistemological foundation for Christian thought.  He articulates many, many of the things I have been trying to articulate myself for quite a while, but does a much better and much more comprehensive job than I ever could.   

In the meantime.  All of you may be interested in taking a look at the latest issue of the Episteme journal (not a religious journal, by the way), which deals with the epistemology of Testimony.  I just finished reading Peter Lipton's essay, and thought it was quite good.  You can download the articles for free for the next 5 days or so.  Here is the link:  http://www.eupjournals.com/journal/epi.

Have a good day, all. 

 

I'm not really saying it isn't philosophy, rather I'm saying it is bad philosophy. I think philosophy ultimately should be worthwhile, and the matrix/brain-in-a-vat philosophy achieves nothing. It might be interesting to posture (I think it is interesting) however it really doesn't have a place is a argument, in my view. If an idea/claim cannot potentially be resolved and/or tested in some way then there is not point in discussing it as it simply becomes two people voicing opinions.

 

It's a useful example of the limits of our epistemology, but the claim itself is useless. I think there is a distinction. 

 

In order to verify the claim, yes.

 

Perhaps, however we must maintain a distinction between useful vis-a-vis verifying a claim, and some other potential use, such as, brain in a vat or supernatural 'hypothesis' revealing the limits of our epistemology. The fact the brain in a vat idea may be epistemologically revealing does not mean it is a useful theory when it comes to verification, which is what I, and I suspect others, mean when saying X is not useful; we mean it cannot be verified.

 

The weight of a rock.

The length of a pencil.

The number of keys on a keyboard.

The colour of a ball.

Etc.

 

Right, but it is a necessary 'bias'.

 

Not when you want to verify the claim. For example, if you say a supernatural 'being' caused X, you are making a useless claim, since the supernatural is not testable, thus the claim cannot be verified.

 

 

 

Topher,

 

Thanks again for your dialog.  I apologize for the delay in my response.

 

:: I'm not really saying it isn't philosophy, rather I'm saying it is bad philosophy.

 

It is probably best, then, to call it simply “bad philosophy.”  Rather than meaning “bad philosophy”, the prefix “pseudo” means that it has the deceitful appearance of philosophy, but it is really not. 

 

::  (Facts, of which we can have absolute certainty):  The weight of a rock.  The length of a pencil.  The number of keys on a keyboard.  The colour of a ball.  Etc.

 

You have provided for us a list of things of which we can only be absolutely certain if and only if you can be absolutely certain that your senses are reliable, and you are not, for example, a brain-in-a-vat.  Yet because you cannot be absolutely certain of your senses (which you admit to), you cannot be absolutely certain about those “facts,” can you?

 

:: I think philosophy ultimately should be worthwhile, and the matrix/brain-in-a-vat philosophy achieves nothing. It might be interesting to posture (I think it is interesting) however it really doesn't have a place is a argument, in my view. If an idea/claim cannot potentially be resolved and/or tested in some way then there is not point in discussing it as it simply becomes two people voicing opinions

 

Well, I would say that the BIV is a hypothesis that can perhaps be tested in a way, but not empirically, and not (necessarily) objectively. 

 

You see, the BIV is a logically coherent hypothesis (it is not self-contradictory) that cannot be falsified by empirical testing, because it renders empirical testing impotent.  And yet you deny that the BIV is the case: why?  You seem to be saying, “because it cannot be empirically tested.”  But that is simply not a valid reason for rejecting it.  When the credibility of a tool is being called into question, you cannot prove that tool’s credibility with itself, obviously.

 

So what keeps our belief or disbelief in that BIV hypothesis from being entirely arbitrary?  Is there some criteria against which it can be tested? 

 

I would tend to say “yes,” but the kind “testing” I’m thinking of is something that is (necessarily) unempirical, and may not be entirely objective.  In fact, I might even say that this is the test you are, tacitly, passing it through when you reject it.  I would say that we reject it because we do not find it “lovely”, and do not see it as possessing the same kind of explanatory power that we find demonstrated in other hypothesis.  We reject it because it is not the “best explanation” (to borrow a term used by Peter Lipton). 

 

“Best explanation” obviously needs some unpacking.  I need to do some more research on that myself.  But I do think it is a trajectory that is extremely promising. 

 

My main point here has been to demonstrate that empirical testing is not the ultimate point at which a belief in something stands or falls.  There is something else at play here.

 

 

Uh, yeah. I'd like to know what that is, too. Especially considering it's fairly easy to test things, now that we're extremely good at the scientific method.

*ahem*

There are no darwinian arguments for eugenics.  There are arguments for eugenics that include elements (often, misunderstood) of natural selection.  However, Darwinism, evolution, natural selection... whatever you want to call it, is NOT prescriptive in any way whatsoever.  Any system of ethics must be derived from the concept of a GOAL, which is not present in evolutionary theory.  Natural selection just happens.  To speak of it having a goal is to make an anthropomorphic error.

I am a big believer in the idea that proper understanding of human nature can aid us in forming ethical models, but the crux of any ethical model that includes natural selection is going to involve a prescriptive goal -- that is, people ought to strive for this or that because of this or that.  Such a prescriptive goal will not be derived from natural selection.  It will be derived from some other philosophy, whether it is maximization of individual happiness, group cohesion, social order, or distribution of resources.  In any of those cases, science can help us by giving us information about what humans are strongly likely to do, but it cannot tell us what humans should do.

 

I don't know if it's really that difficult. The "best explanation" is the one that best fits observable data. If there's a better explanation forthcoming, then that one will replace or augment the former "best explanation". Einstein's work on gravitation augmented Newton's work on gravitation, and Einstein's work simply fit the observable data better. Newton's math is still perfectly good for engineering, as it matches the observable data pretty well itself.

It's usually easy to find the best explanation for something, and often you'll find that an empirical method is part of that explanation. Other methods, such as logical proofs, don't necessarily do quite as well, despite their obvious value in rational thinking.

 

Well said.

 

Eugenics = ARTIFICIAL selection

Evolution = NATURAL selection

 

The ultimate contradiction of evolution by natural selection!