Notes on dreams, signs and classification
It has been said that life is worth living in accordance to the scope of one's dreams, and I will not be one to refute this. Instead I will try to offer an analysis, and hopefully an inspiration in accord to the passions that set the gears of life in joyful motion. If we try to navigate the labyrinth of the spirit, it is tempting, and perhaps necessary to abstract and fragment it's aspects into useful identities, and within these identities really rest territories we give to space or action. Love, fear, lust, disappointment and the rest of the spectrum we use to denote our experienced world, are external descriptions we use to convey meaning to one another and, and as symbols with clear denotations, serve as a surface description-- a mask used for presentation to the receiver. The masks of these representations serve to manipulate the social animals with which we can communicate, through marking the space inside the denotation into a territory or identity. The demarcation required for abstract representation and communication serves to classify serial identities and needs precision in order to relate to its context. The relativistic nature of context necessitates a certain malleable character for representations to indicate how far down the list of qualities an identity has are useful. A set is an identity and a thing, it is separate from other identities based on qualities; the sub-set of this set too is an identity, and all identities have qualities. The identity of the sub-set is contingent to the identity of the set that contains it, however, as the sub-set too may contain its own sub-sets and qualities, the set itself is a sub-set to a set of a broader context. This is the hierarchy of denotation, an ever branching series of identities and sub-identities.
The identity, which is a symbol and representation, remains an identity so long as its context remains. The topological mask of all identities and classifications poses an opaque threshold in two directions. The exoteric variety holds that one identity is a mask for the identities in other contexts and/or the identity given under a context competes with other identities in the same context. The esoteric variety holds that the qualities of an identity cannot be known without creating sub-identities which compose the said identity. One might think it well to assume that meaning or understanding can never be attained given such a paradigm for understanding, and yet it is the common root of all human knowledge, classification, and communication because these things require a pragmatic use of information to deal with the context or situation these symbols are used to describe. Communicating the drinking of water does not necessitate one know its chemical composition to understand what is meant, nor does water need to be identified in the communication of the presence of a human being, even though their composition certainly is mostly water. It is not practical to mention the classification in either direction, or conversation would talk to long to be effective. We know that languages that are best suited for the developing child brain will pass on more easily, pragmatism is inherit in the survival of a being in its environment, shades and nuances increase only insofar as the capacity of the intellect has use for them. If we posit intelligence as being effective manipulation of the context of a medium, an effective manifestation of this intelligence is the ability to realize new situations and applications which will require both new exoteric and esoteric identities, both of which rest on a form of generality.
There are two types of generality: that of quality and that of quantity; the former which measures appearances to one another to evaluate a resemblance, and the latter which measures degree, intensity and equivalence. The cyclical generality of 'quality' has a different function than the generalized intensity of a quantity, i.e. we cannot identify phenomena like 'heat' or 'loving' in a generalized singular quality without quantifying and comparing it to other values of the same identified quality. To say anything of heat or love you are inviting a comparison, 'very hot' implies there are other quantities of hotness that are known generally. These seemingly invite distinction, however, the consequential and indefinite relativism invites one to be able to change or substitute terms for one another while either being able to give the specious appearance that the context has not changed, or to make appear that the context has changed when in fact has not. We generally assume these things to be clarified by the situational and non-vocal context, such as a mutually shared experience. The effectiveness of this generality prompts one to accept a kind of empiricism, so long as one realizes that that the qualifiers and quantifiers can be replaced by a resembling idea under the moniker of the same word, but this leads to problems such as the 'Quine-Duham thesis'. The nature of repetition rests in contrast to this; it is a conduct of the appearance of the physical world. A drop of water has both different physical and abstract qualities and quantities from any other drop of water, yet what holds our conceptualization of these two drops of water as being identifiable with one another are the similarities they share and not the differences that drive them to chaos from one another. The structure of any classification system is precisely based on this pattern of human cognition; one cannot overestimate its utility. However, a danger rests here, a barrier perhaps. A double is not the same as its resemblance, which is to say, a quality is not the same as its equivalence; what have we been losing with our propensity to generalize? Clarity, falsifiability and epistemology are at stake when a contextual ambiguity (perceived or not) rests on the imprecision of word/concept substitution to which no grammar or thought has quelled (Q-D Thesis).
The basis for our systematic paradigm for knowledge, for accumulating knowledge, rests in the ability for the human intellect to abstract, from the whole of reality, digestible pieces which it can represent, and therefore rests as the foundation of knowledge from which all investigations have as their aim. One can easily posit that, from a phenomenological assessment of epistemology, the broadest contexts of empirical reality rest on the subjectivity of the senses, and the third party perspectives that agree and give credence to the senses of the herd. From the spatial spectacles of Kant that force us to filter reality in spatial dimension, and not true in-itself reality, to Nietzsche and the various phenomenologists he would inspire with his 'Perspectivism', you will find no small degree of struggle between the object and its subject. Likewise the aim of all scientific endeavors is the validation of this premise into experiment and experience, tested and firm, vigorously checking the various human cognitive flaws which can prevent us from understanding objective reality. In proportion to our sensual capacities we have sought the most rigid philosophy of science as yet possible in order to satisfy this desire for experience, for 'real' experience… for knowledge.
To be put clearly, as falsifiability is the premise by which all hypotheses must be judged, a hypothesis must have contained within it the means by which it can fail or succeed in its presentation to the senses, and in the context in which the senses are so placed. It forms a sort of checklist of requirements needed to be satisfied to prove viable. Since we cannot posit knowledge outside of the senses, or our technological extensions of the senses, it is hence from which we can only posit our empiricism, and since scientific methodology is concerned with circumventing our intrinsic cognitive flaws, the constant reminder that these cognitive flaws exist, that our perspective of knowledge is brought though the window of the senses, we come across the undeniable reality that knowledge is never exhaustive, nor absolute. We might venture so far as to say, science can show us primarily what the world 'is not', for what science shows us through the process of testing, prediction and explanation, there rests a vista beyond the horizon, where still more refined knowledge exists of the subject in which we are inquiring.
That being said, we must posit then, from the idea of infinitely progressive and therefore incomplete knowledge and the greater exhaustive capacity for knowledge to show us what 'isn't' true, than an exhaustive absolute knowledge is not possible nor required, so long as the mode of inquiry includes the end result by which the knowledge sought must achieve. The open ended question is infinite, unless the knowledge is placed in the perspective of the goals of the senses. One should not ask 'Why do all life forms contain carbon?", for example, for the answer rests solely on the limitations of our current capacity to investigate physical phenomena. But when one asks quite specifically "Can life exist without carbon?", the end, the goal is clear, and the knowledge one attains from the inquiry is certain. Only by posing a line of questioning from the role of a perceiver and task-doer can we soundly say, knowledge has exhaustively filled the vacuum of the unknown, which it has set to explore for very specific reasons. i.e., a goal for knowledge must be present in order to absolutism to occur.
As even the wandering spirit itself dreams, and to dream is to dream about something specific that has yet to occur, this is almost identical with our concept of goal, and with that rests the moral of the story. Knowledge is not an end in itself; knowledge can only show us to means to an end. Along the way it shows us our error.
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