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Is materialism self-evident?
Posted on: August 31, 2008 - 5:26pm
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Is materialism self-evident?
Is materialism self-evident? Just wondering if this is the case.
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The idea of "self-evidency" is difficult enough by itself. How do we know when an idea is self-evident? Philosophers have seriously contested pretty much every idea you can think of, even Todangst's three axioms. On the other hand, different philosophers have argued that pretty much any idea you can think of IS self-evident. You can find thinkers who would say that the existence of God, the validity of animal rights, and/or the truth of altruism as an ethical theory are self-evident.
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I agree with you about the importance of predictions with correspondence theory of truth, that it NOT where I am disagreeing with you. (I've actually stated this several times now.) My point is just that the pragmatism you are talking about does not relate to pragmatic theory of truth. They are distinct. Pragmatism in of itself is just a method. Pragmatic theory of truth is a fully fledged truth theory. What you are talking about is NOT pragmatic theory of truth. The fact correspondence theory of truth relies on pragmatism (the method) does not mean it relates in any way to pragmatic theory of truth, let alone is inferior to it. The two are opposing theories of truth. Accepting the importance of pragmatism does not mean you are adhering to pragmatic theory of truth. That is what you do not seem to understand.
Even if you formulate a prediction-based theory of truth, it does not in any way mean this is the pragmatic theory of truth as it is known in philosophy, so surely you can see why it would be misleading to refer to this prediction theory of truth as a a pragmatic theory of truth.
"It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring" -- Carl Sagan
I never said it did, and have in fact repeatedly, and from the very beginning, distinguished what I'm talking about from so-called 'pragmatic theory of truth'. You are the one who keeps returning to this subject. Over and over. I have stated that the pragmatic theory of truth is obsolete, inadequate, prone to misunderstanding, and represents a Ford Model T and pragmatism 1.0. You have completely ignored my distinctions and kept coming back to the straw man.
Exactly. In fact, I gave you a name you can use to distinguish what I'm talking about from your so-called 'pragmatic theory of truth'. Epistemological pragmatism. Why don't you address what I'm actually talking about rather than what you think I'm talking about?
Again! Straw man. I never said any such thing. What I said is that in my epistemological pragmatism, truth means the ability to make predictions, and *this* idea of truth, not the vague 'pragmatic theory of truth', is what underlies correspondence.
What *you* don't seem to understand is that I never claimed I was adhering to your so-called 'pragmatic theory of truth'. I adhere to epistemological pragmatism. There is a difference. Do you get it now?
Please QUOTE me saying that my epistemological pragmatism should be equated with 'pragmatic theory of truth'. Please. When you fail to provide a quote, maybe we can move beyond this ridiculously stubborn straw man conception of yours.
What I HAVE said is that my idea of pragmatism as an epistemology is BASED on old ideas of 'pragmatic theory of truth', but is changed, evolved, improved from that, and so represents a flying car, a pragmatism version 101.7.
Maybe you just don't read my comments? Maybe I'm writing in French and think it's English.
Or maybe, just maybe, you have a preconceived notion of what I'm saying, and no matter how many words I use to explain what I'm actually saying, you project your preconceived notions onto what I write, and so fail to comprehend what I am actually saying. You are attacking a straw man.
And you still haven't addressed the idea of making predictions as truth. You haven't even begun to address my actual points. It's quite a disappointing exchange.
If you continue to accuse me of espousing 'pragmatic theory of truth', I'm not going to bother responding any further to this straw man.
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That there are material objects in the world that we interact with is evident by virtue of the fact that we have sensible experiences, but certainly not self-evident--at least not from a Kantian perspective. It's quite the opposite of self-evidence, actually. Material objects are the occasions through which we are able to have sensible experiences, but beyond our perception of such occasions, not much else can be said. Things get really sticky when we start to speak of objects in themselves a priori, or apart from our sensible relations to them. To do this with any accuracy, we'd either a) have to become the external objects of which we speak or b) the external objects would have to become us. So it really begins and ends with our perception of the purported "material world".
Regardless of perception and assuming material means something we can interact with somehow, asserting the opposite is self-contradictory. If some detect-ables are immaterial then they are not detectable. If some non-detect-ables are material then we cannot interact with them and thus they are not material. Since it is contradictory to assert the opposite, materialism is self-evident.
Umm, we are stuck in our place, where the material is all we can math model, while the immaterial is simply a yang of perception from our material observations, of not even non opposites. We are literally deaf and blind. My point is no more religion idol worship. Go science.
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