To elaborate... is saying something is the default position the same as saying it is self-evident?

I think materialism (e.g. all we can detect is material) is the default position but I'm not sure it we can say it is self evident, because it relies on observation rather than the statement being tautological.

I would argue that it is. You know what pisses me off? There are people who might say something like "It is the job of science to investigate the material world", implicitly stating that there is some "non-material" world which can be accessed by the methodologies of another discipline. It seems that “metaphysics” is a label applied to something until scientific investigation demonstrates a meaningful model behind it. I stress that since it is the job of science to investigate phenomenon then it appears, from an epistemological standpoint, to be problematic to say that we can conclude in a phenomenon that cannot be investigated by science (in other words, that a phenomenon is "non-material". Why is this so? Consider it. When it is through some complicated causal chain, which via deduction, we can link some model or external object to some feature of our perceptual experience, then we are performing a scientific investigation. Solely by means of using our intuitive understanding based on our immediate perceptual experience, we wouldn’t get very far, but, by means of accumulating knowledge, we can effectively link causal chains of experienced phenomenon to an external world behind the experiences. Thus, for example, we would be unable to conclude in “dark matter” on the basis of our analysis of galactic motions through telescopes if we didn’t already have an understanding of what galactic motion should look like based on Relativity, which in turn, we wouldn’t have been able to conclude in if we didn’t have a set of equations describing our intuitive basis for relative motion, called “Newtonian mechanics”, which in turn we wouldn’t be able to conclude in unless we had…

You get the idea. So, in effect, by asserting that some phenomenon is beyond the realm of science (or, equivalently, isn't material), we are, in effect, asserting that such a feature has no causal relationship, however complicated it may be, that is needed to explain our perceptual experience. Obviously, there is some confusion about this. We don’t perceive, for example, “electron density”, but through a complex causal chain employing deductive experiments and prior knowledge also based on experiments, we can link electron density to some feature of perceptual experience. If there was no way whatsoever to link some phenomenon to some feature of our perceptual experience, however complex the linking chain might be, then, in effect, we are making assertions about phenomenon that, through no amount of deduction or investigation, can we make conclusions about based upon our perceptual experiences, which are the source of all our knowledge (although, as Kant pointed out, not all our knowledge is derived from perceptual experience. There is a difference). So, you are on impossible ground, epistemologically speaking. To make your assertion, you must relinquish any knowledge claims you might make about this phenomenon at all.

DG,

Would you agree that the claims of theism can be investigated by science.

I was recently discussing what I think is an inconsistency among many skeptics who want to diminish faith-based thinking and dogma, and are willing to do so when it presents itself in the form of conspiracy theories, alternative medicines, psychics, etc, but are seemingly willing to give a pass to the greatest propagator of faith/dogma: religion.

They seems to respond to this inconsistency by stating that religion is based on supernatural claim and so cannot be tested by science. But this seems irrelevant: the claims still carry scientific import, either explicitly or tacitly. Furthermore, paranormal claims such as life energies and psychics also rely on supernaturalism, so there is really no ultimate distinction between the two, hence the inconsistency.

Claiming that Jesus was born of a virgin it is a scientific claim about biology. We can look at the science of the claim. Is it scientifically possible? No. Are there any confirmed cases? No. Can we scientifically conclude the claim fails to conform to science and should therefore be rejected? Absolutely yes.

Claiming that Jesus rose from the dead is a scientific claim about biology and physics. We can look at just what needs to happen to rise from the dead (i.e. reversal of decomposition), whether there are confirmed cases of it happening, and evaluate whether it is likely to happen based on that information: the fact it has never been known to happen, and the fact decomposition cannot be reversed means we can scientifically conclude it is highly unlikely to be true, if not impossible.

Claiming that we go to an afterlife contains the scientific claim that our conciseness/mind survives the decomposition of our brains. We can look at the relationship between conciseness/mind and the brain and determine that there is no scientific basis to hold that conciseness can survive the destruction of our brain.

Of course, the believer invokes god/supernatural to bypass the science, but psychics, alt med proponents, or weeping statues believers also invoke god/supernatural, but that does not stop skeptics from investigating those. They just sweep aside the unjustified assumption (the supernatural) and see if the phenomena has a natural explanation.

The person I was discussing this with basically implied that materialism a priori reject supernaturalism:

Although he is right in one sense (e.g. materialism does not allow for the Christian god), he is implicitly suggesting that materialism is an assumption.

DG is not diluted. Nice it is to know non delusion. Go science philosophy, and please keep in mind us simple farmers, we layman, we kids. LOL RRS. Communicate.

I agree with DG that materialism is self evident.  It is, I believe, a different class of self-evident because it relies on observation, but we can actually ask a rather pointed question about our philosophical tautologies.  How do I know that I think I exist?  Because I perceived my own thought.  How do I know that I think there is a star around which the earth orbits?  Because I perceived it.  Supposing that I could have a thought and not perceive it, would the thought have existed?

In short, we cannot help but perceive unless we are dead.  If we live, we perceive, even if we are only perceiving our own thoughts or dreams.  We're all familiar with the descent into nihilism that results from the brain in a vat hypothesis, but we also need to be aware of the descent into absurdity that results from the notion of that which defies nature.  If there exists something that can defy "natural existence," then I cannot discount the possibility that I perceive myself to exist while not existing!

In a nutshell, the axiom of identity is self evident because materialism is self evident, and vice versa.  Reality breaks down for different reasons if we don't accept them, which, I think, puts them in slightly different classes, but I'll let the philosophy professors work that one out. 

Interesting read. That helps boil down the silliness of creating a separate god of some super natural non material concept, and helps to understanding traditional wacko dogma superstition invention. Basically I found you two to be in vague agreement (?) of the yet indescribable, and a bit like an atheist debating a pantheist about the science question of consciousness.

I work to be open minded, but the concepts and words, "supernatural and immaterial", also don't ring any bells for my dull brain. Heck, even TIME requires the material I say in awe. No material , no time?!?! All has always been. Zero "creation", all is a "transition" .... Whatever.

Religion while it can be a seed to inspire, it essentially becomes pollution to furthering clear honest thinking. I like sci-fi , but I cannot appease the god fantasies of any traditional religion claims, by any philosophical or science definitions. What is Time? , I ask them.

Okay,  I am closed simple minded, and yeah I say, existence (g-awe-d) is atheist (no master), to the so many clueless lost people. Yes, I am a 100% prejudiced atheist, g-awe-d fan !  

Sorry, the best I can do is rant. Thanks a lot for this thread Topher ....  

Thanks a ton DG. Go science philosophy for us layman and kids.

Even our most wildest intuitve mental constructs are 100% material. There is no way around this, none, zillth. It feels good to let go of all self doubt and worry that we are missing some great truth that the supernaturalists spout in so many silly imaginitive ways, both philosophically and religious.

Thanks for your simple wise helpful words DG.

 Forgive me for posting this so often, but for all those who haven't heard this simple short clip, I so wish they would. Who runs the FCC, the embarrassing major media ?

Carl Sagan - Pale Blue Dot - 3 mins

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p86BPM1GV8M

How could that be done?. It sounds like materialism has been defined in such a way that showing it is incorrect would be impossible.

Good point. Scratch that part. Any reasoned inquiry into the world will immediately find it to be correct.

You're making the mistake of putting the mind before nature.  As I've demonstrated, rational materialism is necessary for knowledge to be possible.  This includes knowledge of the pragmatic.

Humans are observers of nature, not controllers of it.  Whether a child has yet become cognizant of the nature of reality, it is still functioning within the rules of reality.  One need not be aware that one is using logic or science to use them. 

No, it's not.  Regardless of the label we apply to the set, there is a set which includes everything that exists.  For example, let's describe an existing set, Poundcake, which includes everything that exists.  Ok, now that we've done that, we can say that anything at all that exists -- in any way, whether repeatable, predictable, observable, or none of these -- is poundcake.  Everything is poundcake.

This set doesn't prescribe any particular boundaries for anything in it.  That is to say, it doesn't prevent things which are not repeatable, predictable, or observable from being within the set.  So, what is often called supernatural by theists -- ghosts, spirits, gods -- is not ruled out a priori.

Where spirits get ruled out is in the application of logic and science, which I've demonstrated to be necessarily the only means to acquire knowledge and derive conclusions.  When we use valid logic and true empirical data, we realize that only things which meet certain criteria, namely posessing identity and therefore existing as something, can possibly exist in the set, Poundcake.

So, it's not the dichotomy between supernatural and natural that throws a monkey wrench into the theist's propositions.  It's the invention of an empty set as a pressuposition, and the ad hoc assertion that a dichotomy exists.

Perceptive natural. If one could "fix my words", it would often be you. Words like unity, and even pragmatic, as simple definitions are easily usable, but as in philosophy they often become so broad, I shy from them and often roll my eyes. It's like, how is this person using that word? Of course the most confused word of use is g-o-d.

That is why I mostly laugh at so much g-o-d and philosophy talk. I mean geez, in one sense of "talk" we can imagine what is not real or natural, but that is just our natural  imagination .... So using Occams Razor, I simply say it's all gawed, and let's instead put our efforts to improving this world of so much unnecessary suffering, for all. 

Geezz people of the world, pragmatically and naturally, we are g-o-d. We are ONE. "Awaken" to what we all obviously are. Let's work at being proud. Think on the kids and help make them truly happy. Fancy philosophical words not required. Tell no lies. Come together, right now, over me .... as WE are g-o-d. GOD Damn IT, no religion of separatism !       

No, I'm talking about *how* we know things, not about *what* we do know. We do know that reality came before we did. But we know *that* from our experiences, which came before our knowledge of reality. You can't know anything if you don't have any experiences.

I never claimed the contrary.

But you can't *know* that you're functioning in reality until you become cognizant of reality. This is a question of epistemology, i.e. How do we know things. You can't say "I know X because I know X." Where did that knowledge come from? It's inherently a question of how our minds work practically. We know things by pragmatism, not by materialism or naturalism. What we do know *is* that materialism (physicalism) and naturalism are true, but we know this through pragmatism, i.e. they make the best predictions.

This does not address the question of what is 'natural'. You are defining 'natural' as everything that exists. And then you are conflating that with what we know exists. I define the 'cosmos' as everything that exists, and the 'physical' to be everything we know exists. There may exist something that we cannot possibly know whether it exists. It might even be completely incomprehensible by humans in principle. But it might exist somewhere in the cosmos. It might even be non-physical or non-natural. What could that possibly be? I have no way of knowing. But it remains a possibility. On the other hand, there is a vast universe that I *know* exists. That is the natural and physical universe. That is a strict subset of the cosmos. It may be all that exists, but I can't possibly know that. The universe may be exactly equal to the cosmos, but I can't know that, because the cosmos is 'what exists, whether I know it or not', and the universe is 'what I know exists'.

You are conflating the two. You are saying that 'what we know exists' is 'what exists'. What if there's more that cannot ever be known by us?

The solution to this is epistemology, specifically pragmatism. I don't know if more exists, and so I apply Occam's Razor to reject the supernatural and wait for some pragmatic reason to believe in it.

Here's a parallel: For a long time we didn't know that dark matter existed, because, as we've since discovered, dark matter *does not interact* with other matter except apparently through gravity. Now, the only way we could find out that dark matter even exists is because of its gravitational interaction. We made a prediction that we'd be able to see it by its gravitational lensing, and voila!, we recently have observational evidence that confirms the prediction.

I now propose that it is possible that there is another kind of matter, called 'ignosia', which exists, but it does not interact with any known matter, either by gravity, or by any other interaction. It is non-interacting matter. But it exists, or so I claim for argument's sake. It is part of the cosmos, it exists. It is *not* part of the universe, in the sense that we do not know it exists. In fact, we cannot know. Maybe it doesn't and the claim is useless. The only way to make that distinction is to apply pragmatism. The theory of ignosia makes no predictions, because there's no way to interact with it. So, we apply the pragmatic principle of Occam's Razor and say, "Hey, we don't need to theorize about it, so it might as well not exist; it has no effect either way. Come back to us when you get some evidence."

It would be false to say that because ignosia is 'beyond nature' that it definitely does not exist in the cosmos. The only appropriate thing to do is say we don't know if it exists or not. On top of that, we can adopt a philosophy of naturalism or physicalism which claims that only things we can interact with exist. But that's a separate step. Personally, I'm a physicalist. I only accept the existence of physical things. I acknowledge that the non-physical might exist, but I apply pragmatism to rule it out of my practical existence.

Logic and science don't rule out spirits. Occam's Razor does. It is a pragmatic principle, not a logical axiom or a strict tenet of science. Science operates under *methodological* naturalism, which does not rule out the actual existence of the supernatural.

That's some tasty "fixins" there natural. You seem a great good cook to this simple cowboy. RRS has many fine fancy cooks, as in this thread. I'm just a beans and corn bread guy, thanks for sharing them flavors ya all.    ____________________

 - Wise Topher beat me in this reply, but it seems we are all agreeing, and basically polishing our personal philosophy language styles. Am I missing something?  

Wow, just when I thought the cooking couldn't get much finer, our Eloise adds a cup of new tasty spice. I love this cook out ! It's a miracle for sure. A "self evident miracle", I must say. I am not just lost in space and time , I'm lost in definitions! I am in awe. What a ride! Yippy I yea  !!!      

P.S. I vote Eloise gets her special badge, as theist Cpt Pinapple has one.

By 'default position' I do not mean 'self-evident', rather I am saying only that position is justified; it is the only valid position, and therefore materialism becomes the default position until proven otherwise. So materialism (i.e. all we can detect is material) is where we must start, and we must remain there until falsified (i.e. we detect something that is NOT material).

I don't mean it is the default position because it is self-evident, rather it is the default position because only that position has survived the logic, reason, and observation.

The argument is similar to weak/agnostic atheism being the default position because nothing else is valid.

This is not what I stated. What I am arguing is that materialism is supportable by deductive argument, as opposed to merely rejecting arguments in favor of supernaturalism. It is directly analogous to stating that atheism is deductively defensible as opposed to merely rejecting theist a priori and a posteriori arguments. I prefer the term physicalist, by the way.

For me, physicalism starts by asking the following question:

What is a physical object?

For most people, a “physical object” is something comprised of solid stuff which comprises a physical universe. You and I are sufficiently versed in physics to know that this is not true, and we need a better and less vague definition of physicalism.

For me, the obvious answer is that physical objects are precisely those things which are causally responsible for our experiences. We intuitively infer that a real world exists on the basis of our experiences, and that world we label “physical”. The external world which is causally responsible for our experience is that which we consider physical. What else could it be? There is no such property called “physicalness” such that “non-physical objects” could be said to be those objects not endowed with this property. This, for me, is why the notion of a non-physical object breaks down into meaninglessness. When we talk about atoms, or charge density, or electrons or fields or dark matter, we are discussing concepts whose properties we have deduced on the basis of its causing our experiences. If it wasn’t responsible for our experiences, we wouldn’t know about it! We know about Dark matter, about space-time, about all these things, on the basis of deductive chains. Whenever we discover new objects which are part of causal chains responsible for our experience (such as gravitational fields) we merely add it to our repertoire of understanding of the physical world. The physical world is precisely that world we can causally link to our experience. The epistemological necessity of physicalism from this shouldn’t need spelling out.

Please don't use this naive interpretation of materialism. Materialism does of course account for consciousness. Spirit, no, consciousness, yes. We don't have a complete account, but it does exist, and it is firmly rooted in the brain (a material entity).

Because 'materialism' is so prone to this naive interpretation, I prefer the word 'physicalism', which implies 'physics', which implies 'that which we know exists because of scientific investigation'. Consciousness is a physical process that occurs in our physical brains.

I hate words sometimes.

Anyway, here's the sense in which I mean self-evident in this context.  The concepts (and hence the words which refer to them) of supernatural and immaterial are incoherent.  Nevertheless, they exist (that is, the concepts exist), and their existence is owed to the material.  That is to say, without reference to the material, there would be no concepts.  The invention of these concepts necessitates acceptance of the material.  Like the foundational axioms of philosophy, materialism must be employed to question materialism. 

As topher has pointed out, acceptance of materialism doesn't rule any particular thing out a priori.  It simply dictates that anything which does exist exists as something within the set {All that exists}.  This is a tautology, and so must be true.  It is self evident.  In other words, materialism simply acknowledges the set {All that exists} and gives it the name "natural."  Just to be pedantic about it, try imagining something that exists, but doesn't exist as something.  If that were the case, assigning it to {All that exists} would create a paradox, for the description "a thing which exists in the set {all that exists} is an identity, however minimal.  If, however, we do not include it in {All that exists} we have created another paradox, for {All that exists} does not contain all that exists.

Think of it a different way.  All the materialist asserts is that anything which exists, exists as something.  He uses the words "natural" and "material" to refer to existence.  This is nothing more than the application of the axiom of identity to the universe.  The rational materialist will deduce the conclusion that anything which does not exist as something cannot exist.  This is a deductive conclusion, and is not self evident.  This is why I often speak of rational materialism as opposed to just materialism.  Like atheism, materialism by itself doesn't really tell us anything.  It is only in the application of logic to materialism that we can draw conclusions.

Topher has done a good job of addressing most of what natural has said, so I'm not going to repeat it.

Yeah Consciousness, C.  Thoughts of a kid. Is the grass conscious? I say yes. Is a dormant seed? Can we ever find a C particle or cluster of particles we would uniquely label C? Could it in any sense be non physical? I say no. I say C is result of Energy/ Matter. At what point or degree would we say something possesses C ? Umm, a math equation of C? I say yes eventually, maybe soon.    

  Isn't pantheism largely about the unresolved science questions regarding C ?  As a materialist, I appreciate pantheism and have said it's often an xlint help to getting god of abe dogmists out of their dangerous rut.

Thinking on C in a pantheist theme, will physics ever come to say that C is an inherent part of all energy, matter and time? This burns in my head. Something whispers yes. I want that "theory of everything" NOW, damn it. (laughing in hysteria)

              For Eloise,

"I believe in God, only I spell it Nature." - from Frank Lloyd Wright quotes.

'to compliment a pantheistic outlook'

      http://home.utm.net/pan/quotes.html

If you will think of ourselves as coming out of the earth, rather than having been thrown in here from somewhere else, you see that we are the earth, we are the consciousness of the earth.  These are the eyes of the Earth.  And this is the voice of the earth. ~ Joseph Campbell .... Carl Sagan, Alan Watts echoed that.

Words have too many damn definitions .... pantheists aren't always theists.

Thanks all for caring. (((( Hamby: a writer gifted with clarity. (radio friendly) 

Such as? What position other than materialism is justified? It seems like you are saying something may exist albeit differently to what we already know exists, but still ultimately material.

I subscribe to correspondence theory of truth, that is, what is true is what corresponds to objective reality. We do this by objectively testing our theories and observations with the universe.

Something may be pragmatic and useful but nevertheless be completely wrong. Belief in god/religion for instance may carry with it useful benefits but it remains incorrect. The problem with pragmatic theory of truth, as Bertrand Russell argued, is that it leads us to relativism in that if two mutually exclusive things are useful, they we must hold them both true. For instance, belief and non-belief in god may both have their own benefits.

You could say the methods we use to determine truth (science) are pragmatic, however we do not determine truth by the methods we use, but rather by whether it corresponds to reality.

I never heard of that distinction used before. I've always used 'cosmos' and 'universe' interchangeably.

He said things may *actually* exist outside of our knowledge, so he was not conflating 'what we know exists' with 'what exists' (as you said he was), he stating the exact opposite: what we know exists may not be all that actually exists.

The point I was making was that even if we allow for the possibility that 'other things' actually exist, it does not mean we can know they exists, and that is precisely the problem with theism and supernaturalism. Objectively speaking supernaturalism may be correct in that it may *actually* exists, but there is no epistemological foundation for the claim. Unless the supernaturalist can present 'another way' of knowing, they have no way of confirming their claim, which means they must concede that their position doesn't hold.

Exactly. And the problem with supernaturalism is that it is based on the assumption that there are two sets of existence, one material, and one not-material, which violated the law of identity! How can something exist, and by definition have identity, but not be something. To say it is something but in a 'different way' is a distinction without a difference: it is still at the end of the day a 'thing'.

As you describe it, correspondence theory and pragmatism are similar, if not the same. My impression is that correspondence would be justified by pragmatism, actually.

The benefits of religion do not pragmatically justify the existence of gods, they only justify the efficacy of belief for changing psychological states. You see there is a difference in a simplistic or naive application of pragmatism, vs. a more complete and sophisticated application of it.

For example, I've already explained that Occam's Razor is a pragmatic principle. It leads to better predictions. Specifically, it predicts that simpler theories will make as good or better predictions than ones with unnecessary assumptions.

But in your example of pragmatism leading to 'wrong' conclusions, you've applied a naive interpretation of pragmatism which does not include Occam's Razor. When you continue on and complete the pragmatic analysis, you'll see that Occam's Razor rules out the necessity of a god in the efficacy of religious experience.

Pragmatism is an unbeatable philosophical foundation. Any time you point out a theory that is 'better' (i.e. makes better predictions) than pragmatism, it is automatically supported by pragmatism. So the only way you can 'defeat' pragmatism is to present a Straw Man version of it, which does not include a complete application of pragmatic principles.

Corresponding to reality means that the theory makes good predictions about reality, right? That's exactly what I'm saying. In what other way can we say that a theory corresponds to reality than to test its predictions?

Here's a little metaphor I've used before. Never got any feedback on it yet, but it makes sense to me. Here it is: A truth is like an arrow. When an arrow is true, it strikes its target. When an arrow is untrue, it fails to strike where you aim. Theories are the same way. If a theory's predictions are accurate, then the theory is true. This is a pragmatic conception of truth. Now, it does not mean we've discovered Absolute Truth or Absolute Reality. We discover truths, not Truth.

Now, you mentioned somebody's critique of pragmatism. I must say that pragmatism as it was originally conceived by Pierce and James is not the same kind of pragmatism I'm talking about. It is more or less the same, but it has evolved. The more we learn, the more pragmatism learns. If pragmatism was statically stuck in its form 100 years ago, that wouldn't be very 'pragmatic', would it?

At it's core, it is very simple. Make a prediction. If it turns out accurate, whatever it was that allowed you to make the prediction is 'true', like an arrow is true.

Regarding when two 'different' ideas have 'benefits'. Are they both 'true'? Again, you must apply the complete set of pragmatic principles. Is the benefit identical? If not, then are we really comparing apples and apples, or apples and oranges? Secondly, have we applied principles such as Occam's Razor? For example, there's the idea that religion helps people's emotional health. What is the prediction? Is the prediction that God exists, therefore religious people will be more emotionally healthy? Or is it the more pragmatic idea that participating in religious groups and rituals will lead to more emotional health? Both theories predict the same result, one has fewer unnecessary assumptions (God). Occam's Razor applies.

It is implicit in ideas such as the multiverse.

Yes, it really is. Any claim you can make to truth depends on making accurate predictions.

I think so too, and in fact that's what I meant when I said you are relying on a Straw Man version of pragmatism. For example, you brought up Peirce and James when I had already addressed them as being somewhat obsolete. A decent starting point perhaps, but not the state of the art.

See, there's that straw man again. Even in my very first post I made it clear that the word 'utility' is problematic, and should be replaced by 'prediction'. But you keep whacking that straw man, over and over.

And how do we know that it is 300,000 km/sec? Because that is our prediction, and the prediction is accurate. There is no other way. Specifically, the prediction is 'if you repeat this experiment/observation, then you will come to a result of 300,000 km/sec.' There are many ways to test the prediction via experiment/observation.

You can't speak about 'facts' without implicitly speaking about predictions. Predictions are how we know facts correspond with reality. There really is no other way of knowing.

I'm not talking about your straw man version of it, that's for sure.

Again, ignoring my emphasis on predictions. You're hung up on the old concept of 'utility'. Just drop it. That's not what I'm talking about.

No, that is not what I'm saying. I'm saying that you can't even begin to talk about 'correspond to objective reality' without depending on the idea of making predictions and testing them.

The target is the prediction. If an astronomer predicts that Jupiter and Mars will appear in a particular region of the sky, and his prediction is accurate, i.e. we observe that yes, indeed they are there, then the theory he made his predictions by, i.e. that planets orbit the sun according to the laws of physics, is 'true'. If an *astrologer* predicts that because I was born in August, I will end up getting a promotion at work this month, and this doesn't beat the default chance prediction that people born in August won't have any special difference in success at work, then the 'theory' of astrology is 'untrue'. Maybe the planets really do influence our daily lives. That may be 'the truth' about reality. But using that theory does not make good predictions. Correspondence theory depends on pragmatism.

Let me rephrase what you're saying into my usage of pragmatism: "The fact that you can make the most accurate predictions does not necessarily mean it corresponds to objective reality."

- First of all, on the surface, I agree with this. Before Copernicus, the best predictions came from the epicycle theories. But the planets do not move via epicycles in 'objective' reality. After Copernicus, the universe didn't suddenly change its character and become solar centric. Before Einstein, the best predictions came from Newton's theories. The universe didn't suddenly change from aetheric to relativistic when Einstein formulated relatvity. So, on the surface, making the best predictions doesn't lead to correspondence to reality.

- However, there is no other way to determine 'correspondence' with reality than to test predictions. Therefore, if you simply adjust the emphasis from 'any old predictions' to 'the best predictions', you will see that while pragmatism doesn't tell us 'The Truth' about Reality. It tells us many truths about reality. Remember, I'm using truths like arrows here. So, then we can say that while a small-T truth may not be the ultimate description of reality, it can be the best one we have. And so, pragmatism supports correspondence to the extent that correspondence doesn't insist on having the unchanging, for-all-time, final word on 'what is reality'. We will always be able to find better and more accurate theories that may change our conception of reality. A good example being dark matter. At one time recently, we had no inkling that such a thing could be 'real'. And now we do. It was always there, we just updated our theories to represent it.

- Thus, it becomes clear why I find it important to distinguish between the Cosmos and the Universe. The Cosmos is what really exists, whether we know it or not. The Universe is what we know exists. The Cosmos is 'reality' and the Universe is *merely* our best conception of reality. The Universe is an idea in our heads about the Cosmos. When I speak of the universe in common parlance, I'm attaching the qualifier 'as far as I know' to everything I say. When I say that the universe expanded in the big bang, does this 'correspond' with reality? As far as we know, it does. It is our best prediction... so far. Who knows, maybe some day we'll discover evidence that makes our big bang theory look like epicycles or phlogiston.

- So, with all that in mind, to say that 'pragmatism does not necessarily mean correspondence with reality' is really to say nothing at all, because the only way of determining 'correspondence' is to test predictions. There is no other way. Pragmatism is our *best* and *only* way of determining correspondence with reality. Not ultimate correspondence, not a complete description of the Cosmos. But our best description of the known universe. To say that we can know *anything at all* depends on pragmatism, i.e. making and testing accurate predictions.

I think it is you who is being dogmatic. It reminds me of creationists who insist on bringing up old and discredited ideas to criticize evolution. Like saying, well, evolutionists made the mistake of taking Piltdown Man for genuine, and so evolution is crap. My conception of pragmatic truths is not dogmatic, it is simple and flexible and allows anyone to come to the table: Show me your best predictions, and if they are more accurate than mine, I will agree that they are true. 

You have not addressed the concept of predictions at all. You have merely focused on an old and outdated 'pragmatic theory of truth' which may be what is in a philosophy text, but hey, I've heard many a philosopher insist that materialism *must* mean that *only* matter/energy exists. It needn't and doesn't. The best theory of truth is about making predictions. If some old article or text insists that pragmatism *must* stay static, then it is wrong. It certainly doesn't make sense for a pragmatist, who is *all about* using the best ideas, to insist on using a broken idea when there's a better one to be had.

'Utility' is not 'wrong', it is just vague. 'Utility' is the ability to make accurate predictions. I boil down pragmatism to a simple idea: Use the best ideas. That's it, boiled down to a nutshell. Now, if someone asks me, But what do you mean by 'use', and 'best'? I simply tell them, 'best' is determined by which ideas make the most accurate predictions, and 'use' simply means to adopt them as your prediction-making tools. The concept of utility is implicit, but specifically defined as making predictions. Without that, of course 'utility' would be vague and lead to the problems you brought up, such as whether a religion gives some 'benefit' to its believers. With the definition depending on accurate predictions, we see that the religious claims fall down.

The 'best' idea is to define utility as the ability to make better predictions.

And my original point was, is, and remains: If pragmatism doesn't entail correspondence with reality, then nothing does. Why don't you explain your alternate idea of how correspondence works in some way 'better' than pragmatism. What does it practically mean to say "Well, pragmatism leads to believing X, but X doesn't really correspond to reality."? My first question will be, of course, "Well, how do you know what corresponds with 'reality'?" And if you end up with the inevitable "I don't know, other than the ability to make predictions that are accurate," then what is the point of the distinction you're making?

Quite, because this is the best one.

And this is different from what I've been saying... how? Let me simplify your compound sentence: Pragmatism is the means by which we determine truths. There, that's better.

When you define utility as the ability to make better predictions, this argument falls apart. That is the whole big point about me distancing from the word utility. It is too vague, and too easily twisted around in a discussion. "Well, what if it is 'useful' to Hitler to kill Jews? Does that mean Nazism is 'true'? What if it is useful to a psychopath to torture innocent children? Does that mean his warped view of reality is 'true'?" Predictions are plain and simple. You can either make an accurate prediction, or you can't. What predictions does Nazism make that are better than our current best ideas? None. What predictions does the psychopath make that are more accurate than anyone else? None. Nazism predicts that we will be better off with a pure white Aryan race. This is a false prediction. It turns out that genetic diversity is important for long-term survival of any species. We will be better off with greater diversity than with less. This is a true prediction made by evolutionary science. Evolution is true, Nazism is false.

Why bother getting side-tracked into these pointless digressions about how pragmatism leads to relativism? Instead, just insist that we talk about predictions rather than utility, and suddenly pragmatism is completely obvious and unbeatable.

Hold on a second. *I* am not the one here insisting on bring 'pragmatic theory of truth' into the discussion. I never used it in any of my posts except in reference to your insistence on it.

Do not claim that *I* am 'transporting that new definition back to a prior context'. You are the one who keeps insisting on bringing up the past.

The whole frigging point of my very first post in this thread was to show that I agreed with the person you quoted, as long as it was understood that utility should be replaced by predictions. In other words, I am insisting on *dropping* the old context altogether, because better ideas have arisen since then, and there are simpler and clearer ways to explain pragmatism.

If you want me to distinguish what I'm talking about from 'pragmatic theory of truth', then call it 'epistemological pragmatism'. It's still frigging pragmatism, except updated. It is still talking about what's true and how we can know things.

In my opinion, 'pragmatic theory of truth' is like the Model T Ford, and epistemological pragmatism is like a flying car that runs on matter/antimatter energy conversion. One is descended from the other, but far far better. And you keep insisting that my flying car either a) isn't a car or b) must necessarily run off of fossil fuels, because the Model T did.

I dispute that, below. But regardless, it *is* relevant to epistemological pragmatism. You still haven't addressed it.

No, neither. I am supporting epistemological pragmatism. Correspondence theory is in turn indirectly supported by epistemological pragmatism.

What I am saying is that predictions are 'useful' and anything that is really 'useful' depends on making predictions. Utility = ability to make accurate predictions. And following that up with: anything that makes accurate predictions is 'true' like an arrow is true. Truth is like an arrow. Only after that can I invoke correspondence and make the additional claim that such predictions (or rather the theories that allow us to make the predictions) represent reality.

Again, I am in *no* way trying to 'transport' meaning back to a previous context. You are the one insisting on bringing up the Model T. I'm talking about my flying car.  

If you really think about it, it does not make any sense to say that *anything* is useful if it does not involve making accurate predictions. Think about it. In what way is it possible to 'use' something, if by using it you do not expect some future outcome from said use, and that the usefulness is measured by how reliably the expected outcomes are met? The word 'use' implies making a prediction about what will happen when such-and-such procedure is undertaken.

In the same way, in what way does it make sense to say something is 'better' than something else if you are not expecting some future result from it that achieves a desired goal (target) more accurately/reliably than the alternative? 'Better' also implies making accurate predictions.

That's the point of epistemological pragmatism. Since predictions are really the underlying 'utility' that the pragmatists were trying to elucidate, we just make the concept explicit. If this relegates 'pragmatic theory of truth' to the junkyard of philosophy (or maybe the smash up derby you seem intent on), then so be it. As a simple matter of fact, epistemological pragmatism is more 'useful' than 'pragmatic theory of truth'. That fact alone is enough justification for a pragmatist, who, again, is all about using the best ideas, to adopt it. 

Please explain. In what way can you say something is 'useful' without implicitly making a prediction about what will happen when you use it? In what way can you say something 'works' without implying 'for some end result', which again implies a prediction of the future?

No. It allows for people to *claim* that pragmatism supports knowingly false propositions. It allows people to muddy the conversation with equivocation. It is vague and critics latch onto the vagueness to try to twist pragmatism around, making it say things it doesn't really say.

I haven't made the distinction between pragmatic and true. In fact, I'm claiming they are the same. But I'm using 'true' like an arrow, not like an Absolute Truth.

Don't forget, as you seem to be drifting from my position, that my conception of epistemological pragmatism concerns our *best* ideas, not just pretty good ideas. Pretty good ideas can be useful, can make decent predictions. But when you put them up against our *best* ideas, they usually fall apart. A pretty good idea is that because religion makes someone feel good, there may be an actual God doing the magical feel-good stuff. But our *best* ideas are that such feelings are naturally occurring in our brains based on our beliefs. God is an approximation. A better approximation is neurochemistry. Who knows, maybe one day we'll have a quantum-level theory of belief that makes the theory of neurochemistry seem like a child's stick figure drawing compared to the Mona Lisa.

This also explains why gaining comfort from religions my be 'useful', but does not support the 'truth' of the religion under epistemological pragmatism. The religion is 'useful' in the sense that it makes a prediction: Belief our doctrines are true and you will feel comforted. That's a prediction. It still comes down to predictions. But notice that this is not the *best* theory. The best theory in this case is that by believing the doctrines, your brain will make you comforted; not that the doctrines *themselves* are true, but simply because the belief in them leads to a neurochemical effect in the brain that results in comfort. So, again, I must insist that we focus on the *best* ideas, when discussing epistemological pragmatism.

Context is important. You can't use Newton's Laws to determine how to invest in the stock market. But in the end it all boils down to whether or not the theory makes good predictions.

No, I disagree. Making and testing predictions doesn't depend on there being an objective outside world, it only depends on us having consistent experiences. The idea that there's an objective world comes from us making predictions based on our experiences and testing them and seeing that Hey, it looks like there's some sort of consistency here that is independent of myself. In other words, pragmatism supports correspondence theory because correspondence theory makes good predictions. Pragmatism itself (as I'm using it) does not logically equate to correspondence.

I would replace your word 'flexibly' with 'loosely', and point out that it is not more useful to use a loose word like 'practical' or 'useful', because it leads to pointless diversions in conversations. Better, and more useful, is to use the word 'prediction' and be very clear what you're talking about. Pragmatism supports my emphasis on making predictions. I predict that describing pragmatism by 'useful', 'utility', 'works', and 'practical' will cause more confusion and wasted time, and thus be less useful, than using the word 'prediction'. Lo and behold, my prediction came true (I made the prediction in my very first post on this thread, and here we are confused and wasting time over 'utility').

See, this is where you are falling into the trap of pragmatism. You cannot really criticize it by saying 'it doesn't work in such and such situation' or 'pragmatism is so-so, but I have a better idea'. In both cases, pragmatism implicitly supports whatever idea *does* work in such and such situation, and whatever idea *is* better than whatever straw man version of 'pragmatism' the person thinks is real pragmatism.

You favour 'correspondence theory of truth' over 'pragmatic theory of truth'. Why? For, whatever reason you can give, pragmatism usurps that reason, as long as it is really a good, useful reason, and thereby adopts your alternative theory.

My version of epistemological pragmatism simply embodies this idea by saying that whatever is our best idea, judged by its ability to make good predictions and thereby proving itself to be the best, is true. If you point out some better idea that makes even better predictions, then that idea is true. And so on, forever. If you can't practically prove your idea is better, then pragmatism says "Good try, come back when you've got something that actually works better."

So, while you keep poking holes in so-called 'pragmatic theory of truth', which represents pragmatism version 1.0, real pragmatists are leaving you in their dust, cruising along in their pragmatism version 101.7 (over 100 years since Peirce and James' original conceptions of it).

You can't hold pragmatism to its past. That is completely unpragmatic. You are not really criticizing pragmatism in its full and complete form.

Again, this is your confusion over my position, ignoring that I'm calling the *best* ideas true, not just any-old-ideas. When you say 'what is pragmatic may not always lead us to correspondence', you are talking about 'for some people, who may not really know the deep inner workings of things, their ideas of what is real may be over-simplified, or in fact completely wrong'. But this is not my position. My position is that the *best* ideas are true, until we find better ones. So, to use James' example of a clock's inner workings, if the average Joe thinks there are little gnomes inside the clock moving the hands, that is not our best idea. Our best ideas regarding clocks are those of clock makers and physicists, who will talk about gears and springs, and potential and kinetic energy and so on.

This is a nice dodge, by begging the question of what 'false' means. What does it practically mean for X to be false?

And again, it is ignoring that I'm talking about using the best ideas, not just run-of-the-mill ideas.

But that's the whole point of claiming that pragmatism is a valid epistemology! Of course I'm equating pragmatism with truth, as long as we understand that I mean truth like an arrow, not like an Absolute Truth.

Again, you're ignoring that epistemological pragmatism does not say 'any idea you find useful is true', but 'those ideas that make the best predictions are true'. Best, best, best. Not any. Best.

You have to be very careful here, because *actually* all of our beliefs are imperfect, and contain an element of 'non-true'. No arrow strikes its target 100% of the time.

When I say something is true, I always mean 'like an arrow is true'. Of *course* it is possible that our current conception of reality is not 'the real reality', is not a perfect representation of what actually exists. In fact, I would say that the odds are very good that every single thing we believe is non-true to some extent, every belief we hold does not perfectly represent reality, does not make perfect predictions.

So, be very careful not to equate arrow-truth with Absolute Truth. I do not think it is possible to know Absolute Truth.

So, when you say 'you have defined pragmatism is such a way it cannot lead to knowing non-true beliefs', to me it sounds like you're saying I don't think pragmatism can lead to making mistakes about the nature of reality. That is definitely not what I'm saying. In fact, I would say that all of our understanding is mistaken to one degree or another. Part of pragmatic truths is that they incorporate the understanding that they not only *can* be wrong, but are imperfect almost by definition, and so in some sense *are* wrong in every case. But they are merely less-wrong than any other 'truth' we have conceived. In epistemological pragmatism it makes sense to say that some truths are more true than other truths, just like it makes sense to say that some arrows are more true than other arrows, even though they may both be true, it's just that one is more true than the other. In other words, one theory can make better predictions than another, like relativity vs. Newton's laws. We hold that the universe *is* relativistic, while acknowledging that newton's laws are also true to a good extent.

To say that they are 'not concerned' with whether X corresponds to reality is an overstatement. They would claim that it's not the best arbiter of truth, but they would also acknowledge the usefulness of correspondence theory. Again, because of the predictions correspondence can make.

You misunderstood, I'm saying that epistemological pragmatism is the best theory of truth. Correspondence follows from it, but pragmatism is primary. Pragmatism is the foundation.

And therein lies the reason not to use it to describe pragmatism. It is so overloaded in common parlance, and even in philosophical language, that its 'utility' as a descriptor for pragmatism is quite low actually.

No surprises there. More confusion about the words 'useful' and 'utility'. Funny: The last two or three comments mirror this conversation pretty closely.

Let me pose a simple question to you: You think that correspondence theory of truth is a better theory of truth than pragmatic theory of truth (as you are describing it); Why is correspondence better? Focus on the word 'better'. In what way is it better?

But these may not always lead to truth (i.e. correspondence with reality)

You are redefining pragmatism/utility and then insistent that this new definition apply to pragmatic theory of truth. 

The point is something being 'useful' or 'better' is context-dependent. You are begging the question that to be useful or to be better must lead to correspondence with reality (i.e. truth. That is only true within the context of understanding the world. 

Telling a dying patient that they are going to get better will probably be useful in that it will easy their passing, comfort them. What you've told them is false, but useful, given the context.

I can imagine how it is possible for belief in god (fear of god) is the best way for an individual to be moral.

Both examples have pragmatic value.

See above. In neither case does the usefulness or practicality or the proposition leads to a correspondence with reality, however it does have pragmatic value.

Well there's your problem.

It seems you are defining 'best' as 'true'. Thus the best predictions are the ones that lead us to truth, in that our best predictions correspond to reality. But that is of course assuming that what it best within a context is also what is true (i.e. is what correspond to reality). It isn't.

Which means you must accept that what is pragmatic does not always correspond to reality.

1. If you define 'truth' as being 'that which corresponds to reality' then it means pragmatism can lead to non-true conclusions, because what is pragmatic does not always correspond to reality.

2. If you define 'truth' as 'that which is pragmatic' then clearly what is true to you does not depend on whether it correspond to reality. 

If you accept 1, then you accept correspondence theory of truth, not pragmatic theory of truth.

If you accept 2, then you accept pragmatic theory of truth, not correspondence theory of truth.

I am not saying pragmatism does not work, I am saying that in certain contexts what is pragmatic does not necessarily lead to truth (i.e. correspondence with reality).

Your redefinition of pragmatism is stopping you from understanding pragmatic theory of truth as it is understood in philosophy.

Correspondence theory of truth states that proposition X is true if it corresponds with reality. i.e. the proposition "snow is white" is only true if snow is in fact white. (And pragmatism does play a role in determining if X corresponds to reality.) 

Pragmatic theory of truth states that proposition X is true if it is useful. (It is irrelevant whether X correspond to reality.)

You may not like that understanding of pragmatic theory of truth, but that is how it is understood within philosophy, and how it is describes everywhere. You are redefining pragmatism to the point where it no longer relates to pragmatic theory of truth.

Also, note that correspondence theory is in fact the most accepted theory of truth, and with good reason.

But this does not ensure correspondence with reality, which means what is the best within a given context may not always be truth. If you are happy with that, then fine. However you cannot just beg the question that what is the best is by definition true.

But the *best* idea may not always correspond to reality, however if you think the best idea is by definition true, then clearly truth does not depend on correspondence with reality.

Not corresponding with reality.

I define truth as that which corresponds with reality, and false as that which does not correspond with reality.

So something can be useful, it can be practical, but not correspond to reality and thus be false.

I am not defining true and false by utility. The fact something is useful does not mean it is true.

Do you agree that something is only true if it correspond to reality?

Again again, this is ignoring that the best ideas may not always correspond with reality.

Actually pragmatic theory of truth and correspondence are completely distinct from each other.

Correspondence theory or truth DOES NOT follow from pragmatic theory of truth. It's a bit like ways intelligent design follows from the theory of evolution!

http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/Truth_theories.html

Because you want to strictly define pragmatism in a way that the term is not even used!

Correspondence theory of truth is better because it actually describes reality. What is describes as true is actually how reality is.

Pragmatic theory of truth does not describe reality, instead it is focused on what works, but what works does not always correspond to reality, thus pragmatic theory of truth allows for truths which are not actually true according to correspondence theory.