AbrahObscura's blog
Desire, evaluation, happiness and the difference
Submitted by AbrahObscura on April 1, 2007 - 2:55am.Put simply, 'happiness' is a qualitative state that is meaningless without the context, and therefor the means, by which it attained. It states relation between subject and object: I (subject) have happiness (object) because... (relation to such and such). However there have been no fool proof methods of yet attaining the goodlife for everyone, and that is with no shortage of attempts, either offered in advice or forced by dogma! Aside from the relation of subject to object, there is also something intrinsic to the idea of a state of being arising from a relation to other things -- evaluation. Evaluation is a measure in accordance to goal. If you want to live, you will evaluate food is better than poison. As happiness always seems abject to the fulfillment of desire. Perhaps the case would be a simple one, concerning human beings happiness, if we had relatively few desires that didn't conflict with one another. Unfortunate the case might be that I might both want to go out drinking all night, and at the same time arrive to work the next morning less than drained, I will have to arbitrarily evaluate these projected outcomes to one another. But there is nothing that imposes that I must remain continuous with my evaluation. Though I might value a night drinking on the town with my friends, at the sacrifice of sleep and sobriety next morning, it is no guarantee that I will retain this evaluation the next morning as I hug the toilet vomiting, and call out to work. So we have a few obstacles, we have the contingency of happiness to means (i.e. not self sufficient; desire other than, or upkeep to present being), we have the multiplicity of drives and desires (themselves host to different causal phenomena like chemical reflex, or psychological conditioning) that can and often do compete with one another, and we have a capricious nature of fickle moods that alter the priority of values into different hierarchies.
On the meaninglessness of the word God
Submitted by AbrahObscura on April 1, 2007 - 2:52am.If you are going to propose something exists, you must also propose the means by which it is intelligible. If you cannot define what it is you are proposing, then the validity of what is denoted becomes meaningless in conversation. This must mean, of course, that a thing must be somehow knowable, which is to say, identifiably different than other things. Something must be known of the object claiming existence, in order to make propositions of existence intelligible. This proceeds the need for proof, because before we can weigh evidence, we need to know what it is we are talking about, and how it is made intelligible. Asking for proof that a 'flabulperbotuck' exists skips over the need for intelligibility.
Notes on dreams, signs and classification
Submitted by AbrahObscura on April 1, 2007 - 2:49am.It has been said that life is worth living in accordance to the scope of one's dreams, and I will not be one to refute this. Instead I will try to offer an analysis, and hopefully an inspiration in accord to the passions that set the gears of life in joyful motion. If we try to navigate the labyrinth of the spirit, it is tempting, and perhaps necessary to abstract and fragment it's aspects into useful identities, and within these identities really rest territories we give to space or action. Love, fear, lust, disappointment and the rest of the spectrum we use to denote our experienced world, are external descriptions we use to convey meaning to one another and, and as symbols with clear denotations, serve as a surface description-- a mask used for presentation to the receiver. The masks of these representations serve to manipulate the social animals with which we can communicate, through marking the space inside the denotation into a territory or identity. The demarcation required for abstract representation and communication serves to classify serial identities and needs precision in order to relate to its context. The relativistic nature of context necessitates a certain malleable character for representations to indicate how far down the list of qualities an identity has are useful. A set is an identity and a thing, it is separate from other identities based on qualities; the sub-set of this set too is an identity, and all identities have qualities. The identity of the sub-set is contingent to the identity of the set that contains it, however, as the sub-set too may contain its own sub-sets and qualities, the set itself is a sub-set to a set of a broader context. This is the hierarchy of denotation, an ever branching series of identities and sub-identities.