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I wish here to address the charge often levelled at atheists with regard to criterion of proof for certain ideas and propositions, particularly religious and other metaphysical ones. The charge, often made by theists, is that such people are practicing “scientism” and are following a “materialist ideology”. The charge is vacuous and I will not spend masses of time on it.

The first thing to ask is what precisely we mean by “scientism”. The term is almost wholly used in a negative context, and refers to the idea that empirical testing constitutes the only valid method for knowing. This claim has been levelled many times with respect to numerous disciplines of science, because they are often staking claim on grounds usually claimed by religion and metaphysics. Hence it has particular importance for contemporary debate. The “argument from scientism” as I call it, is vapid. In it, an interlocutor asserts that because an empirical inquiry is taking place into certain fields of endeavour where it should not, and more importantly, that people promoting it consider this empirical inquiry superior to other ways of knowing.

Take two “controversial” examples. Neurotheology and evolutionary psychology. The former is a misnomer since neurotheology, a real discipline, has nothing to do with theology. “Neurotheology” constitutes using techniques of modern neuroscience to investigate the brain functioning behind belief in God. Naturally, because of this, it has come under attack by those who wish to relegate non-material explanations for such phenomenon. The charge hence levelled by the empirical investigation of a domain for so long off-limits to empirical investigation is “scientism” and “materialist ideology”. This charge is vacuous.

It is immediately obvious that such a charge is innately vapid because the assertion contains no substance. “Science” and “scientific theories” constitute models used to explain and predict phenomenon based on a preponderance of facts. To assert that an empirical inquiry into any domain constitutes an exclusionary practice is both nonsensical and irrelevant. All that is relevant is the methodology used. The problem at hand is that the vacuous charge of “scientism” is not a methodological critique. If an empirical inquiry into a domain produces a set of results and a body of theoretical knowledge used to explain and predict associated phenomenon based on a preponderance of fact, then the charge that empirical inquiry is off-limits to that domain is both false and irrelevant. The charge of “scientism” is also a methodological red herring. It is worth nothing that supposed metaphysical “methods” which are being excluded by empirical inquiry into this field, have produced no fruit whatsoever. This is precisely my point. When considering valid methodologies for gaining and evaluating knowledge claims about the world, we are not playing a game of “meet me in the middle”. Poor methods, or non-methods, cannot be included solely by virtue of the necessity of having some diversity in our study.

The charge levelled is hence two-fold. “Scientism” believes that all ideas and conceptualizations are testable by empirical methods, and this is supposedly concomitant with “materialist ideology”, whilst such practices exclude “other” ways of knowing, such as metaphysical means of gaining knowledge about the same subject.

Again, the charge is vapid. The first charge is a simply a non sequitur. In the case of neurotheology as an example of scientific inquiry entering a discipline hitherto off limits, the assertion that scientific investigation into the workings of belief in God based on neuroscience excludes metaphysical and religious “methods” and constitutes scientism is a vacuous charge. The charge of scientism, as I said before, is a non sequitur . The premise of any scientific inquiry into any possible conceptualization, or any waters untapped, is that there is an empirical and testable aspect of that idea or set of ideas. Whereas, the claim of “scientism” is that there is an empirical and testable aspect to all sets of ideas. The movement from one to other is a non sequitur. Whereas, in the case of science investigating a domain it previously could not, the charge of “scientism” hence reflects the vapid and boorish behaviour of those who wish to exclude empirical inquiry from investigating how the brain may produce the conceptualization of the existence of God. When Relativity was first announced, although many physicists accepted it, another large body of them did not, refusing to believe that empirical methodology could come to grips with the nature of space and time. These opponents were reduced to calling the supporters of Relativity “metaphysicians”, despite the fact that the empirically verifiable Einstein field equations could be used to explain and predict the motion of bodies travelling at very fast speeds that Newtonian mechanics could not. Ironically, about 20 years later, it would be a charge later repeated by Relativists, when faced with the rise of Quantum Mechanics.

Presumably this tells us we should be careful when asserting that certain knowledge claims cannot be investigated by certain methods. Provided that the method in question has proved to be a reliable method for explaining and predicting phenomenon. The assertion that the study of belief in God should be off-limits to neuroscience because that would constitute a “materialist” approach to the subject which would exclude possible other methods is vacuous for that very reason. Supposed “non-material” methods for gaining knowledge of these phenomenon outside empirical inquiry have not produced a concrete and solid set of coherent, explainable theories to predict and explain the phenomenon attempting to be explained. Ever. This makes the charge of “exclusion” equally mendacious. If a method is being excluded from a process, it usually indicates it is useless in that regard. In order for a method to be shown to be a useful method for making justifiable knowledge claims about certain ideas and concepts, it must be able to explain and predict them.

This being the case, whence the charge of scientism? It is most likely political. With respect to neurotheology and evolutionary psychology to name two examples, most people levelling the critiques under discussion are not versed in either, and the use of the terms “scientism” and “materialist ideology” despite these being mendacious and vapid assertions, demonstrate that empty political rhetoric is being employed, with the greater concern being sway than debate. As Daniel Dennett pointed out: "Whenever the religious come across a scientific theory they do not like, they just dismiss it as "scientism"". As I said before, this assertion, by itself, no more constitutes a valid way to justify knowledge claims than it would be to claim that smoking drugs is a valid way to learn about the Earth's orbit around the sun because the use of a telescope and painstaking observations constitutes "scientism".

This being the case, whenever claims are made that certain concepts are utterly excluded from empirical inquiry since they deal wholly in metaphysical realms, these are ad hoc claims. The claims are not derived from anything. There is no “non-material” investigative method which allows the conformation or falsification of any of these ideas. To wit, there has never been a “non-material” method that gathers a set of coherent and explainable facts that are in turn used to build theories to explain and predict more associated phenomenon with respect to the mysterious domain of the supposed “soul”, nor for any of the vast number of human ideas regarding metaphysical realms. This is another reason why charges of “materialist ideology” are mendacious. Whereas materialist approaches to phenomenon are backed by a method which explains and predicts associated phenomenon and builds concomitant bodies of knowledge called theory, there is no such counterpart for the supposed metaphysical realms to which many incoherent religious concepts are relegated. They have never born any useful fruits. Indeed, it often turns out that when something is relegated to a metaphysical realm, it turns out to be quite wrong. Indeed, much of the history of science has been involved in overturning such metaphysical ideas. This is the problem at hand. One may assert that their interlocutor’s desire to investigate a certain phenomenon from a purely empirical phenomenon constitutes “scientism”, but where no other “alternative” method for gaining a set of coherent and explainable facts that in turn explain and predict other phenomenon, then this is hardly a charge to take seriously.

The misunderstanding here is that the placing of certain concepts or ideas within metaphysical realms hence excluding them from empirical inquiry, somehow validates them. In reality, this defence is an appeal to ad hocism.

The charges against evolutionary psychology are equally ridiculous. Somehow, these people have gotten it into their heads that evolutionary psychology, which is a new field, albeit a real field is not a real field but rather a “materialist faith”. This reflects the childish boorishness of many who attack scientific inquiry into domains previously untouched by empiricism, and that most of these critics are completely unaware of the field they are studying. Evolutionary psychology, despite having some poor press due to “popular” science books such as The Third Chimpanzee, is, in formal academia, as real a discipline as biology which seeks to understand the evolutionary roots of psychological behaviours and manifestiations, both in human and other animals and involves two serious disciplines.

Evolutionary biology aside, the general point, for all scientific inquiry into any domain, the charge that empirical inquiry should be restricted from such domains is a ridiculous charge. It does not constitute a methodological critique. One must evaluate the method, and only then can one charge those using it with making unjustified knowledge claims. But the assertion, even before the method is used, that the systematic approach used by the method should be excluded because it works in a domain (in this case, the material) that the concepts in question are outside of, is an ad hoc appeal. A man of the Newtonian era, educated in the proportionality of the distance of a falling body to the square of the time in free fall, might utterly refuse to believe that it is possible to gain knowledge of subatomic particles of accuracy comparable to measuring the length of the United States to within one hair’s breadth accuracy, but he would have to study about 300 years worth of physics first. With respect to the first example I used, neurotheology, It is not as though this discipline tentatively entered a hotbed of competitive research. There were no feverish theologians and metaphysicians having assembled a coherent method for gaining a set of coherent facts to explain and predict non material phenomenon. The assertion that such the scientific method must proceed from the assumption of metaphysical naturalism (singular physical ontology) which excludes possible non-material components and associated methods is an equally mendacious assertion. Whilst it is true that science by definitions works with epistemological naturalism, the jump from epistemological naturalism to metaphysical naturalism is a non sequitur. All charges on this theme simply distract from the fact that there is no coherent methodology for gaining a set of coherent facts about a supposed non-material metaphysical realm. Where knowledge claims about either the physical or supposed “non-physical” realms are made, they must be judged by the method that claims to justify them. In this case, the choice is very, very easy.

I wrote this piece because I am troubled by the fact that the word "scientism" has become a one word argument, to the point where the word has essentially lost all meaning. A religious leader has only to utter the word "scientism" to gain an edge in an argument. Keep in mind that throughout this, I have never actually lent support to the notion that empirical inquiry is the only valid way of knowing., Therre are plenty of other valid methods which have established themsleves. Mathematics is not an empirical inquiry based on inductive testing. Mathematics constitutes a set of abstract principles derived from constructing proof heirarchies of a priori truths derived from tautologies. Philosophy is more all-encompassing and simply works on the principles of reasoned argument to put forth ideas about the nature of the universe. Neither of these constitute empirical testing, but they are valid methods all the same.

The only difference is, religious metaphysical claims do not get to employ this defence, because they don't have a valid method which has established itself. When religious metaphysical claims are defended by claiming exclusion on part of the domination of empirical inquiry into the matter and invoke the dreaded word "scientism", they are simply setting up a fallacy of false dichotomy. One gets the sense the more important objective is simply to be able to use the dreaded "s" word in the argument, more for rhetorical purposes, even when it is not a true description of your opponent's position. And the exclusion of religious and metaphysical claims by an empirical inquiry into a domain most certainly does not constitute "scientism". Therefore, several things need to be made absolutely clear

1) An empirical inquiry into domains that the religious consider to be beyond an empirical and material explanation does not constitute "scientism". If said empirical inquiry returns a body of theoretical knowledge built upon a preponderance of observable and testable facts, then it is clear that the claim that this particular domain cannot be investigated in an empirical manner is false. This has happened many times in the history of science. Many fields today investigate and provide coherent explanations and predictions for phenomenon that were once considered shut from the domain of empirical inquiry, mostly because it was too limited at that time. It is now possible to study ethics in biology instead of philosophy. It is now impossible to study psychology without neuroscience, or human neuroscience without psychology.

2) The claim that empirical inquiry is excluding other forms of inquiry into concepts and ideas and that this constitutes "scientism" since it is acted on as if science was the only way to investigate said phenomenon is a useless red herring. The reality is, this essentially constitutes a one word argument to distract from the fact that there is no coherent method to gain a body of knowledge based on a preponderance of facts which can be gathered by virtue of employing our epistemological faculties with respect to numerous religious ideas which are claimed on no methodological basis whatsoever. Thus, those who employ the scientism argument are forced to rely on vague and incoherent terms such as "other methods" and "non-material" without ever clarifying what precisely they mean by these terms. In reality, whether or not your interlocutor or opponent considers empirical inquiry the only way of knowing is completely irrelevant. Only two things matter. 1) Where I am making knowledge claims, is the method by which I gather the preponderance of facts to support this able to actually support my knowledge claims? If not, why would I attack the investigations of a method that does as exclusionary? Science has the method capacity to make a set of coherent theories based on a preponderance of facts which explain and predict the nature of the relationship between the human brain and belief in God. There is no contradistinctive metaphysical method which would support the assertion that there is a non-material aspect to be studied. Hence, the claim that an empirical investigation into a field which should be "off limits" to empirical inquiry because it is "non-material" and those who think otherwise are following a "materialist religion" is a non sequitur. It is simply an insult juxtaposed against incoherent political rhetoric which covers up for two problems. The first is that there isn't a method for gaining knowledge of the supposed "non-material" aspect of the concepts under discussion to be excluded by empirical inquiry! The second is that it is completely meaningless to assert that your opponent is "assuming" materialism if his method does return a set of coherent theories based on a preponderance of observable fact used to explain and predict phenomenon! The entire argument constitutes a play with rhetoric and a red herring.

3) The claim "science is a religion" simply reveals the idiotic and boorish behaviour of those who wish to cover up for the fact that they have no coherent alternative method for investigating their metaphysical claims. The claim is a non sequitur using two rhetorical devices which take advantage of two common perceptions, one of which is good in my opinion, and the other is not. The first (which is good) is that the word "religion" has essentially become an insult in modern society (be assured that I do not lament this...). To say "this is your religion" is to insult whatever is under discussion. THe second (which is actually a problem) is that for most people, they consider "science" to be a mystical authority. This allows for the intellectual climate where the claim "science is your religion" can espace without the destruction it deserves. Most people think of science as a "body" of knowledge or claims. But this is not the case, sceince is much more than that. As I have said countless times, Science is a method of inquiry for gathering theories based on a preponderance of facts which explain and predict phenomenon. To assert that "science is a religion" is the height of vapid rhetoric. It does not constitute a valid method critique or rational judgement on whether an empirical inquiry into a certain idea is valid or not. The only reason anyone can get away with it is because of the way science is taught to our society, namely, as a set of disjointed facts about the world usually explained in overly simplistic language. These disjointed facts are taught without discussion about the methods, models, experimental and deductive basis for them being taught. Hence, for those who do not actually work in a scientific field performing scientific experiments, it becomes difficult to make a distinguishing between a scientific fact and a mystical authority. The notions of the scientific method, the experiments by which said ideas that we simply take for granted are gleaned, are never taught. It's like trying to teach mathematics without teaching the concept of proof. Could you imagine if a religious metaphysical idea made certain knowledge claims about the nature of the universe that could be investigated via pure mathematics, and the integrity of said ideas were defended by the notion that mathematical investigation into the matter is "exclusionary" to "religious method"? Or that "mathematics is your religion"? There is precisely no difference save for the way that science is percieved in society, and it is that which allows those who propogate the argument from scientism to get away with this intellectual madness. A method must be evaluated without such useless rhetorical nonsense. And indeed, it is perfectly possible to evaluate a proper empirical inquiry into the world. It's done all the time.

When there is a religious method for gaining a body of theoretical knowledge based on a preponderance of facts which can be gathered by employing human epistemological faculties, used to explain and predict non-material phenomenon in a coherent fashion, then maybe we can evaluate that too.