Exactly.

Just like I said in the Bipolar thread.

It's a cheap mindfcuk.

The scam artist's best friend.

If (A) I can make this coin disappear, then (B) you will know, that (C) magic is real.

A+B=C

I have just proved to you, magic is real!

Modal logic, my a**

The premise is retarded.

Complete non sequitur.

Completely circular reasoning. Translated it nakedly asserts, "if it exists, it's exists for a specific reason; It's needed. It's an absolute necessity. The universe would be unbalanced and would cease to function if it was absent."

Transposed "If a prime mover exists, then a prime mover is necessary"

Transposed again "If blowjobs exist, then blowjobs are necessary"

Transposed again "If diamonds exist, then diamonds are necessary"

Transposed again "If Coca-Cola exists, then Coca-Cola is necessary"

Transposed again "If malaria exists, then malaria is necessary"

Transposed again "If gum was on the bottom of my shoe, then gum on the bottom of my shoe was necessary"

WTF kind of sophisticated logic is that? 

Then'll they drone on and on about a 'perfectly tuned' universe.

What perfectly tuned universe do you see?

What perfectly tuned earth do you see?

How many species have gone extinct every since the earth began?

If they existed, they were 'necessary'?

Being born is necessary, so you can get dead?

1. If God necessarily exists, then there are no possible worlds containing eliminable evils. (from the actualization rule, the eliminability rule, and necessary existence)
2. There are possible worlds containing eliminable evils.
3. Therefore, God does not necessarily exist.

And from this we get our fourth ontological argument:

1. If God exists, then it is metaphysically necessary that he exist.
2. It is not metaphysically necessary that God exists. (from the previous 1-3)
3. Therefore, God does not exist.

The theist's least unpleasant option from all this is to discard all of the foundational premises of ontological arguments (such as necessary existence and/or modal axiom S5), or they must say that it is strictly impossible for worlds containing eliminable evils to exist (beyond being plainly untrue, since obviously there are possible worlds containing eliminable evils, this would require the theist to discard a substantial amount of Plantinga from God, Freedom, and Evil). Or the theist could just stop being a theist.

From Steven Carr

1) There is a possible world of only well-being (p). 

2) A capable limitless good being (x) knowing of this world (p) would actualize (necessarily) it over  possible worlds with evil and suffering (q).

3)x necessarily would not allow  q

4)p--> not q

5) It is possible that god is x

5)q --> not p

6) Our world=q

7)not p--->not x

7)not x

8)god= not x

 Our world entails there is no capable limitless good being. If there is a god he is not that being.

I emailed Dr. James F. Sennett about Mr. Metaphysic's ontological argument. He responded:

The logic is perfectly valid by S5, although the move from (1) to (2) is a little subtle. It's easier to show if we use a possibility operator (e.g., the diamond) in the place of ~N~.

The problem with this argument, as with all versions of the Ontological Argument, is with the first premise. As stated, it's actually weaker than Anselm's premise (if possibly God exists then necessarily God exists). However, it runs into the same kinds of problems. After studying many versions of the argument, I remain convinced that it is virtually impossible to argue for this key claim without begging the question. Also, there are very good arguments against the claim, one of which I have published myself.

So, how are things going?

--James

Recently, P. J. McGrath and James F. Sennett have independently argued that the OA lacks probative force in all, and perhaps all possible, versions. Although neither denies that the argument can be validly formulated, both endorse the claim that the argument begs the question at the crucial premise that states, in effect, that God is possible. Sennett, however, advances the further claim that the crucial premise, though perhaps not demonstrably false, is such that it is more rationally rejected than accepted. Thus Sennett maintains, not only that the OA begs the question at the crucial premise, but also that the crucial premise -- There is a possible world in which unsurpassable greatness is exemplified -- ought to be rejected by a reasonable person.

 I personally believe Mr Metaphysical is a miner, he goes underground for days at the time, has no internet access, and thinks about the next 'check mate atheists!" reply.  Then he comes up every week or so, types his metaphysical inconsistent mental diarrhea and then goes back underground.  I wonder what he's mining for?...  Interesting fellow, but low oxygen environments tend to kill a lot of braincells apparently.  Too bad, he had a better vocabulary then most other hit and run theists on this website.  My guess is that his posts will degenerate into incoherency as time progresses.  Or he may develop a multiple personality disorder and come back with a different account.  

That is part of my continued questioning...would anyone ever think of a hypothesis like this if they did not assume the existence of God beforehand?  I don't think it would ever happen, because it doesn't actually explain anything, it is just grasping at straws to support a belief that someone refuses to subject to falsification.

The major issue that I had since day one, was that he was defining god in his terms, then using said definition to form an argument to prove the definition.  It is the most basic circular reasoning... redneF's reaction seems the most sensitive in retrospect.  We all have given him too much respect.

A quote from the movie Seven comes to mind:

I hate to break your dick (I'm lying).

But you're a total fcuking moron. 

Your formula isn't worth the paper it's written on.

It just dawned on me why the whole fcuking thing was cognitively dissonant to me.

The answer was soooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo fcuking obvious. So easy to miss....

Let's start with some preface from you, so there's no room for ambiguity, from you.

These statements will haunt you....

This statement will haunt you....

That was your first mistake.

You agree with yourself, too much.

You agree with yourself, too much.

I guess that means there's an assumption made, or a presupposition, huh?

The reality is, that people who agree with themselves too much, make those all the time...

According to whom, was always my question to you.

You wouldn't answer, because you don't question yourself, enough.

You love to agree with yourself, too much.

According to whom?

Lemme guess...

So, you agree with yourself, that you are logical?

And you agree with yourself that logic is capable of distilling what's 'true' and what is not 'true'?

Let's see what logic can prove is 'true'....

Since you said it, you must accept, you must agree with yourself.

That would be logically consistent...

One that is inescapable.

Non sequitur.

Occam's Razor (you should get one, they're given to scientists, for free).

Translated:  Absence is not abscence.

That's not logical.

It's self refuting.

That's what you think.

Because you think 'inside the box'.

That's about the most logical thing you've ever said.

Some disambiguation  here, would be helpful to you, in your future (perhaps as an atheist ).

In order to properly test something, you need to remove everything superfluous, that could give you a false positive.

Sure.

Ready, there, Mr_Mega Dumbdick?

You assigned superfluous 'constraints'.

You anthropomorphised.

You assigned a 'material' constraint.

You arbitrarily presupposed that the answer is 'singular' in nature.

You arbitrarily assigned a finite constraint.

You arbitrarily presupposed that 'IT'  (a material thing) could NOT be more than 1.

You lose, big shot...

Hey, that's my line, except, I would change that to "Is that what took you a lifetime to conjure up?" 

You should care that you've bought into a 'False Positive'

I hope your parents didn't pay a lot of money for your Philosophy degree...

So, the question is:

If I can present a deductively valid argument whose premises are true and whose conclusion is 'God does NOT exist', then you have to accept that God does NOT exist--plain and simple.  You have no choice in this matter .

So, when are you going to throw in the towel?

Should we set up a party here, or what?...

Welcome to the 'Darkside', brother.

There is no God.

It was all just a fairy tale.

Beware of *cough* 'False Prophets'.

Edit: It just occurred to me, that BobSpence1, previously pointed out the 'IT' part, when he said "That's IT!"

Credit, where credit is due.

BobSpence1 (atheist) wins

Mr_Metaphor (theist) loses

There is NO sound argument for an IMMATERIAL GOD.

IT IS A LOGICAL FALLACY.

THE DEBATE IS OVER

THE DEBATE IS OVER

'Materiality' imposes some limits on possibility, but 'immateriality' imposes even more, such as no persistent coherent structure, necessary for complexity of organization or process.

This primitive intuitive prejudice against 'mere material' entities and substance is one of the core problems of metaphysical and related areas of speculation.

The assumption that a God exists in an 'immaterial' realm is unjustified and not helpful to establishing the reality of this conceptual entity.

Right.

You can't suck and blow, at the same time.

You can't have it both ways.

You cannot claim immaterial, and then assign any material 'properties' or 'values' to 'an absence of any matter'.

It's a complete non sequitur.

Self contradicting.

It's not 'workable'.

Right from the 'get go'.

The concept is a logical fallacy.

Nah, dude.

None taken.

Not at all.

I know.

Over the top.

I grew up on too much David Lee Roth, from Van Halen, I think...

As far as the god thing.......I really, truly have been a complete atheist my entire life.

I never really sat down to 'reconcile' why there could not be one, because it seemed so retarded, to begin with.

I can obviously give a ton of reasons why I think it's retarded, but none more logical than the one of the logical fallacy of the BASE PREMISE.

A timeless material/immaterial male god that made time and all material.......in the absence of material and the time to do it......exists...

Fcuk is that stoopid, that anyone could even fit that square peg into the round hole in their head...

Got it from the Nuge, Baby...

Take no prisoners

Go big, or go home!

The disparity you've created between normal and non-normal uses between 'possibility' is overstated--it really does not exist anywhere in any significant way, except maybe in your own mind.  You latch onto it here for no other reason than that you do not like the implications that my understanding has for this argument. The sense in which you are using the term only applies to temporal events; for example, if your friend asks 'Did the Steelers win the Super Bowl?' and you answer 'it's possible', you are referencing a temporal event that has passed and acknowledging that you do not know what happened. I'm using it in the divided sense, in order to make an actual statement about a theoretical notion that is temporally neutral--it would make absolutely no sense under this stipulation to say that modalities are epistemic; here, Abelard's understanding of modalities 'de re' is at the forefront, for to apply modal notions to beings is to actually say something about them.

You, sir, are really confused.  Do you know what a 'modal' term is?  It's merely a modifier of a statement.  So, for example, if I say 'Bob is really stupid', the auxiliary term 'really' suffices as a modal term.  There are various modal systems, including epistemic systems which contradict much of what you say here.  

You don't even understand what modal logic is, so why should I take you seriously here?

This is hardly a debate.  Do you have anything else?

Okay, this is just embarassing. Modal logic *is* propositional logic; the Lewis systems include axioms and theorems that are used in propositional logic. It may get a little more complicated when you get into Kripke semantics, but there is nothing in propositional logic that contradicts modal logic. Modal logic is merely the formalization of statements that are qualified, which happens to be a huge part of our discourse; the fact that you keep claiming that it's counterintuitive is laughable because Lewis formulated his systems precisely because he felt propositional logic led to counterintuitive things (see the paradox of material implication). Modal logic is merely propositional logic with the modal operators included, and different systems include special rules.

Modal epistemology does not stand or fall upon the capacity for empirical observation, and you will be hard pressed to find one metaphysician who agrees with you on this point. If, upon serious inquiry, you find no logical contradictions, then you are entirely justified in saying that something is possible; you are merely adhering to your own epistemological biases and applying them without qualification, which makes it even more difficult for me to take you seriously during this debate. If you are going to argue that the concept of God *may* be contradictory, then I will argue that the concept of a hot dog *may* be contradictory.

It's not a category error. God is defined according to his status as a maximally great being, such that God cannot be anything other than a maximally great being; otherwise, the being in question is not God. 'God' can be defined any way that we wish. If your objection is merely with the terminology, then simply let the phrase 'maximally great being' stand in for the term 'God'. This process can continue ad nauseum; it really does not amount to any valuable objection. The fact that the modal terms declaim upon the subject (see the Abelardian notion of modalities 'de re') does not preclude one from defining a being according to the attribute. At best, your objection amounts to: I don't like the consequences of defining God in this way; therefore, you cannot define God in this way.

I emailed Dr. James F. Sennett about Mr. Metaphysic's ontological argument. He responded:

The logic is perfectly valid by S5, although the move from (1) to (2) is a little subtle. It's easier to show if we use a possibility operator (e.g., the diamond) in the place of ~N~.

The problem with this argument, as with all versions of the Ontological Argument, is with the first premise. As stated, it's actually weaker than Anselm's premise (if possibly God exists then necessarily God exists). However, it runs into the same kinds of problems. After studying many versions of the argument, I remain convinced that it is virtually impossible to argue for this key claim without begging the question. Also, there are very good arguments against the claim, one of which I have published myself.

So, how are things going?

--James

Recently, P. J. McGrath and James F. Sennett have independently argued that the OA lacks probative force in all, and perhaps all possible, versions. Although neither denies that the argument can be validly formulated, both endorse the claim that the argument begs the question at the crucial premise that states, in effect, that God is possible. Sennett, however, advances the further claim that the crucial premise, though perhaps not demonstrably false, is such that it is more rationally rejected than accepted. Thus Sennett maintains, not only that the OA begs the question at the crucial premise, but also that the crucial premise -- There is a possible world in which unsurpassable greatness is exemplified -- ought to be rejected by a reasonable person.

Re: Your premise and the empirical :

1) There is a possible world of only well-being (p). 

2) A capable limitless good being (x) knowing of this world (p) would actualize (necessarily) it over  possible worlds with evil and suffering (q).

3)x necessarily would not allow  q

4)p--> not q

5) It is possible that god is x

5)q --> not p

6) Our world=q

7)not p--->not x

7)not x

8)god= not x

 Our world entails there is no capable limitless good being. If there is a god he is not that being.

My point pertained strictly to the reliability of modal intuitions.  Obviously, the possibility of a contingent existing thing cannot entail its actual existence., and I've granted that.  The chasm between concepts and reality is bridged, however, when we apply this reasoning to necessary things (mind you, Lewis's formalization of system S5 had no theistic underpinnings whatsoever; hence, this is not something invented for theism).  Modal statements cannot be modally qualified without dispositioning at least one of the operators.  Thus, your question should not be whether I can empirically demonstrate that God exists, but it should be whether or not God is actually possible; given the reliability of our modal intuitions as it pertains to, say, a six foot hot dog, I would have no problem applying this to God as well.

I don't follow you.

Again, I'm not quite following you.

The purpose of modal logic is to include a system for modally qualified statements which are an integral part of language.

In fact, it underlies all of logic; one of the first things that any introductory logic student is going to learn is the notion of deductive validity, according to which an argument is valid iff it is necessary that the conclusion follows from the premises.  Interestingly enough, Bob the idiot has been trying to sell us on the notion that 'normal possibility' and 'normal necessity' merely have epistemic implications; thus, it follows that conclusions must follow from the premises as far as we know--I wonder what logicians he can quote in support of this.

If a god was limitless, then it doesn't even follow, logically, that he would not simply create other peer 'entities'.

As it stands, the notion of a Christian god, is one that is jealous and insecure, and a host of other 'mental' illnesses.

And, he's not very fcuking bright. If it weren't for our own ingenuity, we possibly would have been eradicated by plagues, and superior predators.

The more 'they elaborate' on their idea of a monotheistic god, the more nonsensical it becomes.

And then you have dicks who come in posturing and spouting 'logic'. 

STFU already...

I initially challenged your S5 premise as being invalid in the context of ontological arguments. You're asserting that ~N~(G). But this, as I stated, requires a priori knowledge about what is and isn't possible in the actualized world. To assert something about all possible worlds and assume that actualized world is in this set of possible results in question begging. You've done nothing except prove your initial point. What's there to prevent me from saying, "~N~¬(G) --> ¬G" ? Under S5, this is valid, and necessarily true, and therefore a valid ontological argument for nonexistence. But I cannot know that without making a naked assertion that is not grounded except in speculative possible world. If the actualized world is a part of this set, it is only accidental.

Begging the question (or petitio principii, "assuming the initial point) is a type of logical fallacy in which the proposition to be proven is assumed implicitly or explicitly in the premise. The first known definition in the West is by the Greek philosopher Aristotle around 350 BC, in his book Prior Analytics, where he classified it as a material fallacy. Begging the question is related to the circular argument, circulus in probando (Latin, "circle in proving) or circular reasoning, though these are considered absolutely different by Aristotle.[1]

Begging the question is similar to the fallacy of many questions: a fallacy of technique that results from presenting evidence in support of a conclusion that is less likely to be accepted, rather than merely asserting the conclusion. A specific form of this is reducing an assertion to an instance of a more general assertion which is no more known to be true than the more specific assertion:

    * All intentional acts of killing human beings are morally wrong.
    * The death penalty is an intentional act of killing a human being.
    * Therefore the death penalty is wrong.

If the first premise is accepted as an axiom within some moral system or code, this reasoning is a cogent argument against the death penalty. If not, it is in fact a weaker argument than a mere assertion that the death penalty is wrong, since the first premise is stronger than the conclusion.

I don't like the S5 but it is apparently OK from asking around since this is not my forte.  It is the premise.  If this world is entailed empirical and other arguments obtain to it. I still think that the ontological argument in history was a way to ignore the theodicy problem as well as the free will vs determinism issue. 
 

Can someone please ban him?

At this point, his posts are just flooding the board.  

Have you ever heard of paragraphs, dude?

Is it really necessary to post like this?

Should I degenerate to your level and start insulting?

You are a doodie-head!

You are a stupid!

Nyah!

Nyah!

Nyah!

There is something wrong with you.

Your behavior is not normal.

Even other atheists on this board seem to find your behavior to be bizarre.

You don't have kids do you?

If you do, I presume that they are stuffed in your freezer.

You are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle, are you?

You do not live in the United States do you?

Moderators, BAN THIS GUY!  PLEASE!

HE JUST FLOODS THE BOARD, and HIS POSTS MAKE NO SENSE.  

You could do much better than this... seriously.  

Where did you find this psycho?
 

Mr. Metaphysics:

I've established that a priori knowledge of the actual world is not required.  So, all I can think of that you'd be left with is questioning the epistemic confidence we may place in the possibility premise.  Here, what you may be in a position to argue is that perhaps I am not in a position epistemically to affirm the possibility of God, to which I would respond that I am in a position epistemically to affirm that God is either possible or impossible; therefore, you need to account for the latter option.  Ultimately, you are doing nothing more than proclaiming that the possibility premise may be false; you need to show me what contradictions inhere in it.  If you cannot, then you are in no position to proclaim that the premise is false, and I am in a better rational position than you are. 

TGB: I think we would need account for either possible or impossible. You would need to account for the former.   Again I point to all the continued and unresolved discussions through out history about the premise.  I would contend that the theodicy issue makes it more plausible that it is impossible than possible. The issue is also not about just p or -p it is about the necessity. This presupposes a lot about the unfounded definition of god. It is possible that there is a capable good god that co-exists with creation that is  limited and that is more perfect than a limitless god that may well be a non-relative responsive principle rather than a person. That is to say there may be factors were limitlessness is less perfect than limitedness.  Again this gets into issues of types or constructs of gods and what satisfies goodness and freedom vs omnipotence or omniscience. 

The actual world is a member of a set of all possible worlds.  A good and capable god would necessarily insure the well-being of all.  A good and capable being would not allow evil or suffering. Suffering exists in this actual world  which is a member of those possible worlds.( if you really looked at it would cause you to swear and gasp).  There is no good and capable god. What is the next candidate for god? A loving and caring god that is limited and can't stop evil because of freedom?  That is to say god's omniscience is limited to allow freedom and therefore necessitates the possibility of evil.

I still don't completely understand the argument...............

Lol. This is an open forum, so anyone in the world with Internet access can get on. If redneF flames too much, then your best solution is probably to just ignore him. This forum very lenient with rudeness etc.

If you want, you could also start a conversation in the Kill 'em with Kindness sub-forum instead.

Plantinga makes the same mistake Anslem and Godal do. But appealing to him as an authority does not make an invalid premise valid. It just shows that you like fallacies.

I'm saying that you're making claims about possible worlds a priori. In other words, you're constructing worlds that may or may not exist. If you say that these are "maximal descriptions of realities" and assume the actual world is contained within one of these realities, then you're begging the question. Every ontological argument I've ever seen has this one critical flaw. There's nothing about your possible world scenarios that garantees that the actual world is contained in these realities.

But how do you know it's possible a priori without merely asserting it? The truth of the matter is that you don't, such that all you have then is a naked assertion. You premise, then, is no where close to being sound. But you have otherwise more or less admitted you have such knowledge, such that I have reason to believe you are making naked assertions. It is not my job to show that you don't have a priori knowledge, but rather your job to show me that you do. As many have pointed out, if such is the case, then based on if it is possible that p, then it is necessary that it is possible that p  any number of things become possible. But this is really not the problem.... it's the possible necessities that become problematic, and as I showed you, I could as easily propose an ontological argument for non-existence which is equally valid.

My assertion was that ontological argument that assumes a possible worlds scenario and assumes the actual world is part of this set of possible world is begging the question. Of course a priori knowledge isn't required if you assume to have such knowledge, but this just shows that you are making assertions about about the acutualized world, al biet indirectly through possible world scenario, and are really just question begging. If it has any bearing whatsoever on the actual world, it is accidental...not because it was show to be so. I'm not accounting for anything..that is the impossibility or possibility of a god's existence. I'm saying that the proposed system is fundamentally flawed such that the only thing it proves is what it assumes to be true already.

By virtue that you are doing this, you are basically admitting that your possible worlds scenarios include the actual world such that any a priori statement about the possible worlds scenario also applies to the actual world. This is merely asserting that the actual world is as you say it is. Any maximal description of reality can work in possible scenarios if I get to make up the worlds. But this isn't proving anything!

All I did was insert a ¬G where you inserted G. This is a valid substitution, such that it shows ¬G. I don't have to show that it is contradictory...only that the system you're using to prove such a concept is true is broken, which I have done so, unless you can show me how you're not begging the question, because as far as I can tell, you're assuming a whole lot and proving according to the assumptions. But as I said already, this proves only assumptions, and if it says anything about the actual world, it is merely accidental.