That humans desire happiness above everything else is an factual empirical claim. We can empirically determine whether it is in fact that case that humans desire happiness above everything else (or whether they desire something else, more than anything else.) It isn't subjective.

Sure, but then that is still a matter of empirical scientific inquiry, and it still necessitates a factual answer.

In any case, the behaviour X would necessarily result in desire Y above negative Z (assuming there even is a negative of course), otherwise X would not be statistically more likely to result in Y, and therefore would not be the moral thing to do. The point is that once we empirically determine what it is that people want Y, we can then empirically determine what behaviours will statistically be more likely to result in Y. This behaviour is X. Thus we will necessarily end with a behaviour or behaviours which are statistically more likely to result in Y (and do not result in any possible negative consequences greater than Y)

If we do not desire them then how are they more important? Why are they important, to whom, and for what reason? Surely it is the case that the most important thing to us is that which we desire above all else. 

Here's a talk by Richard Carrier on scientific morality: 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GkE1TxMRzU (That is part four, where is talk about scientific morality.) 

Here's a quote on defining morals:

"A moral ought is what you ought to do more than anything else, since moral are supposed to supersede all other demands - thats what makes them moral. But if the moral thing to do is what we ought to do more than anything else, then the moral thing to do must be what gives us what we want more than anything else, because only a greater desire would ever motivate us to obey."

Surely this could constitute a desire to please god, and/or a desire not to go to hell, and/or a desire to go to heaven. But you said something other than what we desire. I think our behaviour is always based on a desire, which ultimately draws to some ultimate underlining desire, such as happiness.

Again, would this not constitute a desire to make god happy, indeed, you even say this yourself (the bit in bold).

This doesn't really answer your suggestion that we may find something that we do not desire important enough to act on it over what we do desire, but so far your suggestions are things we do desire, namely, the desire to please god, the desire to make god happy, the desire to not to go to hell, or the desire to go to heaven.

This is simply saying we desire everything on earth to live, so its still a desire.

Again, you suggested we may find something important other than what we desire. But this doesn't make any sense since surely in order to find something important it must satisfy a desire in us, thus there can be nothing more important than our desire(s).

I would say that they all draw to some ultimate desire which we all share, thus even if my desire is X, and your desire is Y, both satisfy the same ultimate desire (e.g. happiness)

Good question.

If we ultimately share the same desire, then our desire would be equal, although as I say above, we may take different routes in satisfying this desire, for instance, X may make me happy, whereas Y may make you happy, but both may encompass behaviours/lifestyles that satisfy this ultimate desire. So what matters is not so much specific behaviours (X versus Y), but rather the overall lifestyle we live, e.g. consistently lying will probably not lead to happiness for various reason, whereas being honest and compassionate will probably lead to happiness.

 I want to jump in on this, and I simply don't have the time right now.  You can probably guess a lot of what I'll say, though, as I've expounded on morality quite often.

Maybe the thread will be alive later this week.

They may conflict, but if the hypothesis is right then they would both satisfy the ultimate shared desire: Z (what ever Z is, such as happiness.)

Well aside from sociopaths/psychopaths, most people are compassionate, and share the feelings of others, so in making others happy will increase your own happiness, but making others unhappy, then you share their unhappiness, so any action which negated someone elses happiness would negate your own.

(Also, it would contain the tacit assumption that your desires/happiness were superior to someone else's desires.)

I would say we should pursue desires/behaviours that do not negate the desire of others, so even if someone does not enjoy that desire or behaviour (i.e. if it does not make them happy), if it does not make them unhappy, then there would be not problem.

How would it interfere with their happiness. How would the person lifestyle of someone actually infringe on their own desire to be happiness. They may dislike it but then that it not a reason to suppress it, nor would it stop their own desires to be happy. We could show that suppressing homosexual behaviour does real damage to the homosexual (in terms of happiness) yet allowing it damages no one, unless of course they could demonstrate that it negates their desire to be happy.

 Ok.   A couple of observations:

When we start talking about human desires, we're opening up a pandora's box when it comes to finding anything on which we can hang our empirical hats.  I wrote something that I'm having trouble locating in which I talk about a common mistake theists make when arguing about morality and happiness.   They say that morality must transcend happiness because people who just live by the motto "happiness first" always end up ruining their lives.  

Let's suppose a hypothetical married man, "Bob" decides he's going to live entirely for his own happiness.  The first morning after this decision, he wakes up and realizes that gourmet food makes him very happy.  Rather than have a sensible breakfast at home, he goes to the most expensive place in town and orders a $200 breakfast.  Realizing that he doesn't really like his job, he decides he would be happier playing video games than working, so he goes home and plays video games all day.  Picking the kids up from school is a chore and a bother, so he doesn't do it.  That night, he goes out to a bar and gets drunk because getting drunk makes him happy.  Sex makes him happy, too, so he picks up a girl at the bar.  Condoms are a hinderance to full enjoyment of sex, so he doesn't use one.  Etc... etc.. 

Anyone with half a brain can see why this scenario is absurd.  Bob is choosing instant happiness over long term happiness in all cases.  In real life, nobody does that.  Every human has the ability to see beyond their immediate actions and curb various desires based on projected results.  We all balance short and long term happiness in determining what we should do.

It might seem like a simple matter to form some kind of equation by which we can weight long and short term happiness and find some kind of balance, but it's much more difficult than that.  Happiness itself is very hard to define, and I, for one, don't think short and long term happiness are the same thing.  "Instant happiness" is a rather intense emotion that comes with physiological changes, endorphin rushes, and feelings of well being, fun, exhiliration, and whatever else we can lump in there.   Long term happiness is quite different.  That's a continual state of existence where we can say that on balance, we aren't overly stressed or unhappy, and are more or less content with our place in the universe.

Beyond this, we really do have the problem of happiness meaning different things to different people.  So, while I agree with you in principle that there is empirical reality behind every moral motivation, I think there are so many layers of subjective interpretation between the empirical and the motivation, you'd be hard pressed to make the observation useful except for philosophical discussions.

To complicate matters further, our moral instincts are not always particularly logical, yet they are the primary impetus behind many of our actions.  For instance, the most logical way for humans to reproduce would be to decide on the number of people necessary for the next generation and then assign the most genetically, financially, and educationally fit people the task of bearing the correct number of children.  Childrearing would be the responsibility of the entire community, and the concept of "my child" would be meaningless, since two people can't possibly give a child as much quality childrearing as hundreds.

Maybe I'm a little off on my scenario, but the point is that our way of having and raising children makes very little sense, yet we all feel a strong moral imperative associated with parents and their children. 

I'm saying all of this to say that I think it's highly improbable that we could ever come up with a math equation to determine the "correct" moral action in a given situation.  Obviously as a materialist, I believe that our moral drives are an emergent property of the physical universe, and as such, can be quantified.  However, in this case, I think for all practical purposes, the idea of morals by math is unworkable.  The observation that people will always tend towards moral decisions that seem like the best thing to do for the desired result is almost a tautology, and so broad as to be virtually useless as a predictive or prescriptive tool.

 I haven't read Carrier's book.  I'll add it to my already lengthy list... 

I think another thing you're not taking into consideration (or at least not mentioning) is that our desires are part of what we could call a "moral matrix."  Our desires are often contradictory, and we have to choose which of our principles takes precedence.  Unfortunately, this isn't a static formula.  Given two identical situations, we might choose two different actions based on any number of things.  When you stop to think that any moral decision might overlap ten or twelve of our moral "principles," you can see that it's a lot more like multidimensional math than linear logic.

Also consider that guilt is a major factor in moral decisions.  The thing is, guilt doesn't necessarily equate to the correct moral decision.  I sometimes feel guilty for firing employees, even when I know it's the best thing for my business, and by extension, all of my other employees.  Sometimes, though, I do the wrong thing because feelings of guilt blind my sense of logic.

What about things that are not particularly important but are still within the realm of "moral" decisions?  An example that pops to mind is a girl I was talking to very recently who won't do certain sexual things with her boyfriend because of feelings of guilt from her Catholic upbringing.  She feels horrible when she does them, in fact.  The problem is, she feels horrible because she knows her guilt is irrational.  What is the correct moral thing to do?  If she does these things to please her boyfriend, her boyfriend's enjoyment will possibly go down because he will know that she is making herself unhappy to please him.  If she doesn't do these things, she's depriving her boyfriend of things he really wants for no good reason.  It's not a major world crisis we're talking about here.  There's no single principle I can think of by which we should judge the "correct" moral decision.  In fact, either decision might have a positive or negative effect, so it's just guesswork.  There are too many variables to consider, and human nature is too fickle to be able to predict the outcome.

That's exactly what I'm trying to say.  Add to this little conundrum that each person's "correct" solution to this problem is going to be slightly different, and not because the empirical reality of the actions is any different, but because each person's sense of morality, guilt, right and wrong, empathy, and responsibility has been shaped by their environment, which may or may not have been conducive to accurate moral reasoning (whatever that is... since we're trying to define it).

To be honest, I think of morality not in terms of right and wrong but better and worse.  In most cases, I don't think there is a correct decision versus lots of incorrect ones.  If you think about it, you perform hundreds, maybe thousands of very small acts of moral behavior in any day, depending on how far you want to go with calling something moral.  I consider it very moral for people not to ram my car with theirs when I unintentionally (or even intentionally) cut in front of them in busy traffic.  If we can say that every time we don't do something bad to someone when we get a burst of rage, we are being moral, well, that's a lot of being moral.

Then again, if I cut someone off and they flip me off, I don't consider that to be the "wrong" choice.  It's certainly better than hurting me.  If they yell at me and tailgate, that's not as good a choice, but it's still better than hurting me.  If they follow me to my destination, get out of the car and scream at me, that's still better than hurting me.  You see what I'm getting at?

Likewise, in the case of the girl with hangups, either decision they make will probably be better in some respects and worse in others.  This brings me around to yet another problem with making math out of morality.  Regardless of how they decide to handle that situation, if both of them feel they are doing something helpful for the other (and themselves) then most people will agree that they are doing a moral thing, even if the outcome is bad.  In a lot of cases, motive counts for more than actions.  In morality, it is often true that "it's the thought that counts."

To argue for moral realism is to argue for the existence of God.

I will counter with the following:

To argue for salary caps is to argue for the cult of personality.

Now, we're on exactly the same terms.  Neither one of us has any idea what the other is talking about.

So, let me see if I understand you correctly. You believe in a moral universe?

Okay. Please define "Y." Or, at least, provide an example of "Y."

Certainly covers me adequately enough. Everything else is window dressing for "Y".

Biological cues, such as hormones, can show what makes people happy. Studies can narrow down happiness "cues" if you will.

I only responded because noone else did yet. I'm not a biologist, so I can't narrow it down the way someone like Deluded_God can. But this will suffice for the moment I think.

**Editted for clarity**

Okay, but the moral aspect implies that we take a broader outlook than simply looking at the individual's state of mind or welfare. Each of us should or ought to be concerned for other human beings. Or, at least, one can make the moral argument that this should be the case. And moreover, one could make the moral argument that we should be concerned for more than human beings. Some may argue that we should be concerned for all living things and the environment. Ultimately, this becomes a matter of values. So, how do we determine scientifically what should be our morals or values? 

There are some factors which are universal. Everyone feels good when they have a good meal in their stomach and a roof over their heads. I agree that some "happiness factors" are significantly different for some individuals over others, but there is a baseline to work with that all life stems from.

This is getting too insubstantial for me. But I do recall a phrase....."the good of the many outweigh the good of the few, or the one." to close with.

Well if humans desire X (happiness), then behaviour and lifestyles will either increase or decrease that goal. This means that moral statements are factual empirical propositions to be judged according to our lifestyles.

I agree with Carrier's suggestion that the moral thing to do (i.e. what we ought to do more than anything else) must be what we we want more than anything else. So if humanity collectively desires happiness, then maximising happiness will be the moral thing to do, and that therefore becomes the criterion for determining what is moral. This means that moral statements will be propositions that have factual, empirical answers.

I know this is all theoretical and in practice when must take into account all sorts of variables it may not change. I certainly still need to read up on this more.

Finally, you said "there is no natural moral law" and yet you say that "human beings have the natural capacity for altruism." This seems to be a contradiction or at least an inconsistency? If humans have an innate moral capacity in the form of altruism then this does mean that we have some natural moral system. I wold agree that there is a human construct too morality--a formalisation to morality--however I do think that this formalisation of morality is ultimately derived from facts about human nature. This means that morality hasn't merely changed over decades and centuries, rather it has become more refined, as a result of increased knowledge about human nature, suffering, what humans desire, the impact of our actions, etc. For example, we now know that black people and white people (or heterosexuals and homosexuals) are not intrinsically different and should not be segregated or regarded as interior or superior, because this does not increase human happiness but in fact decreases it and negatively effects the well-being of society in general. So the statements "black people are inferior to white people" or "homosexuality is wrong" are in fact factual empirical statements that must be judged according to whatever it is that humans desire. If an action or lifestyle increases or does not infringe on our desires that there is no reason to disallow it. Whereas if an action decreases our desire then there is reason to disallow it or control it in some way.

Yes, this line of reasoning has been used from time immemorial to justify the torture of the one or few for the sake of the many.

"And one of them, named Cai'aphas, being the high priest that same year, said unto them, Ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not." John 11:49, 50
 

On what authority do you make this moral absolute?

Of course not. Nothing about morals is objective. Their existence is predicated on subjective ideas.

There is also no doubt that it has obtained faulty information and led to the deaths of soldiers in wartime. Over and over and over again.

I have proven that they don't.

I think I already established that morals aren't objective. Are you ready to move on yet?

As for it being my personal opinion, it is my moral position. It's not an opinion. I literally feel when I hear or see an incident of torture that is impossible to distance myself from emotionally. It stems from my morality, something that has developed since my birth. Much like yours has.

Ridiculous. I'm not going to repeat myself, so I'll direct you to both of my previous posts. Read the pertaining paragraphs again, more carefully this time. And take into account that this is based on my MORALITY. Not opinion. Your morality can be different. And is. You are entitled to a different moral standing on every subject than I have. But this is mine on this subject. You wanted to delve into it, you got what you asked for.

Since I've not made such a statement, what's holding you back?

Of course. Objective morals are impossible. How many times do I have to repeat myself?

I do. For me, I am god. Nothing else qualifies, or even comes close. However, I still haven't made any objective moral statements. Any morality I have ever brought up in any topic anywhere is subjective, and I have stated as much. Including in this topic.

You are simply taking my comment out of the context that morals are subjective. If you'd quit doing that, then you'd realize that it is impossible for anyone to justify torture to me. This is not to say that others will have the same response.